A Protocol for Authentication with Multiple Levels of Anonymity (AMLA) in VANETs

The basic requirements for secure communication in a vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) are anonymous authentication with source non-repudiation and integrity. The existing security protocols in VANETs do not differentiate between the anonymity requirements of different vehicles and the level of anonymity provided by these protocols is the same for all the vehicles in a network. To provide high level of anonymity, the resource requirements of security protocol would also be high. Hence, in a resource constrained VANET, it is necessary to differentiate between the anonymity requirements of different vehicles and to provide the level of anonymity to a vehicle as per its requirement. In this paper, we have proposed a novel protocol for authentication which can provide multiple levels of anonymity in VANETs. The protocol makes use of identity based signature mechanism and pseudonyms to implement anonymous authentication with source non-repudiation and integrity. By controlling the number of pseudonyms issued to a vehicle and the lifetime of each pseudonym for a vehicle, the protocol is able to control the level of anonymity provided to a vehicle. In addition, the protocol includes a novel pseudonym issuance policy using which the protocol can ensure the uniqueness of a newly generated pseudonym by checking only a very small subset of the set of pseudonyms previously issued to all the vehicles. The protocol cryptographically binds an expiry date to each pseudonym, and in this way, enforces an implicit revocation for the pseudonyms. Analytical and simulation results confirm the effectiveness of the proposed protocol.

Anonymous Authentication with Shared Secrets

Anonymity and authenticity are both important yet often conflicting security goals in a wide range of applications. On the one hand for many applications (say for access control) it is crucial to be able to verify the identity of a given legitimate party (a.k.a. entity authentication). Alternatively an application might require that no one but a party can communicate on its behalf (a.k.a. message authentication). Yet, on the other hand privacy concerns also dictate that anonymity of a legitimate party should be preserved; that is no information concerning the identity of parties should be leaked to an outside entity eavesdropping on the communication. This conflict becomes even more acute when considering anonymity with respect to an active entity that may attempt to impersonate other parties in the system. In this work we resolve this conflict in two steps. First we formalize what it means for a system to provide both authenticity and anonymity even in the presence of an active man-in-the-middle adversary for various specific applications such as message and entity authentication using the constructive cryptography framework of Mau11, MR11]. Our approach inherits the composability statement of constructive cryptography and can therefore be directly used in any higher-level context. Next we demonstrate several simple protocols for realizing these systems, at times relying on a new type of (probabilistic) Message Authentication Code (MAC) called key indistinguishable (KI) MACs. Similar to the key hiding encryption schemes of BBDP01] they guarantee that tags leak no discernible information about the keys used to generate them.