Risk Minimizing Option Pricing in a Semi-Markov Modulated Market

We address risk minimizing option pricing in a semi-Markov modulated market where the floating interest rate depends on a finite state semi-Markov process. The growth rate and the volatility of the stock also depend on the semi-Markov process. Using the Föllmer–Schweizer decomposition we find the locally risk minimizing price for European options and the corresponding hedging strategy. We develop suitable numerical methods for computing option prices.

Asymptotic analysis of option pricing in a Markov modulated market

We address asymptotic analysis of option pricing in a regime switching market where the risk free interest rate, growth rate and the volatility of the stocks depend on a finite state Markov chain. We study two variations of the chain namely, when the chain is moving very fast compared to the underlying asset price and when it is moving very slow. Using quadratic hedging and asymptotic expansion, we derive corrections on the locally risk minimizing option price.

A Shapley value analysis to coordinate the formation of procurement

In this paper we address the problem of forming procurement networks for items with value adding stages that are linearly arranged. Formation of such procurement networks involves a bottom-up assembly of complex production, assembly, and exchange relationships through supplier selection and contracting decisions. Recent research in supply chain management has emphasized that such decisions need to take into account the fact that suppliers and buyers are intelligent and rational agents who act strategically. In this paper, we view the problem of Procurement Network Formation (PNF) for multiple units of a single item as a cooperative game where agents cooperate to form a surplus maximizing procurement network and then share the surplus in a fair manner. We study the implications of using the Shapley value as a solution concept for forming such procurement networks. We also present a protocol, based on the extensive form game realization of the Shapley value, for forming these networks.

An optimal weighted-average congestion based pricing scheme for enhanced QoS

Pricing is an effective tool to control congestion and achieve quality of service (QoS) provisioning for multiple differentiated levels of service. In this paper, we consider the problem of pricing for congestion control in the case of a network of nodes under a single service class and multiple queues, and present a multi-layered pricing scheme. We propose an algorithm for finding the optimal state dependent price levels for individual queues, at each node. The pricing policy used depends on a weighted average queue length at each node. This helps in reducing frequent price variations and is in the spirit of the random early detection (RED) mechanism used in TCP/IP networks. We observe in our numerical results a considerable improvement in performance using our scheme over that of a recently proposed related scheme in terms of both throughput and delay performance. In particular, our approach exhibits a throughput improvement in the range of 34 to 69 percent in all cases studied (over all routes) over the above scheme.

Link route pricing for enhanced QoS

Pricing is an effective tool to control congestion and achieve quality of service (QoS) provisioning for multiple differentiated levels of service. In this paper, we consider the problem of pricing for congestion control in the case of a network of nodes under multiple service classes. Our work draws upon [1] and [2] in various ways. We use the Tirupati pricing scheme in conjunction with the stochastic approximation based adaptive pricing methodology for queue control (proposed in [1]) for minimizing network congestion. However, unlike the methodology of [1] where pricing for entire routes is directly considered, we consider prices for individual link-service grade tuples. Further, we adapt the methodology proposed in [21 for a single-node scenario to the case of a network of nodes, for evaluating performance in terms of price, revenue rate and disutility. We obtain considerable performance improvements using our approach over that in [1]. In particular, our approach exhibits a throughput improvement in the range of 54 to 80 percent in all cases studied (over all routes) while exhibiting a lower packet delay in the range of 26 to 38 percent over the scheme in [1].

The core and shapley value analysis for cooperative formation of procurement networks

Formation of high value procurement networks involves a bottom-up assembly of complex production, assembly, and exchange relationships through supplier selection and contracting decisions, where suppliers are intelligent and rational agents who act strategically. In this paper we address the problem of forming procurement networks for items with value adding stages that are linearly arranged We model the problem of Procurement Network Formation (PNF) for multiple units of a single item as a cooperative game where agents cooperate to form a surplus maximizing procurement network and then share the surplus in a stable and fair manner We first investigate the stability of such networks by examining the conditions under which the core of the game is non-empty. We then present a protocol, based on the extensive form game realization of the core, for forming such networks so that the resulting network is stable. We also mention a key result when the Shapley value is applied as a solution concept.

An efficient pricing based protocol for broadcasting in wireless ad hoc networks

In many applications of wireless ad hoc networks, wireless nodes are owned by rational and intelligent users. In this paper, we call nodes selfish if they are owned by independent users and their only objective is to maximize their individual goals. In such situations, it may not be possible to use the existing protocols for wireless ad hoc networks as these protocols assume that nodes follow the prescribed protocol without deviation. Stimulating cooperation among these nodes is an interesting and challenging problem. Providing incentives and pricing the transactions are well known approaches to stimulate cooperation. In this paper, we present a game theoretic framework for truthful broadcast protocol and strategy proof pricing mechanism called Immediate Predecessor Node Pricing Mechanism (IPNPM). The phrase strategy proof here means that truth revelation of cost is a weakly dominant-strategy (in game theoretic terms) for each node. In order to steer our mechanism-design approach towards practical implementation, we compute the payments to nodes using a distributed algorithm. We also propose a new protocol for broadcast in wireless ad hoc network with selfish nodes based on IPNPM. The features of the proposed broadcast protocol are reliability and a significantly reduced number of packet forwards compared to the number of network nodes, which in turn leads to less system-wide power consumption to broadcast a single packet. Our simulation results show the efficacy of the proposed broadcast protocol.

A Shapley Value-Based Approach to Discover Influential Nodes in Social Networks

Our study concerns an important current problem, that of diffusion of information in social networks. This problem has received significant attention from the Internet research community in the recent times, driven by many potential applications such as viral marketing and sales promotions. In this paper, we focus on the target set selection problem, which involves discovering a small subset of influential players in a given social network, to perform a certain task of information diffusion. The target set selection problem manifests in two forms: 1) top-k nodes problem and 2) lambda-coverage problem. In the top-k nodes problem, we are required to find a set of k key nodes that would maximize the number of nodes being influenced in the network. The lambda-coverage problem is concerned with finding a set of k key nodes having minimal size that can influence a given percentage lambda of the nodes in the entire network. We propose a new way of solving these problems using the concept of Shapley value which is a well known solution concept in cooperative game theory. Our approach leads to algorithms which we call the ShaPley value-based Influential Nodes (SPINs) algorithms for solving the top-k nodes problem and the lambda-coverage problem. We compare the performance of the proposed SPIN algorithms with well known algorithms in the literature. Through extensive experimentation on four synthetically generated random graphs and six real-world data sets (Celegans, Jazz, NIPS coauthorship data set, Netscience data set, High-Energy Physics data set, and Political Books data set), we show that the proposed SPIN approach is more powerful and computationally efficient. Note to Practitioners-In recent times, social networks have received a high level of attention due to their proven ability in improving the performance of web search, recommendations in collaborative filtering systems, spreading a technology in the market using viral marketing techniques, etc. It is well known that the interpersonal relationships (or ties or links) between individuals cause change or improvement in the social system because the decisions made by individuals are influenced heavily by the behavior of their neighbors. An interesting and key problem in social networks is to discover the most influential nodes in the social network which can influence other nodes in the social network in a strong and deep way. This problem is called the target set selection problem and has two variants: 1) the top-k nodes problem, where we are required to identify a set of k influential nodes that maximize the number of nodes being influenced in the network and 2) the lambda-coverage problem which involves finding a set of influential nodes having minimum size that can influence a given percentage lambda of the nodes in the entire network. There are many existing algorithms in the literature for solving these problems. In this paper, we propose a new algorithm which is based on a novel interpretation of information diffusion in a social network as a cooperative game. Using this analogy, we develop an algorithm based on the Shapley value of the underlying cooperative game. The proposed algorithm outperforms the existing algorithms in terms of generality or computational complexity or both. Our results are validated through extensive experimentation on both synthetically generated and real-world data sets.

Risk Minimizing Option Pricing for a Class of Exotic Options in a Markov-Modulated Market

We address risk minimizing option pricing in a regime switching market where the floating interest rate depends on a finite state Markov process. The growth rate and the volatility of the stock also depend on the Markov process. Using the minimal martingale measure, we show that the locally risk minimizing prices for certain exotic options satisfy a system of Black-Scholes partial differential equations with appropriate boundary conditions. We find the corresponding hedging strategies and the residual risk. We develop suitable numerical methods to compute option prices.

Determining Top K Nodes in Social Networks using the Shapley Value

In this paper, we consider the problem of selecting, for any given positive integer k, the top-k nodes in a social network, based on a certain measure appropriate for the social network. This problem is relevant in many settings such as analysis of co-authorship networks, diffusion of information, viral marketing, etc. However, in most situations, this problem turns out to be NP-hard. The existing approaches for solving this problem are based on approximation algorithms and assume that the objective function is sub-modular. In this paper, we propose a novel and intuitive algorithm based on the Shapley value, for efficiently computing an approximate solution to this problem. Our proposed algorithm does not use the sub-modularity of the underlying objective function and hence it is a general approach. We demonstrate the efficacy of the algorithm using a co-authorship data set from e-print arXiv (www.arxiv.org), having 8361 authors.

A Shapley Value Analysis to Coordinate the Formation of Procurement Networks

In this paper we address the problem of forming procurement networks for items with value adding stages that are linearly arranged. Formation of such procurement networks involves a bottom-up assembly of complex production, assembly, and exchange relationships through supplier selection and contracting decisions. Research in supply chain management has emphasized that such decisions need to take into account the fact that suppliers and buyers are intelligent and rational agents who act strategically. In this paper, we view the problem of procurement network formation (PNF) for multiple units of a single item as a cooperative game where agents cooperate to form a surplus maximizing procurement network and then share the surplus in a fair manner. We study the implications of using the Shapley value as a solution concept for forming such procurement networks. We also present a protocol, based on the extensive form game realization of the Shapley value, for forming these networks.

An optimal weighted-average congestion based pricing scheme for enhanced QoS, , LNCS 4882, 2007

Pricing is an effective tool to control congestion and achieve quality of service (QoS) provisioning for multiple differentiated levels of service. In this paper, we consider the problem of pricing for congestion control in the case of a network of nodes under a single service class and multiple queues, and present a multi-layered pricing scheme. We propose an algorithm for finding the optimal state dependent price levels for individual queues, at each node. The pricing policy used depends on a weighted average queue length at each node. This helps in reducing frequent price variations and is in the spirit of the random early detection (RED) mechanism used in TCP/IP networks. We observe in our numerical results a considerable improvement in performance using our scheme over that of a recently proposed related scheme in terms of both throughput and delay performance. In particular, our approach exhibits a throughput improvement in the range of 34 to 69 percent in all cases studied (over all routes) over the above scheme.

Pricing a Shared Access Link for Fair and Efficient Operation with Variable User Data Rates

The literature on pricing implicitly assumes an "infinite data" model, in which sources can sustain any data rate indefinitely. We assume a more realistic "finite data" model, in which sources occasionally run out of data; this leads to variable user data rates. Further, we assume that users have contracts with the service provider, specifying the rates at which they can inject traffic into the network. Our objective is to study how prices can be set such that a single link can be shared efficiently and fairly among users in a dynamically changing scenario where a subset of users occasionally has little data to send. User preferences are modelled by concave increasing utility functions. Further, we introduce two additional elements: a convex increasing disutility function and a convex increasing multiplicative congestion-penally function. The disutility function takes the shortfall (contracted rate minus present rate) as its argument, and essentially encourages users to send traffic at their contracted rates, while the congestion-penalty function discourages heavy users from sending excess data when the link is congested. We obtain simple necessary and sufficient conditions on prices for fair and efficient link sharing; moreover, we show that a single price for all users achieves this. We illustrate the ideas using a simple experiment.

Resource Pricing for Fair and Efficient Link Sharing with a Finite Data Model

The literature on pricing implicitly assumes an "infinite data" model, in which sources can sustain any data rate indefinitely. We assume a more realistic "finite data" model, in which sources occasionally run out of data. Further, we assume that users have contracts with the service provider, specifying the rates at which they can inject traffic into the network. Our objective is to study how prices can be set such that a single link can be shared efficiently and fairly among users in a dynamically changing scenario where a subset of users occasionally has little data to send. We obtain simple necessary and sufficient conditions on prices such that efficient and fair link sharing is possible. We illustrate the ideas using a simple example

Network pricing for QoS: A 'Regulation' approach

V. S. Borkar’s work was supported in part by grant number III.5(157)/99-ET from the Department of Science and Technology, Government of India. D. Manjunath’s work was supported in part by grant number 1(1)/2004-E-Infra from the Ministry of Information Technology, Government of India.