Bit Steering In The Minimization Of Control Memory In Microprogrammed Digital-Computers

This correspondence presents an algorithm for microprogram control memory width minimization with the bit steering technique. The necessary and sufficient conditions to detect the steerability of two mutually exclusive sets of microcommands are established. The algorithm encodes the microcommands of the sets with a bit steering common part and also extends the theory to multiple (more than two) sets of microcommands.

Register Allocation and Optimal Spill code Scheduling in Software Pipelined Loops using 0-1 Integer Linear Programming Formulation

In achieving higher instruction level parallelism, software pipelining increases the register pressure in the loop. The usefulness of the generated schedule may be restricted to cases where the register pressure is less than the available number of registers. Spill instructions need to be introduced otherwise. But scheduling these spill instructions in the compact schedule is a difficult task. Several heuristics have been proposed to schedule spill code. These heuristics may generate more spill code than necessary, and scheduling them may necessitate increasing the initiation interval. We model the problem of register allocation with spill code generation and scheduling in software pipelined loops as a 0-1 integer linear program. The formulation minimizes the increase in initiation interval (II) by optimally placing spill code and simultaneously minimizes the amount of spill code produced. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first integrated formulation for register allocation, optimal spill code generation and scheduling for software pipelined loops. The proposed formulation performs better than the existing heuristics by preventing an increase in II in 11.11% of the loops and generating 18.48% less spill code on average among the loops extracted from Perfect Club and SPEC benchmarks with a moderate increase in compilation time.

Incentive compatible mechanisms for group ticket allocation in software maintenance services

A customer reported problem (or Trouble Ticket) in software maintenance is typically solved by one or more maintenance engineers. The decision of allocating the ticket to one or more engineers is generally taken by the lead, based on customer delivery deadlines and a guided complexity assessment from each maintenance engineer. The key challenge in such a scenario is two folds, un-truthful (hiked up) elicitation of ticket complexity by each engineer to the lead and the decision of allocating the ticket to a group of engineers who will solve the ticket with in customer deadline. The decision of allocation should ensure Individual and Coalitional Rationality along with Coalitional Stability. In this paper we use game theory to examine the issue of truthful elicitation of ticket complexities by engineers for solving ticket as a group given a specific customer delivery deadline. We formulate this problem as strategic form game and propose two mechanisms, (1) Division of Labor (DOL) and (2) Extended Second Price (ESP). In the proposed mechanisms we show that truth telling by each engineer constitutes a Dominant Strategy Nash Equilibrium of the underlying game. Also we analyze the existence of Individual Rationality (IR) and Coalitional Rationality (CR) properties to motivate voluntary and group participation. We use Core, solution concept from co-operative game theory to analyze the stability of the proposed group based on the allocation and payments.