Nonneutral network and the role of bargaining power in side payments

Representatives of several Internet access providers have expressed their wish to see a substantial change in the pricing policies of the Internet. In particular, they would like to see content providers pay for use of the network, given the large amount of resources they use. This would be in clear violation of the �network neutrality� principle that had characterized the development of the wireline Internet. Our first goal in this paper is to propose and study possible ways of implementing such payments and of regulating their amount. We introduce a model that includes the internaut�s behavior, the utilities of the ISP and of the content providers, and the monetary flow that involves the internauts, the ISP and content provider, and in particular, the content provider�s revenues from advertisements. We consider various game models and study the resulting equilibrium; they are all combinations of a noncooperative game (in which the service and content providers determine how much they will charge the internauts) with a cooperative one - the content provider and the service provider bargain with each other over payments to one another. We include in our model a possible asymmetric bargaining power which is represented by a parameter (that varies between zero to one). We then extend our model to study the case of several content providers. We also provide a very brief study of the equilibria that arise when one of the content providers enters into an exclusive contract with the ISP.

Fuzzy Clustering Based Ad Recommendation for TV Programs

Advertisements(Ads) are the main revenue earner for Television (TV) broadcasters. As TV reaches a large audience, it acts as the best media for advertisements of products and services. With the emergence of digital TV, it is important for the broadcasters to provide an intelligent service according to the various dimensions like program features, ad features, viewers’ interest and sponsors’ preference. We present an automatic ad recommendation algorithm that selects a set of ads by considering these dimensions and semantically match them with programs. Features of the ad video are captured interms of annotations and they are grouped into number of predefined semantic categories by using a categorization technique. Fuzzy categorical data clustering technique is applied on categorized data for selecting better suited ads for a particular program. Since the same ad can be recommended for more than one program depending upon multiple parameters, fuzzy clustering acts as the best suited method for ad recommendation. The relative fuzzy score called “degree of membership” calculated for each ad indicates the membership of a particular ad to different program clusters. Subjective evaluation of the algorithm is done by 10 different people and rated with a high success score.

Truthful multi-armed bandit mechanisms for multi-slot sponsored search auctions

In pay-per-click sponsored search auctions which are currently extensively used by search engines, the auction for a keyword involves a certain number of advertisers (say k) competing for available slots (say m) to display their advertisements (ads for short). A sponsored search auction for a keyword is typically conducted for a number of rounds (say T). There are click probabilities mu(ij) associated with each agent slot pair (agent i and slot j). The search engine would like to maximize the social welfare of the advertisers, that is, the sum of values of the advertisers for the keyword. However, the search engine does not know the true values advertisers have for a click to their respective advertisements and also does not know the click probabilities. A key problem for the search engine therefore is to learn these click probabilities during the initial rounds of the auction and also to ensure that the auction mechanism is truthful. Mechanisms for addressing such learning and incentives issues have recently been introduced. These mechanisms, due to their connection to the multi-armed bandit problem, are aptly referred to as multi-armed bandit (MAB) mechanisms. When m = 1, exact characterizations for truthful MAB mechanisms are available in the literature. Recent work has focused on the more realistic but non-trivial general case when m > 1 and a few promising results have started appearing. In this article, we consider this general case when m > 1 and prove several interesting results. Our contributions include: (1) When, mu(ij)s are unconstrained, we prove that any truthful mechanism must satisfy strong pointwise monotonicity and show that the regret will be Theta T7) for such mechanisms. (2) When the clicks on the ads follow a certain click precedence property, we show that weak pointwise monotonicity is necessary for MAB mechanisms to be truthful. (3) If the search engine has a certain coarse pre-estimate of mu(ij) values and wishes to update them during the course of the T rounds, we show that weak pointwise monotonicity and type-I separatedness are necessary while weak pointwise monotonicity and type-II separatedness are sufficient conditions for the MAB mechanisms to be truthful. (4) If the click probabilities are separable into agent-specific and slot-specific terms, we provide a characterization of MAB mechanisms that are truthful in expectation.

CAVVA: Computational Affective Video-in-Video Advertising

Advertising is ubiquitous in the online community and more so in the ever-growing and popular online video delivery websites (e. g., YouTube). Video advertising is becoming increasingly popular on these websites. In addition to the existing pre-roll/post-roll advertising and contextual advertising, this paper proposes an in-stream video advertising strategy-Computational Affective Video-in-Video Advertising (CAVVA). Humans being emotional creatures are driven by emotions as well as rational thought. We believe that emotions play a major role in influencing the buying behavior of users and hence propose a video advertising strategy which takes into account the emotional impact of the videos as well as advertisements. Given a video and a set of advertisements, we identify candidate advertisement insertion points (step 1) and also identify the suitable advertisements (step 2) according to theories from marketing and consumer psychology. We formulate this two part problem as a single optimization function in a non-linear 0-1 integer programming framework and provide a genetic algorithm based solution. We evaluate CAVVA using a subjective user-study and eye-tracking experiment. Through these experiments, we demonstrate that CAVVA achieves a good balance between the following seemingly conflicting goals of (a) minimizing the user disturbance because of advertisement insertion while (b) enhancing the user engagement with the advertising content. We compare our method with existing advertising strategies and show that CAVVA can enhance the user's experience and also help increase the monetization potential of the advertising content.

Regulation of Off-Network Pricing in a Nonneutral Network

Representatives of several Internet service providers (ISPs) have expressed their wish to see a substantial change in the pricing policies of the Internet. In particular, they would like to see content providers (CPs) pay for use of the network, given the large amount of resources they use. This would be in clear violation of the ``network neutrality'' principle that had characterized the development of the wireline Internet. Our first goal in this article is to propose and study possible ways of implementing such payments and of regulating their amount. We introduce a model that includes the users' behavior, the utilities of the ISP and of the CPs, and, the monetary flow that involves the content users, the ISP and CP, and, in pUrticular, the CP's revenues from advertisements. We consider various game models and study the resulting equilibria; they are all combinations of a noncooperative game (in which the ISPs and CPs determine how much they will charge the users) with a ``cooperative'' one on how the CP and the ISP share the payments. We include in our model a possible asymmetric weighting parameter (that varies between zero to one). We also study equilibria that arise when one of the CPs colludes with the TSP. We also study two dynamic game models as well as the convergence of prices to the equilibrium values.

Accelerating Information Diffusion in Social Networks Under the Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible Epidemic Model

Standard Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) epidemic models assume that a message spreads from the infected to the susceptible nodes due to only susceptible-infected epidemic contact. We modify the standard SIS epidemic model to include direct recruitment of susceptible individuals to the infected class at a constant rate (independent of epidemic contacts), to accelerate information spreading in a social network. Such recruitment can be carried out by placing advertisements in the media. We provide a closed form analytical solution for system evolution in the proposed model and use it to study campaigning in two different scenarios. In the first, the net cost function is a linear combination of the reward due to extent of information diffusion and the cost due to application of control. In the second, the campaign budget is fixed. Results reveal the effectiveness of the proposed system in accelerating and improving the extent of information diffusion. Our work is useful for devising effective strategies for product marketing and political/social-awareness/crowd-funding campaigns that target individuals in a social network.