Optimal incentive timing strategies for product marketing on social networks

We consider the problem of devising incentive strategies for viral marketing of a product. In particular, we assume that the seller can influence penetration of the product by offering two incentive programs: a) direct incentives to potential buyers (influence) and b) referral rewards for customers who influence potential buyers to make the purchase (exploit connections). The problem is to determine the optimal timing of these programs over a finite time horizon. In contrast to algorithmic perspective popular in the literature, we take a mean-field approach and formulate the problem as a continuous-time deterministic optimal control problem. We show that the optimal strategy for the seller has a simple structure and can take both forms, namely, influence-and-exploit and exploit-and-influence. We also show that in some cases it may optimal for the seller to deploy incentive programs mostly for low degree nodes. We support our theoretical results through numerical studies and provide practical insights by analyzing various scenarios.

Game theoretic analysis of collusions in nonneutral networks

This paper studies the impact of exclusive contracts between a content provider (CP) and an internet service provider (ISP) in a nonneutral network. We consider a simple linear demand function for the CPs. We studywhen an exclusive contract is benefcial to the colluding pair and evaluate its impact on the noncolluding players at equilibrium. For the case of two CPs and one ISP we show that collusion may not always be benefcial. We derive an explicit condition in terms of the advertisement revenues of the CPs that tells when a collusion is proftable to the colluding entities.

Co-benefits, trade-offs, barriers and policies for greenhouse gas mitigation in the agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU) sector

The agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU) sector is responsible for approximately 25% of anthropogenic GHG emissions mainly from deforestation and agricultural emissions from livestock, soil and nutrient management. Mitigation from the sector is thus extremely important in meeting emission reduction targets. The sector offers a variety of cost-competitive mitigation options with most analyses indicating a decline in emissions largely due to decreasing deforestation rates. Sustainability criteria are needed to guide development and implementation of AFOLU mitigation measures with particular focus on multifunctional systems that allow the delivery of multiple services from land. It is striking that almost all of the positive and negative impacts, opportunities and barriers are context specific, precluding generic statements about which AFOLU mitigation measures have the greatest promise at a global scale. This finding underlines the importance of considering each mitigation strategy on a case-by-case basis, systemic effects when implementing mitigation options on the national scale, and suggests that policies need to be flexible enough to allow such assessments. National and international agricultural and forest (climate) policies have the potential to alter the opportunity costs of specific land uses in ways that increase opportunities or barriers for attaining climate change mitigation goals. Policies governing practices in agriculture and in forest conservation and management need to account for both effective mitigation and adaptation and can help to orient practices in agriculture and in forestry towards global sharing of innovative technologies for the efficient use of land resources. Different policy instruments, especially economic incentives and regulatory approaches, are currently being applied however, for its successful implementation it is critical to understand how land-use decisions are made and how new social, political and economic forces in the future will influence this process.

Campaigning in Heterogeneous Social Networks: Optimal Control of SI Information Epidemics

We study the optimal control problem of maximizing the spread of an information epidemic on a social network. Information propagation is modeled as a susceptible-infected (SI) process, and the campaign budget is fixed. Direct recruitment and word-of-mouth incentives are the two strategies to accelerate information spreading (controls). We allow for multiple controls depending on the degree of the nodes/individuals. The solution optimally allocates the scarce resource over the campaign duration and the degree class groups. We study the impact of the degree distribution of the network on the controls and present results for Erdos-Renyi and scale-free networks. Results show that more resource is allocated to high-degree nodes in the case of scale-free networks, but medium-degree nodes in the case of Erdos-Renyi networks. We study the effects of various model parameters on the optimal strategy and quantify the improvement offered by the optimal strategy over the static and bang-bang control strategies. The effect of the time-varying spreading rate on the controls is explored as the interest level of the population in the subject of the campaign may change over time. We show the existence of a solution to the formulated optimal control problem, which has nonlinear isoperimetric constraints, using novel techniques that is general and can be used in other similar optimal control problems. This work may be of interest to political, social awareness, or crowdfunding campaigners and product marketing managers, and with some modifications may be used for mitigating biological epidemics.

Cost effective campaigning in social networks

Campaigners are increasingly using online social networking platforms for promoting products, ideas and information. A popular method of promoting a product or even an idea is incentivizing individuals to evangelize the idea vigorously by providing them with referral rewards in the form of discounts, cash backs, or social recognition. Due to budget constraints on scarce resources such as money and manpower, it may not be possible to provide incentives for the entire population, and hence incentives need to be allocated judiciously to appropriate individuals for ensuring the highest possible outreach size. We aim to do the same by formulating and solving an optimization problem using percolation theory. In particular, we compute the set of individuals that are provided incentives for minimizing the expected cost while ensuring a given outreach size. We also solve the problem of computing the set of individuals to be incentivized for maximizing the outreach size for given cost budget. The optimization problem turns out to be non trivial; it involves quantities that need to be computed by numerically solving a fixed point equation. Our primary contribution is, that for a fairly general cost structure, we show that the optimization problems can be solved by solving a simple linear program. We believe that our approach of using percolation theory to formulate an optimization problem is the first of its kind. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.