Optimal maintenance policy for equipment subject to random deterioration and random failure A modern control theory approach.

The stochastic version of Pontryagin's maximum principle is applied to determine an optimal maintenance policy of equipment subject to random deterioration. The deterioration of the equipment with age is modelled as a random process. Next the model is generalized to include random catastrophic failure of the equipment. The optimal maintenance policy is derived for two special probability distributions of time to failure of the equipment, namely, exponential and Weibull distributions Both the salvage value and deterioration rate of the equipment are treated as state variables and the maintenance as a control variable. The result is illustrated by an example

Adsorption of Nitrogen on Activated Carbon-Refit of Experimental Data and Derivation of Properties Required for Design of Equipment

Volumetric method based adsorption measurements of nitrogen on two specimens of activated carbon (Fluka and Sarabhai) reported by us are refitted to two popular isotherms, namely, Dubunin−Astakhov (D−A) and Toth, in light of improved fitting methods derived recently. Those isotherms have been used to derive other data of relevance in design of engineering equipment such as the concentration dependence of heat of adsorption and Henry’s law coefficients. The present fits provide a better representation of experimental measurements than before because the temperature dependence of adsorbed phase volume and structural heterogeneity of micropore distribution have been accounted for in the D−A equation. A new correlation to the Toth equation is a further contribution. The heat of adsorption in the limiting uptake condition is correlated with the Henry’s law coefficients at the near zero uptake condition.

An efficient pricing based protocol for broadcasting in wireless ad hoc networks

In many applications of wireless ad hoc networks, wireless nodes are owned by rational and intelligent users. In this paper, we call nodes selfish if they are owned by independent users and their only objective is to maximize their individual goals. In such situations, it may not be possible to use the existing protocols for wireless ad hoc networks as these protocols assume that nodes follow the prescribed protocol without deviation. Stimulating cooperation among these nodes is an interesting and challenging problem. Providing incentives and pricing the transactions are well known approaches to stimulate cooperation. In this paper, we present a game theoretic framework for truthful broadcast protocol and strategy proof pricing mechanism called Immediate Predecessor Node Pricing Mechanism (IPNPM). The phrase strategy proof here means that truth revelation of cost is a weakly dominant-strategy (in game theoretic terms) for each node. In order to steer our mechanism-design approach towards practical implementation, we compute the payments to nodes using a distributed algorithm. We also propose a new protocol for broadcast in wireless ad hoc network with selfish nodes based on IPNPM. The features of the proposed broadcast protocol are reliability and a significantly reduced number of packet forwards compared to the number of network nodes, which in turn leads to less system-wide power consumption to broadcast a single packet. Our simulation results show the efficacy of the proposed broadcast protocol.