44 resultados para Game laws
Resumo:
Stability results are given for a class of feedback systems arising from the regulation of time-varying discrete-time systems using optimal infinite-horizon and moving-horizon feedback laws. The class is characterized by joint constraints on the state and the control, a general nonlinear cost function and nonlinear equations of motion possessing two special properties. It is shown that weak conditions on the cost function and the constraints are sufficient to guarantee uniform asymptotic stability of both the optimal infinite-horizon and movinghorizon feedback systems. The infinite-horizon cost associated with the moving-horizon feedback law approaches the optimal infinite-horizon cost as the moving horizon is extended.
Resumo:
System of kinematical conservation laws (KCL) govern evolution of a curve in a plane or a surface in space, even if the curve or the surface has singularities on it. In our recent publication K. R. Arun, P. Prasad, 3-D kinematical conservation laws (KCL): evolution of a surface in R-3-in particular propagation of a nonlinear wavefront, Wave Motion 46 (2009) 293-311] we have developed a mathematical theory to study the successive positions and geometry of a 3-D weakly nonlinear wavefront by adding an energy transport equation to KCL. The 7 x 7 system of equations of this KCL based 3-D weakly nonlinear ray theory (WNLRT) is quite complex and explicit expressions for its two nonzero eigenvalues could not be obtained before. In this short note, we use two different methods: (i) the equivalence of KCL and ray equations and (ii) the transformation of surface coordinates, to derive the same exact expressions for these eigenvalues. The explicit expressions for nonzero eigenvalues are important also for checking stability of any numerical scheme to solve 3-D WNLRT. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Resumo:
One of the major tasks in swarm intelligence is to design decentralized but homogenoeus strategies to enable controlling the behaviour of swarms of agents. It has been shown in the literature that the point of convergence and motion of a swarm of autonomous mobile agents can be controlled by using cyclic pursuit laws. In cyclic pursuit, there exists a predefined cyclic connection between agents and each agent pursues the next agent in the cycle. In this paper we generalize this idea to a case where an agent pursues a point which is the weighted average of the positions of the remaining agents. This point correspond to a particular pursuit sequence. Using this concept of centroidal cyclic pursuit, the behavior of the agents is analyzed such that, by suitably selecting the agents' gain, the rendezvous point of the agents can be controlled, directed linear motion of the agents can be achieved, and the trajectories of the agents can be changed by switching between the pursuit sequences keeping some of the behaviors of the agents invariant. Simulation experiments are given to support the analytical proofs.
Resumo:
Channel assignment in multi-channel multi-radio wireless networks poses a significant challenge due to scarcity of number of channels available in the wireless spectrum. Further, additional care has to be taken to consider the interference characteristics of the nodes in the network especially when nodes are in different collision domains. This work views the problem of channel assignment in multi-channel multi-radio networks with multiple collision domains as a non-cooperative game where the objective of the players is to maximize their individual utility by minimizing its interference. Necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for the channel assignment to be a Nash Equilibrium (NE) and efficiency of the NE is analyzed by deriving the lower bound of the price of anarchy of this game. A new fairness measure in multiple collision domain context is proposed and necessary and sufficient conditions for NE outcomes to be fair are derived. The equilibrium conditions are then applied to solve the channel assignment problem by proposing three algorithms, based on perfect/imperfect information, which rely on explicit communication between the players for arriving at an NE. A no-regret learning algorithm known as Freund and Schapire Informed algorithm, which has an additional advantage of low overhead in terms of information exchange, is proposed and its convergence to the stabilizing outcomes is studied. New performance metrics are proposed and extensive simulations are done using Matlab to obtain a thorough understanding of the performance of these algorithms on various topologies with respect to these metrics. It was observed that the algorithms proposed were able to achieve good convergence to NE resulting in efficient channel assignment strategies.
Resumo:
In this paper we propose a multiple resource interaction model in a game-theoretical framework to solve resource allocation problems in theater level military campaigns. An air raid campaign using SEAD aircraft and bombers against an enemy target defended by air defense units is considered as the basic platform. Conditions for the existence of saddle point in pure strategies is proved and explicit feedback strategies are obtained for a simplified model with linear attrition function limited by resource availability. An illustrative example demonstrates the key features.
Resumo:
We study the coverage in sensor networks having two types of nodes, sensor and backbone nodes. Each sensor is capable of transmitting information over relatively small distances. The backbone nodes collect information from the sensors. This information is processed and communicated over an ad-hoc network formed by the backbone nodes,which are capable of transmitting over much larger distances. We consider two modes of deployment of sensors, one a Poisson-Poisson cluster model and the other a dependently-thinned Poisson point process. We deduce limit laws for functionals of vacancy in both models using properties of association for random measures.
Resumo:
We consider a framework in which several service providers offer downlink wireless data access service in a certain area. Each provider serves its end-users through opportunistic secondary spectrum access of licensed spectrum, and needs to pay primary license holders of the spectrum usage based and membership based charges for such secondary spectrum access. In these circumstances, if providers pool their resources and allow end-users to be served by any of the cooperating providers, the total user satisfaction as well as the aggregate revenue earned by providers may increase. We use coalitional game theory to investigate such cooperation among providers, and show that the optimal cooperation schemes can be obtained as solutions of convex optimizations. We next show that under usage based charging scheme, if all providers cooperate, there always exists an operating point that maximizes the aggregate revenue of providers, while presenting each provider a share of the revenue such that no subset of providers has an incentive to leave the coalition. Furthermore, such an operating point can be computed in polynomial time. Finally, we show that when the charging scheme involves membership based charges, the above result holds in important special cases.
Resumo:
We consider a setting in which several operators offer downlink wireless data access services in a certain geographical region. Each operator deploys several base stations or access points, and registers some subscribers. In such a situation, if operators pool their infrastructure, and permit the possibility of subscribers being served by any of the cooperating operators, then there can be overall better user satisfaction, and increased operator revenue. We use coalitional game theory to investigate such resource pooling and cooperation between operators.We use utility functions to model user satisfaction, and show that the resulting coalitional game has the property that if all operators cooperate (i.e., form a grand coalition) then there is an operating point that maximizes the sum utility over the operators while providing the operators revenues such that no subset of operators has an incentive to break away from the coalition. We investigate whether such operating points can result in utility unfairness between users of the various operators. We also study other revenue sharing concepts, namely, the nucleolus and the Shapely value. Such investigations throw light on criteria for operators to accept or reject subscribers, based on the service level agreements proposed by them. We also investigate the situation in which only certain subsets of operators may be willing to cooperate.
Resumo:
A resource interaction based game theoretical model for military conflicts is presented in this paper. The model includes both the spatial decision capability of adversaries (decision regarding movement and subsequent distribution of resources) as well as their temporal decision capability (decision regarding level of allocation of resources for conflict with adversary’s resources). Attrition is decided at present by simple deterministic models. An additional feature of this model is the inclusion of the possibility of a given resource interacting with several resources of the adversary.The decisions of the adversaries is determined by solving for the equilibrium Nash strategies given that the objectives of the adversaries may not be in direct conflict. Examples are given to show the applicability of these models and solution concepts.
Resumo:
In this study, we analyse simultaneous measurements (at 50 Hz) of velocity at several heights and shear stress at the surface made during the Utah field campaign for the presence of ranges of scales, where distinct scale-to-scale interactions between velocity and shear stress can be identified. We find that our results are similar to those obtained in a previous study [Venugopal et al., 2003] (contrary to the claim in V2003, that the scaling relations might be dependent on Reynolds number) where wind tunnel measurements of velocity and shear stress were analysed. We use a wavelet-based scale-to-scale cross-correlation to detect three ranges of scales of interaction between velocity and shear stress, namely, (a) inertial subrange, where the correlation is negligible; (b) energy production range, where the correlation follows a logarithmic law; and (c) for scales larger than the boundary layer height, the correlation reaches a plateau.