A game theoretical multiple resource interaction approach to resource allocation in an air campaign

In this paper we propose a multiple resource interaction model in a game-theoretical framework to solve resource allocation problems in theater level military campaigns. An air raid campaign using SEAD aircraft and bombers against an enemy target defended by air defense units is considered as the basic platform. Conditions for the existence of saddle point in pure strategies is proved and explicit feedback strategies are obtained for a simplified model with linear attrition function limited by resource availability. An illustrative example demonstrates the key features.

A Coalitional Game Framework for Cooperative Secondary Spectrum Access

We consider a framework in which several service providers offer downlink wireless data access service in a certain area. Each provider serves its end-users through opportunistic secondary spectrum access of licensed spectrum, and needs to pay primary license holders of the spectrum usage based and membership based charges for such secondary spectrum access. In these circumstances, if providers pool their resources and allow end-users to be served by any of the cooperating providers, the total user satisfaction as well as the aggregate revenue earned by providers may increase. We use coalitional game theory to investigate such cooperation among providers, and show that the optimal cooperation schemes can be obtained as solutions of convex optimizations. We next show that under usage based charging scheme, if all providers cooperate, there always exists an operating point that maximizes the aggregate revenue of providers, while presenting each provider a share of the revenue such that no subset of providers has an incentive to leave the coalition. Furthermore, such an operating point can be computed in polynomial time. Finally, we show that when the charging scheme involves membership based charges, the above result holds in important special cases.

A Coalition game model for spectrum pooling in wireless data access networks

We consider a setting in which several operators offer downlink wireless data access services in a certain geographical region. Each operator deploys several base stations or access points, and registers some subscribers. In such a situation, if operators pool their infrastructure, and permit the possibility of subscribers being served by any of the cooperating operators, then there can be overall better user satisfaction, and increased operator revenue. We use coalitional game theory to investigate such resource pooling and cooperation between operators.We use utility functions to model user satisfaction, and show that the resulting coalitional game has the property that if all operators cooperate (i.e., form a grand coalition) then there is an operating point that maximizes the sum utility over the operators while providing the operators revenues such that no subset of operators has an incentive to break away from the coalition. We investigate whether such operating points can result in utility unfairness between users of the various operators. We also study other revenue sharing concepts, namely, the nucleolus and the Shapely value. Such investigations throw light on criteria for operators to accept or reject subscribers, based on the service level agreements proposed by them. We also investigate the situation in which only certain subsets of operators may be willing to cooperate.

A resource based game theoretical model for military conflicts

A resource interaction based game theoretical model for military conflicts is presented in this paper. The model includes both the spatial decision capability of adversaries (decision regarding movement and subsequent distribution of resources) as well as their temporal decision capability (decision regarding level of allocation of resources for conflict with adversary’s resources). Attrition is decided at present by simple deterministic models. An additional feature of this model is the inclusion of the possibility of a given resource interacting with several resources of the adversary.The decisions of the adversaries is determined by solving for the equilibrium Nash strategies given that the objectives of the adversaries may not be in direct conflict. Examples are given to show the applicability of these models and solution concepts.

The role of surface texture on friction and transfer layer formation during repeated sliding of Al-4Mg against steel

In the present investigation, various kinds of textures, namely, unidirectional, 8-ground, and random were attained on the die surfaces. Roughness of the textures was varied using different grits of emery papers or polishing powders. Then pins made of Al-4Mg alloys were slid against steel plates at various numbers of cycles, namely, 1, 3, 5, 10 and 20 using pin-on-plate reciprocating sliding tester. Tests were conducted at a sliding velocity of 2 minis in ambient conditions under both dry and lubricated conditions. A constant normal load of 35 N was applied in the tests. The morphologies of the worn surfaces of the pins and the formation of transfer layer on the counter surfaces were observed using a scanning electron microscope. Surface roughness parameters of the plates were measured using an optical profilometer. In the experiments, it was observed that the coefficient of friction and formation of the transfer layer depend on the die surface textures under both dry and lubricated conditions. More specifically, the coefficient of friction decreases for unidirectional and 8-ground surfaces while for random surfaces it increases with number of cycles. However, the coefficient of friction is highest for the sliding perpendicular to the unidirectional textures and least for the random textures under both dry and lubricated conditions. The difference in friction values between these two surfaces decreases with increasing number of cycles. The variation in the coefficient of friction under both dry and lubrication conditions is attributed to the change in texture of the surfaces during sliding. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

A game theoretic approach for feature clustering and its application to feature selection

In this paper, we develop a game theoretic approach for clustering features in a learning problem. Feature clustering can serve as an important preprocessing step in many problems such as feature selection, dimensionality reduction, etc. In this approach, we view features as rational players of a coalitional game where they form coalitions (or clusters) among themselves in order to maximize their individual payoffs. We show how Nash Stable Partition (NSP), a well known concept in the coalitional game theory, provides a natural way of clustering features. Through this approach, one can obtain some desirable properties of the clusters by choosing appropriate payoff functions. For a small number of features, the NSP based clustering can be found by solving an integer linear program (ILP). However, for large number of features, the ILP based approach does not scale well and hence we propose a hierarchical approach. Interestingly, a key result that we prove on the equivalence between a k-size NSP of a coalitional game and minimum k-cut of an appropriately constructed graph comes in handy for large scale problems. In this paper, we use feature selection problem (in a classification setting) as a running example to illustrate our approach. We conduct experiments to illustrate the efficacy of our approach.

Pattern clustering using cooperative game theory

In this paper, we approach the classical problem of clustering using solution concepts from cooperative game theory such as Nucleolus and Shapley value. We formulate the problem of clustering as a characteristic form game and develop a novel algorithm DRAC (Density-Restricted Agglomerative Clustering) for clustering. With extensive experimentation on standard data sets, we compare the performance of DRAC with that of well known algorithms. We show an interesting result that four prominent solution concepts, Nucleolus, Shapley value, Gately point and \tau-value coincide for the defined characteristic form game. This vindicates the choice of the characteristic function of the clustering game and also provides strong intuitive foundation for our approach.

Game theoretic, decentralized, local information based algorithm for community detection in social graphs

Motivated by the observation that communities in real world social networks form due to actions of rational individuals in networks, we propose a novel game theory inspired algorithm to determine communities in networks. The algorithm is decentralized and only uses local information at each node. We show the efficacy of the proposed algorithm through extensive experimentation on several real world social network data sets.

Sustaining cooperation on networks: an analytical study based on evolutionary game theory

We analytically study the role played by the network topology in sustaining cooperation in a society of myopic agents in an evolutionary setting. In our model, each agent plays the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game with its neighbors, as specified by a network. Cooperation is the incumbent strategy, whereas defectors are the mutants. Starting with a population of cooperators, some agents are switched to defection. The agents then play the PD game with their neighbors and compute their fitness. After this, an evolutionary rule, or imitation dynamic is used to update the agent strategy. A defector switches back to cooperation if it has a cooperator neighbor with higher fitness. The network is said to sustain cooperation if almost all defectors switch to cooperation. Earlier work on the sustenance of cooperation has largely consisted of simulation studies, and we seek to complement this body of work by providing analytical insight for the same. We find that in order to sustain cooperation, a network should satisfy some properties such as small average diameter, densification, and irregularity. Real-world networks have been empirically shown to exhibit these properties, and are thus candidates for the sustenance of cooperation. We also analyze some specific graphs to determine whether or not they sustain cooperation. In particular, we find that scale-free graphs belonging to a certain family sustain cooperation, whereas Erdos-Renyi random graphs do not. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first analytical attempt to determine which networks sustain cooperation in a population of myopic agents in an evolutionary setting.

Game theoretic analysis of collusions in nonneutral networks

This paper studies the impact of exclusive contracts between a content provider (CP) and an internet service provider (ISP) in a nonneutral network. We consider a simple linear demand function for the CPs. We studywhen an exclusive contract is benefcial to the colluding pair and evaluate its impact on the noncolluding players at equilibrium. For the case of two CPs and one ISP we show that collusion may not always be benefcial. We derive an explicit condition in terms of the advertisement revenues of the CPs that tells when a collusion is proftable to the colluding entities.

Detection of a quantum particle on a lattice under repeated projective measurements

We consider a quantum particle, moving on a lattice with a tight-binding Hamiltonian, which is subjected to measurements to detect its arrival at a particular chosen set of sites. The projective measurements are made at regular time intervals tau, and we consider the evolution of the wave function until the time a detection occurs. We study the probabilities of its first detection at some time and, conversely, the probability of it not being detected (i.e., surviving) up to that time. We propose a general perturbative approach for understanding the dynamics which maps the evolution operator, which consists of unitary transformations followed by projections, to one described by a non-Hermitian Hamiltonian. For some examples of a particle moving on one-and two-dimensional lattices with one or more detection sites, we use this approach to find exact expressions for the survival probability and find excellent agreement with direct numerical results. A mean-field model with hopping between all pairs of sites and detection at one site is solved exactly. For the one-and two-dimensional systems, the survival probability is shown to have a power-law decay with time, where the power depends on the initial position of the particle. Finally, we show an interesting and nontrivial connection between the dynamics of the particle in our model and the evolution of a particle under a non-Hermitian Hamiltonian with a large absorbing potential at some sites.