31 resultados para pricing policy
Resumo:
Groundwater constitutes a vital natural resource for sustaining India’s agricultural economy and meeting the country’s social, ecological and environmental goals. It is a unique resource, widely available, providing security against droughts and yet it is closely linked to surface-water resources and the hydrological cycle. Its availability depends on geo-hydrological conditions and characteristics of aquifers, from deep to alluvium, sediment crystalline rocks to basalt formations; and agro-climate from humid to subhumid and semi-arid to arid. Its reliable supply, uniform quality and temperature, relative turbidity, pollution-safe, minimal evaporation losses, and low cost of development are attributes making groundwater more attractive compared to other resources. It plays a key role in the provision of safe drinking water to rural populations. For example, already almost 80% of domestic water use in rural areas in India is groundwater-supplied, and much of it is being supplied to farms, villages and small towns. Inadequate control of the use of groundwater, indiscriminate application of agrochemicals and unrestrained pollution of the rural environment by other human activities make groundwater usage unsustainable, necessitating proper management in the face of the twin demand for water of good quality for domestic supply and adequate supply for irrigation, ensuring equity, efficiency and sustainability of the resource. Groundwater irrigation has overtaken surface irrigation in the early 1980s, supported by well energization. It is estimated that there are about 24 million energised wells and tube wells now and it is driven by demand rather than availability, evident through the greater occurrence of wells in districts with high population densities. Apart from aquifer characteristics, land fragmentation and landholding size are the factors that decide the density of wells. The ‘rise and fall’ of local economies dependent on groundwater can be summarized as: the green revolution of 1980s, groundwaterbased agrarian boom, early symptoms of groundwater overdraft, and decline of the groundwater socio-ecology. The social characteristics and policy interventions typical of each stage provide a fascinating insight into the human-resource dynamics. This book is a compilation of nine research papers discussing various aspects of groundwater management. It attempts to integrate knowledge about the physical system, the socio-economic system, the institutional set-up and the policy environment to come out with a more realistic analysis of the situation with regard to the nature, characteristics and intensity of resource use, the size of the economy the use generates, and the negative socioeconomic consequences. Complex variables addressed in this regard focusing on northern Gujarat are the stock of groundwater available in the region, its hydrodynamics, its net outflows against inflows, the economics of its intensive use (particularly irrigation in semi-arid and arid regions), its criticality in the regional hydroecological regime, ethical aspects and social aspects of its use. The first chapter by Dinesh Kumar and Singh, dwells on complex groundwater socio-ecology of India, while emphasizing the need for policy measures to address indiscriminate over-exploitation of dwindling resources. The chapter also explores the nature of groundwater economy and the role of electricity prices on it. The next chapter on groundwater issue in north Gujarat provides a description of groundwater resource characteristics followed by a detailed analysis of the groundwater depletion and quality deterioration problems in the region and their undesirable consequences on the economy, ecosystem health and the society. Considering water-buyers and wellowning farmers individually, a methodology for economic valuation of groundwater in regions where its primary usage is in agriculture, and as assessment of the groundwater economy based on case studies from north Gujarat is presented in the fourth chapter. The next chapter focuses on the extent of dependency of milk production on groundwater, which includes the water embedded in green and dry fodder and animal feed. The study made a realistic estimate of irrigation water productivity in terms of the physics and economics of milk production. The sixth chapter analyses the extent of reduction in water usage, increase in yield and overall increase in physical productivity of alfalfa with the use of the drip irrigation system. The chapter also provides a detailed synthesis of the costs and benefits associated with the use of drip irrigation systems. A linear programmingbased optimization model with the objective to minimize groundwater use taking into account the interaction between two distinct components – farming and dairying under the constraints of food security and income stability for different scenarios, including shift in cropping pattern, introduction of water-efficient crops, water- saving technologies in addition to the ‘business as usual’ scenario is presented in the seventh chapter. The results show that sustaining dairy production in the region with reduced groundwater draft requires crop shifts and adoption of water-saving technologies. The eighth chapter provides evidences to prove that the presence of adequate economic incentive would encourage farmers to adopt water-saving irrigation devices, based on the findings of market research with reference to the level of awareness among farmers of technologies and the factors that decide the adoption of water-saving technologies. However, now the marginal cost of using electricity for agricultural pumping is almost zero. The economic incentives are strong and visible only when the farmers are either water-buyers or have to manage irrigation with limited water from tube-well partnerships. The ninth chapter explores the socio-economic viability of increasing the power tariff and inducing groundwater rationing as a tool for managing energy and groundwater demand, considering the current estimate of the country’s annual economic loss of Rs 320 billion towards electricity subsidy in the farm sector. The tenth chapter suggests private tradable property rights and development of water markets as the institutional tool for achieving equity, efficiency and sustainability of groundwater use. It identifies the externalities for local groundwater management and emphasizes the need for managing groundwater by local user groups, supported by a thorough analysis of groundwater socio-ecology in India. An institutional framework for managing the resource based on participatory approach that is capable of internalizing the externalities, comprising implementation of institutional and technical alternatives for resource management is also presented. Major findings of the analyses and key arguments in each chapter are summarized in the concluding chapter. Case studies of the social and economic benefits of groundwater use, where that use could be described as unsustainable, are interesting. The benefits of groundwater use are outlined and described with examples of social and economic impacts of groundwater and the negative aspects of groundwater development with the compilation of environmental problems based on up-to-date research results. This publication with a well-edited compilation of case studies is informative and constitutes a useful publication for students and professionals.
Resumo:
The literature on pricing implicitly assumes an "infinite data" model, in which sources can sustain any data rate indefinitely. We assume a more realistic "finite data" model, in which sources occasionally run out of data; this leads to variable user data rates. Further, we assume that users have contracts with the service provider, specifying the rates at which they can inject traffic into the network. Our objective is to study how prices can be set such that a single link can be shared efficiently and fairly among users in a dynamically changing scenario where a subset of users occasionally has little data to send. User preferences are modelled by concave increasing utility functions. Further, we introduce two additional elements: a convex increasing disutility function and a convex increasing multiplicative congestion-penally function. The disutility function takes the shortfall (contracted rate minus present rate) as its argument, and essentially encourages users to send traffic at their contracted rates, while the congestion-penalty function discourages heavy users from sending excess data when the link is congested. We obtain simple necessary and sufficient conditions on prices for fair and efficient link sharing; moreover, we show that a single price for all users achieves this. We illustrate the ideas using a simple experiment.
Resumo:
The literature on pricing implicitly assumes an "infinite data" model, in which sources can sustain any data rate indefinitely. We assume a more realistic "finite data" model, in which sources occasionally run out of data. Further, we assume that users have contracts with the service provider, specifying the rates at which they can inject traffic into the network. Our objective is to study how prices can be set such that a single link can be shared efficiently and fairly among users in a dynamically changing scenario where a subset of users occasionally has little data to send. We obtain simple necessary and sufficient conditions on prices such that efficient and fair link sharing is possible. We illustrate the ideas using a simple example
Resumo:
Optimal maintenance policies for a machine with degradation in performance with age and subject to failure are derived using optimal control theory. The optimal policies are shown to be, normally, of bang-coast nature, except in the case when probability of machine failure is a function of maintenance. It is also shown, in the deterministic case that a higher depreciation rate tends to reverse this policy to coast-bang. When the probability of failure is a function of maintenance, considerable computational effort is needed to obtain an optimal policy and the resulting policy is not easily implementable. For this case also, an optimal policy in the class of bang-coast policies is derived, using a semi-Markov decision model. A simple procedure for modifying the probability of machine failure with maintenance is employed. The results obtained extend and unify the recent results for this problem along both theoretical and practical lines. Numerical examples are presented to illustrate the results obtained.
Resumo:
V. S. Borkar’s work was supported in part by grant number III.5(157)/99-ET from the Department of Science and Technology, Government of India. D. Manjunath’s work was supported in part by grant number 1(1)/2004-E-Infra from the Ministry of Information Technology, Government of India.
Resumo:
In this paper, we investigate the use of reinforcement learning (RL) techniques to the problem of determining dynamic prices in an electronic retail market. As representative models, we consider a single seller market and a two seller market, and formulate the dynamic pricing problem in a setting that easily generalizes to markets with more than two sellers. We first formulate the single seller dynamic pricing problem in the RL framework and solve the problem using the Q-learning algorithm through simulation. Next we model the two seller dynamic pricing problem as a Markovian game and formulate the problem in the RL framework. We solve this problem using actor-critic algorithms through simulation. We believe our approach to solving these problems is a promising way of setting dynamic prices in multi-agent environments. We illustrate the methodology with two illustrative examples of typical retail markets.
Resumo:
We address the problem of pricing defaultable bonds in a Markov modulated market. Using Merton's structural approach we show that various types of defaultable bonds are combination of European type contingent claims. Thus pricing a defaultable bond is tantamount to pricing a contingent claim in a Markov modulated market. Since the market is incomplete, we use the method of quadratic hedging and minimal martingale measure to derive locally risk minimizing derivative prices, hedging strategies and the corresponding residual risks. The price of defaultable bonds are obtained as solutions to a system of PDEs with weak coupling subject to appropriate terminal and boundary conditions. We solve the system of PDEs numerically and carry out a numerical investigation for the defaultable bond prices. We compare their credit spreads with some of the existing models. We observe higher spreads in the Markov modulated market. We show how business cycles can be easily incorporated in the proposed framework. We demonstrate the impact on spreads of the inclusion of rare states that attempt to capture a tight liquidity situation. These states are characterized by low risk-free interest rate, high payout rate and high volatility.
Resumo:
The financial crisis set off by the default of Lehman Brothers in 2008 leading to disastrous consequences for the global economy has focused attention on regulation and pricing issues related to credit derivatives. Credit risk refers to the potential losses that can arise due to the changes in the credit quality of financial instruments. These changes could be due to changes in the ratings, market price (spread) or default on contractual obligations. Credit derivatives are financial instruments designed to mitigate the adverse impact that may arise due to credit risks. However, they also allow the investors to take up purely speculative positions. In this article we provide a succinct introduction to the notions of credit risk, the credit derivatives market and describe some of the important credit derivative products. There are two approaches to pricing credit derivatives, namely the structural and the reduced form or intensity-based models. A crucial aspect of the modelling that we touch upon briefly in this article is the problem of calibration of these models. We hope to convey through this article the challenges that are inherent in credit risk modelling, the elegant mathematics and concepts that underlie some of the models and the importance of understanding the limitations of the models.
Resumo:
Advances in technology have increased the number of cores and size of caches present on chip multicore platforms(CMPs). As a result, leakage power consumption of on-chip caches has already become a major power consuming component of the memory subsystem. We propose to reduce leakage power consumption in static nonuniform cache architecture(SNUCA) on a tiled CMP by dynamically varying the number of cache slices used and switching off unused cache slices. A cache slice in a tile includes all cache banks present in that tile. Switched-off cache slices are remapped considering the communication costs to reduce cache usage with minimal impact on execution time. This saves leakage power consumption in switched-off L2 cache slices. On an average, there map policy achieves 41% and 49% higher EDP savings compared to static and dynamic NUCA (DNUCA) cache policies on a scalable tiled CMP, respectively.
Resumo:
This paper considers a firm real-time M/M/1 system, where jobs have stochastic deadlines till the end of service. A method for approximately specifying the loss ratio of the earliest-deadline-first scheduling policy along with exit control through the early discarding technique is presented. This approximation uses the arrival rate and the mean relative deadline, normalized with respect to the mean service time, for exponential and uniform distributions of relative deadlines. Simulations show that the maximum approximation error is less than 4% and 2% for the two distributions, respectively, for a wide range of arrival rates and mean relative deadlines. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Resumo:
In this article, we present an exact theoretical analysis of an system, with arbitrary distribution of relative deadline for the end of service, operated under the first come first served scheduling policy with exact admission control. We provide an explicit solution to the functional equation that must be satisfied by the workload distribution, when the system reaches steady state. We use this solution to derive explicit expressions for the loss ratio and the sojourn time distribution. Finally, we compare this loss ratio with that of a similar system operating without admission control, in the cases of some common distributions of the relative deadline.
Resumo:
In underlay cognitive radio (CR), a secondary user (SU) can transmit concurrently with a primary user (PU) provided that it does not cause excessive interference at the primary receiver (PRx). The interference constraint fundamentally changes how the SU transmits, and makes link adaptation in underlay CR systems different from that in conventional wireless systems. In this paper, we develop a novel, symbol error probability (SEP)-optimal transmit power adaptation policy for an underlay CR system that is subject to two practically motivated constraints, namely, a peak transmit power constraint and an interference outage probability constraint. For the optimal policy, we derive its SEP and a tight upper bound for MPSK and MQAM constellations when the links from the secondary transmitter (STx) to its receiver and to the PRx follow the versatile Nakagami-m fading model. We also characterize the impact of imperfectly estimating the STx-PRx link on the SEP and the interference. Extensive simulation results are presented to validate the analysis and evaluate the impact of the constraints, fading parameters, and imperfect estimates.
Resumo:
Representatives of several Internet service providers (ISPs) have expressed their wish to see a substantial change in the pricing policies of the Internet. In particular, they would like to see content providers (CPs) pay for use of the network, given the large amount of resources they use. This would be in clear violation of the ``network neutrality'' principle that had characterized the development of the wireline Internet. Our first goal in this article is to propose and study possible ways of implementing such payments and of regulating their amount. We introduce a model that includes the users' behavior, the utilities of the ISP and of the CPs, and, the monetary flow that involves the content users, the ISP and CP, and, in pUrticular, the CP's revenues from advertisements. We consider various game models and study the resulting equilibria; they are all combinations of a noncooperative game (in which the ISPs and CPs determine how much they will charge the users) with a ``cooperative'' one on how the CP and the ISP share the payments. We include in our model a possible asymmetric weighting parameter (that varies between zero to one). We also study equilibria that arise when one of the CPs colludes with the TSP. We also study two dynamic game models as well as the convergence of prices to the equilibrium values.