CSSP (Consensus Secondary Structure Prediction): a web-based server for structural biologists

Sequence-structure correlation studies are important in deciphering the relationships between various structural aspects, which may shed light on the protein-folding problem. The first step of this process is the prediction of secondary structure for a protein sequence of unknown three-dimensional structure. To this end, a web server has been created to predict the consensus secondary structure using well known algorithms from the literature. Furthermore, the server allows users to see the occurrence of predicted secondary structural elements in other structure and sequence databases and to visualize predicted helices as a helical wheel plot. The web server is accessible at http://bioserver1.physics.iisc.ernet.in/cssp/.

BSDD-2.0: Biomolecules Segment Display Device - An updated web accessible computing resource

The existing internet computing resource, Biomolecules Segment Display Device (BSDD), has been updated with several additional useful features. An advanced option is provided to superpose the structural motifs obtained from a search on the Protein Data Bank (PDB) in order to see if the three-dimensional structures adopted by identical or similar sequence motifs are the same. Furthermore, the options to display structural aspects like inter- and intra-molecular interactions, ion-pairs, disulphide bonds, etc. have been provided.The updated resource is interfaced with an up-to-date copy of the public domain PDB as well as 25 and 90% non-redundant protein structures. Further, users can upload the three-dimensional atomic coordinates (PDB format) from the client machine. A free molecular graphics program, JMol, is interfaced with it to display the three-dimensional structures.

An Optimal Mechanism for Sponsored Search Auctions on the Web and Comparison With Other Mechanisms

In this paper, we first describe a framework to model the sponsored search auction on the web as a mechanism design problem. Using this framework, we describe two well-known mechanisms for sponsored search auction-Generalized Second Price (GSP) and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG). We then derive a new mechanism for sponsored search auction which we call optimal (OPT) mechanism. The OPT mechanism maximizes the search engine's expected revenue, while achieving Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality of the advertisers. We then undertake a detailed comparative study of the mechanisms GSP, VCG, and OPT. We compute and compare the expected revenue earned by the search engine under the three mechanisms when the advertisers are symmetric and some special conditions are satisfied. We also compare the three mechanisms in terms of incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and computational complexity. Note to Practitioners-The advertiser-supported web site is one of the successful business models in the emerging web landscape. When an Internet user enters a keyword (i.e., a search phrase) into a search engine, the user gets back a page with results, containing the links most relevant to the query and also sponsored links, (also called paid advertisement links). When a sponsored link is clicked, the user is directed to the corresponding advertiser's web page. The advertiser pays the search engine in some appropriate manner for sending the user to its web page. Against every search performed by any user on any keyword, the search engine faces the problem of matching a set of advertisers to the sponsored slots. In addition, the search engine also needs to decide on a price to be charged to each advertiser. Due to increasing demands for Internet advertising space, most search engines currently use auction mechanisms for this purpose. These are called sponsored search auctions. A significant percentage of the revenue of Internet giants such as Google, Yahoo!, MSN, etc., comes from sponsored search auctions. In this paper, we study two auction mechanisms, GSP and VCG, which are quite popular in the sponsored auction context, and pursue the objective of designing a mechanism that is superior to these two mechanisms. In particular, we propose a new mechanism which we call the OPT mechanism. This mechanism maximizes the search engine's expected revenue subject to achieving Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality. Bayesian incentive compatibility guarantees that it is optimal for each advertiser to bid his/her true value provided that all other agents also bid their respective true values. Individual rationality ensures that the agents participate voluntarily in the auction since they are assured of gaining a non-negative payoff by doing so.