Stochastic differential games: Occupation measure based approach

A new approach based on occupation measures is introduced for studying stochastic differential games. For two-person zero-sum games, the existence of values and optimal strategies for both players is established for various payoff criteria. ForN-person games, the existence of equilibria in Markov strategies is established for various cases.

Survival of the fittest and zero sum games

Competition for available resources is natural amongst coexisting species, and the fittest contenders dominate over the rest in evolution. The. dynamics of this selection is studied using a simple linear model. It has similarities to features of quantum computation, in particular conservation laws leading to destructive interference. Compared to an altruistic scenario, competition introduces instability and eliminates the weaker species in a finite time.

Provider-Customer Coalitional Games

Efficacy of commercial wireless networks can be substantially enhanced through large-scale cooperation among involved entities such as providers and customers. The success of such cooperation is contingent upon the design of judicious resource allocation strategies that ensure that the individuals' payoffs are commensurate to the resources they offer to the coalition. The resource allocation strategies depend on which entities are decision-makers and whether and how they share their aggregate payoffs. Initially, we consider the scenario where the providers are the only decision-makers and they do not share their payoffs. We formulate the resource allocation problem as a nontransferable payoff coalitional game and show that there exists a cooperation strategy that leaves no incentive for any subset of providers to split from the grand coalition, i.e., the core of the game is nonempty. To compute this cooperation strategy and the corresponding payoffs, we subsequently relate this game and its core to an exchange market setting and its equilibrium, which can be computed by several efficient algorithms. Next, we investigate cooperation when customers are also decision-makers and decide which provider to subscribe to based on whether there is cooperation. We formulate a coalitional game in this setting and show that it has a nonempty core. Finally, we extend the formulations and results to the cases where the payoffs are vectors and can be shared selectively.

The role of surface texture on friction and transfer layer formation during repeated sliding of Al-4Mg against steel

In the present investigation, various kinds of textures, namely, unidirectional, 8-ground, and random were attained on the die surfaces. Roughness of the textures was varied using different grits of emery papers or polishing powders. Then pins made of Al-4Mg alloys were slid against steel plates at various numbers of cycles, namely, 1, 3, 5, 10 and 20 using pin-on-plate reciprocating sliding tester. Tests were conducted at a sliding velocity of 2 minis in ambient conditions under both dry and lubricated conditions. A constant normal load of 35 N was applied in the tests. The morphologies of the worn surfaces of the pins and the formation of transfer layer on the counter surfaces were observed using a scanning electron microscope. Surface roughness parameters of the plates were measured using an optical profilometer. In the experiments, it was observed that the coefficient of friction and formation of the transfer layer depend on the die surface textures under both dry and lubricated conditions. More specifically, the coefficient of friction decreases for unidirectional and 8-ground surfaces while for random surfaces it increases with number of cycles. However, the coefficient of friction is highest for the sliding perpendicular to the unidirectional textures and least for the random textures under both dry and lubricated conditions. The difference in friction values between these two surfaces decreases with increasing number of cycles. The variation in the coefficient of friction under both dry and lubrication conditions is attributed to the change in texture of the surfaces during sliding. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Zero-Sum Risk-Sensitive Stochastic Differential Games

We study zero-sum risk-sensitive stochastic differential games on the infinite horizon with discounted and ergodic payoff criteria. Under certain assumptions, we establish the existence of values and saddle-point equilibria. We obtain our results by studying the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equations. Finally, we show that the value of the ergodic payoff criterion is a constant multiple of the maximal eigenvalue of the generators of the associated nonlinear semigroups.

Existence of Value in Stochastic Differential Games of Mixed Type

In this article, we address stochastic differential games of mixed type with both control and stopping times. Under standard assumptions, we show that the value of the game can be characterized as the unique viscosity solution of corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI) variational inequalities.

General-sum stochastic games: Verifiability conditions for Nash equilibria

Unlike zero-sum stochastic games, a difficult problem in general-sum stochastic games is to obtain verifiable conditions for Nash equilibria. We show in this paper that by splitting an associated non-linear optimization problem into several sub-problems, characterization of Nash equilibria in a general-sum discounted stochastic games is possible. Using the aforementioned sub-problems, we in fact derive a set of necessary and sufficient verifiable conditions (termed KKT-SP conditions) for a strategy-pair to result in Nash equilibrium. Also, we show that any algorithm which tracks the zero of the gradient of the Lagrangian of every sub-problem provides a Nash strategy-pair. (c) 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Spatial SINR Games of Base Station Placement and Mobile Association

We study the question of determining locations of base stations (BSs) that may belong to the same or to competing service providers. We take into account the impact of these decisions on the behavior of intelligent mobile terminals that can connect to the base station that offers the best utility. The signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) is used as the quantity that determines the association. We first study the SINR association-game: We determine the cells corresponding to each base stations, i.e., the locations at which mobile terminals prefer to connect to a given base station than to others. We make some surprising observations: 1) displacing a base station a little in one direction may result in a displacement of the boundary of the corresponding cell to the opposite direction; 2) a cell corresponding to a BS may be the union of disconnected subcells. We then study the hierarchical equilibrium in the combined BS location and mobile association problem: We determine where to locate the BSs so as to maximize the revenues obtained at the induced SINR mobile association game. We consider the cases of single frequency band and two frequency bands of operation. Finally, we also consider hierarchical equilibria in two frequency systems with successive interference cancellation.

Zero-sum risk-sensitive stochastic games on a countable state space

Infinite horizon discounted-cost and ergodic-cost risk-sensitive zero-sum stochastic games for controlled Markov chains with countably many states are analyzed. Upper and lower values for these games are established. The existence of value and saddle-point equilibria in the class of Markov strategies is proved for the discounted-cost game. The existence of value and saddle-point equilibria in the class of stationary strategies is proved under the uniform ergodicity condition for the ergodic-cost game. The value of the ergodic-cost game happens to be the product of the inverse of the risk-sensitivity factor and the logarithm of the common Perron-Frobenius eigenvalue of the associated controlled nonlinear kernels. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Zero-Sum Stochastic Games with Partial Information and Average Payoff

We consider a discrete time partially observable zero-sum stochastic game with average payoff criterion. We study the game using an equivalent completely observable game. We show that the game has a value and also we present a pair of optimal strategies for both the players.

Detection of a quantum particle on a lattice under repeated projective measurements

We consider a quantum particle, moving on a lattice with a tight-binding Hamiltonian, which is subjected to measurements to detect its arrival at a particular chosen set of sites. The projective measurements are made at regular time intervals tau, and we consider the evolution of the wave function until the time a detection occurs. We study the probabilities of its first detection at some time and, conversely, the probability of it not being detected (i.e., surviving) up to that time. We propose a general perturbative approach for understanding the dynamics which maps the evolution operator, which consists of unitary transformations followed by projections, to one described by a non-Hermitian Hamiltonian. For some examples of a particle moving on one-and two-dimensional lattices with one or more detection sites, we use this approach to find exact expressions for the survival probability and find excellent agreement with direct numerical results. A mean-field model with hopping between all pairs of sites and detection at one site is solved exactly. For the one-and two-dimensional systems, the survival probability is shown to have a power-law decay with time, where the power depends on the initial position of the particle. Finally, we show an interesting and nontrivial connection between the dynamics of the particle in our model and the evolution of a particle under a non-Hermitian Hamiltonian with a large absorbing potential at some sites.