Popular Mixed Matchings

We study the problem of matching applicants to jobs under one-sided preferences: that is, each applicant ranks a non-empty subset of jobs under an order of preference, possibly involving ties. A matching M is said to be rnore popular than T if the applicants that prefer M to T outnumber those that prefer T to M. A matching is said to be popular if there is no matching more popular than it. Equivalently, a matching M is popular if phi(M,T) >= phi(T, M) for all matchings T, where phi(X, Y) is the number of applicants that prefer X to Y. Previously studied solution concepts based oil the popularity criterion are either not guaranteed to exist for every instance (e.g., popular matchings) or are NP-hard to compute (e.g., least unpopular matchings). This paper addresses this issue by considering mixed matchings. A mixed matching is simply a probability distributions over matchings in the input graph. The function phi that compares two matchings generalizes in a natural manner to mixed matchings by taking expectation. A mixed matching P is popular if phi(P,Q) >= phi(Q,P) for all mixed matchings Q. We show that popular mixed matchings always exist. and we design polynomial time algorithms for finding them. Then we study their efficiency and give tight bounds on the price of anarchy and price of stability of the popular matching problem.

A non-cooperative game-theoretic approach to channel assignment in multi-channel multi-radio wireless networks

Channel assignment in multi-channel multi-radio wireless networks poses a significant challenge due to scarcity of number of channels available in the wireless spectrum. Further, additional care has to be taken to consider the interference characteristics of the nodes in the network especially when nodes are in different collision domains. This work views the problem of channel assignment in multi-channel multi-radio networks with multiple collision domains as a non-cooperative game where the objective of the players is to maximize their individual utility by minimizing its interference. Necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for the channel assignment to be a Nash Equilibrium (NE) and efficiency of the NE is analyzed by deriving the lower bound of the price of anarchy of this game. A new fairness measure in multiple collision domain context is proposed and necessary and sufficient conditions for NE outcomes to be fair are derived. The equilibrium conditions are then applied to solve the channel assignment problem by proposing three algorithms, based on perfect/imperfect information, which rely on explicit communication between the players for arriving at an NE. A no-regret learning algorithm known as Freund and Schapire Informed algorithm, which has an additional advantage of low overhead in terms of information exchange, is proposed and its convergence to the stabilizing outcomes is studied. New performance metrics are proposed and extensive simulations are done using Matlab to obtain a thorough understanding of the performance of these algorithms on various topologies with respect to these metrics. It was observed that the algorithms proposed were able to achieve good convergence to NE resulting in efficient channel assignment strategies.

Popular mixed matchings

We study the problem of matching applicants to jobs under one-sided preferences; that is, each applicant ranks a non-empty subset of jobs under an order of preference, possibly involving ties. A matching M is said to be more popular than T if the applicants that prefer M to T outnumber those that prefer T to M. A matching is said to be popular if there is no matching more popular than it. Equivalently, a matching M is popular if phi(M, T) >= phi(T, M) for all matchings T, where phi(X, Y) is the number of applicants that prefer X to Y. Previously studied solution concepts based on the popularity criterion are either not guaranteed to exist for every instance (e.g., popular matchings) or are NP-hard to compute (e.g., least unpopular matchings). This paper addresses this issue by considering mixed matchings. A mixed matching is simply a probability distribution over matchings in the input graph. The function phi that compares two matchings generalizes in a natural manner to mixed matchings by taking expectation. A mixed matching P is popular if phi(P, Q) >= phi(Q, P) for all mixed matchings Q. We show that popular mixed matchings always exist and we design polynomial time algorithms for finding them. Then we study their efficiency and give tight bounds on the price of anarchy and price of stability of the popular matching problem. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Reproductive queue without overt conflict in the primitively eusocial wasp Ropalidia marginata

Colonies of the primitively eusocial wasp Ropalidia marginata consist of a single egg layer (queen) and a number of non-egg-laying workers. Although the queen is a docile individual, not at the top of the behavioral dominance hierarchy of the colony, she maintains complete reproductive monopoly. If the queen is lost or removed, one and only one of the workers potential queen (PQ)] becomes hyperaggressive and will become the next queen of the colony. The PQ is almost never challenged because she first becomes hyperaggressive and then gradually loses her aggression, develops her ovaries, and starts laying eggs. Although we are unable to identify the PQ when the queen is present, she appears to be a ``cryptic heir designate.'' Here, we show that there is not just one heir designate but a long reproductive queue and that PQs take over the role of egg-laying, successively, without overt conflict, as the queen or previous PQs are removed. The dominance rank of an individual is not a significant predictor of its position in the succession hierarchy. The age of an individual is a significant predictor, but it is not a perfect predictor because PQs often bypass older individuals to become successors. We suggest that such a predesignated reproductive queue that is implemented without overt conflict is adaptive in the tropics, where conspecific usurpers from outside the colony, which can take advantage of the anarchy prevailing in a queenless colony and invade it, are likely to be present throughout the year.