Pricing credit derivatives

The financial crisis set off by the default of Lehman Brothers in 2008 leading to disastrous consequences for the global economy has focused attention on regulation and pricing issues related to credit derivatives. Credit risk refers to the potential losses that can arise due to the changes in the credit quality of financial instruments. These changes could be due to changes in the ratings, market price (spread) or default on contractual obligations. Credit derivatives are financial instruments designed to mitigate the adverse impact that may arise due to credit risks. However, they also allow the investors to take up purely speculative positions. In this article we provide a succinct introduction to the notions of credit risk, the credit derivatives market and describe some of the important credit derivative products. There are two approaches to pricing credit derivatives, namely the structural and the reduced form or intensity-based models. A crucial aspect of the modelling that we touch upon briefly in this article is the problem of calibration of these models. We hope to convey through this article the challenges that are inherent in credit risk modelling, the elegant mathematics and concepts that underlie some of the models and the importance of understanding the limitations of the models.

A simulation-based algorithm for optimal pricing policy under demand uncertainty

We propose a simulation-based algorithm for computing the optimal pricing policy for a product under uncertain demand dynamics. We consider a parameterized stochastic differential equation (SDE) model for the uncertain demand dynamics of the product over the planning horizon. In particular, we consider a dynamic model that is an extension of the Bass model. The performance of our algorithm is compared to that of a myopic pricing policy and is shown to give better results. Two significant advantages with our algorithm are as follows: (a) it does not require information on the system model parameters if the SDE system state is known via either a simulation device or real data, and (b) as it works efficiently even for high-dimensional parameters, it uses the efficient smoothed functional gradient estimator.

Regulation of Off-Network Pricing in a Nonneutral Network

Representatives of several Internet service providers (ISPs) have expressed their wish to see a substantial change in the pricing policies of the Internet. In particular, they would like to see content providers (CPs) pay for use of the network, given the large amount of resources they use. This would be in clear violation of the ``network neutrality'' principle that had characterized the development of the wireline Internet. Our first goal in this article is to propose and study possible ways of implementing such payments and of regulating their amount. We introduce a model that includes the users' behavior, the utilities of the ISP and of the CPs, and, the monetary flow that involves the content users, the ISP and CP, and, in pUrticular, the CP's revenues from advertisements. We consider various game models and study the resulting equilibria; they are all combinations of a noncooperative game (in which the ISPs and CPs determine how much they will charge the users) with a ``cooperative'' one on how the CP and the ISP share the payments. We include in our model a possible asymmetric weighting parameter (that varies between zero to one). We also study equilibria that arise when one of the CPs colludes with the TSP. We also study two dynamic game models as well as the convergence of prices to the equilibrium values.

Pricing and Power allocation in Femtocells using Stackelberg Game Theory

We consider a system with multiple Femtocells operating in a Macrocell. The transmissions in one Femtocell interfere with its neighboring Femtocells as well as with the Macrocell Base Station. We model Femtocells as selfish nodes and the Macrocell Base Station protects itself by pricing subchannels for each usage. We use Stackelberg game model to study this scenario and obtain equilibrium policies that satisfy certain quality of service.