Campaigning in Heterogeneous Social Networks: Optimal Control of SI Information Epidemics

We study the optimal control problem of maximizing the spread of an information epidemic on a social network. Information propagation is modeled as a susceptible-infected (SI) process, and the campaign budget is fixed. Direct recruitment and word-of-mouth incentives are the two strategies to accelerate information spreading (controls). We allow for multiple controls depending on the degree of the nodes/individuals. The solution optimally allocates the scarce resource over the campaign duration and the degree class groups. We study the impact of the degree distribution of the network on the controls and present results for Erdos-Renyi and scale-free networks. Results show that more resource is allocated to high-degree nodes in the case of scale-free networks, but medium-degree nodes in the case of Erdos-Renyi networks. We study the effects of various model parameters on the optimal strategy and quantify the improvement offered by the optimal strategy over the static and bang-bang control strategies. The effect of the time-varying spreading rate on the controls is explored as the interest level of the population in the subject of the campaign may change over time. We show the existence of a solution to the formulated optimal control problem, which has nonlinear isoperimetric constraints, using novel techniques that is general and can be used in other similar optimal control problems. This work may be of interest to political, social awareness, or crowdfunding campaigners and product marketing managers, and with some modifications may be used for mitigating biological epidemics.

Cost effective campaigning in social networks

Campaigners are increasingly using online social networking platforms for promoting products, ideas and information. A popular method of promoting a product or even an idea is incentivizing individuals to evangelize the idea vigorously by providing them with referral rewards in the form of discounts, cash backs, or social recognition. Due to budget constraints on scarce resources such as money and manpower, it may not be possible to provide incentives for the entire population, and hence incentives need to be allocated judiciously to appropriate individuals for ensuring the highest possible outreach size. We aim to do the same by formulating and solving an optimization problem using percolation theory. In particular, we compute the set of individuals that are provided incentives for minimizing the expected cost while ensuring a given outreach size. We also solve the problem of computing the set of individuals to be incentivized for maximizing the outreach size for given cost budget. The optimization problem turns out to be non trivial; it involves quantities that need to be computed by numerically solving a fixed point equation. Our primary contribution is, that for a fairly general cost structure, we show that the optimization problems can be solved by solving a simple linear program. We believe that our approach of using percolation theory to formulate an optimization problem is the first of its kind. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.