Regulation of Off-Network Pricing in a Nonneutral Network

Representatives of several Internet service providers (ISPs) have expressed their wish to see a substantial change in the pricing policies of the Internet. In particular, they would like to see content providers (CPs) pay for use of the network, given the large amount of resources they use. This would be in clear violation of the ``network neutrality'' principle that had characterized the development of the wireline Internet. Our first goal in this article is to propose and study possible ways of implementing such payments and of regulating their amount. We introduce a model that includes the users' behavior, the utilities of the ISP and of the CPs, and, the monetary flow that involves the content users, the ISP and CP, and, in pUrticular, the CP's revenues from advertisements. We consider various game models and study the resulting equilibria; they are all combinations of a noncooperative game (in which the ISPs and CPs determine how much they will charge the users) with a ``cooperative'' one on how the CP and the ISP share the payments. We include in our model a possible asymmetric weighting parameter (that varies between zero to one). We also study equilibria that arise when one of the CPs colludes with the TSP. We also study two dynamic game models as well as the convergence of prices to the equilibrium values.

Pricing and Power allocation in Femtocells using Stackelberg Game Theory

We consider a system with multiple Femtocells operating in a Macrocell. The transmissions in one Femtocell interfere with its neighboring Femtocells as well as with the Macrocell Base Station. We model Femtocells as selfish nodes and the Macrocell Base Station protects itself by pricing subchannels for each usage. We use Stackelberg game model to study this scenario and obtain equilibrium policies that satisfy certain quality of service.

Universalization of access to modern energy services in Indian households-Economic and policy analysis

Provision of modern energy services for cooking (with gaseous fuels)and lighting (with electricity) is an essential component of any policy aiming to address health, education or welfare issues; yet it gets little attention from policy-makers. Secure, adequate, low-cost energy of quality and convenience is core to the delivery of these services. The present study analyses the energy consumption pattern of Indian domestic sector and examines the urban-rural divide and income energy linkage. A comprehensive analysis is done to estimate the cost for providing modern energy services to everyone by 2030. A public-private partnership-driven business model, with entrepreneurship at the core, is developed with institutional, financing and pricing mechanisms for diffusion of energy services. This approach, termed as EMPOWERS (entrepreneurship model for provision of wholesome energy-related basic services), if adopted, can facilitate large-scale dissemination of energy-efficient and renewable technologies like small-scale biogas/biofuel plants, and distributed power generation technologies to provide clean, safe, reliable and sustainable energy to rural households and urban poor. It is expected to integrate the processes of market transformation and entrepreneurship development involving government, NGOs, financial institutions and community groups as stakeholders. (C) 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Uplink Power Control and Base Station Association in Multichannel Cellular Networks

A combined base station association and power control problem is studied for the uplink of multichannel multicell cellular networks, in which each channel is used by exactly one cell (i.e., base station). A distributed association and power update algorithm is proposed and shown to converge to a Nash equilibrium of a noncooperative game. We consider network models with discrete mobiles (yielding an atomic congestion game), as well as a continuum of mobiles (yielding a population game). We find that the equilibria need not be Pareto efficient, nor need they be system optimal. To address the lack of system optimality, we propose pricing mechanisms. It is shown that these mechanisms can be implemented in a distributed fashion.

Predicting price-tag for customized goods

We discuss a dynamic pricing model which will aid automobile manufacturer in choosing the right price for customer segment. Though there is oligopoly market structure, the customers get "locked" into a particular technology/company which virtually makes the situation akin to a monopoly. There are associated network externalities and positive feedback. The key idea in monopoly pricing lies in extracting the customer surplus by exploiting the respective elasticities of demand. We present a Walrasian general equilibrium approach to determine the segment price. We compare the prices obtained from optimization model with that from Walrasian dynamics. The results are encouraging and can serve as a critical factor in Customer Relationship Management (CRM) and thereby effectively manage the lock-in.

Design of incentive compatible protocols for wireless networks: A game theoretic approach

In this thesis work, we design rigorous and efficient protocols/mechanisms for different types of wireless networks using a mechanism design [1] and game theoretic approach [2]. Our work can broadly be viewed in two parts. In the first part, we concentrate on ad hoc wireless networks [3] and [4]. In particular, we consider broadcast in these networks where each node is owned by independent and selfish users. Being selfish, these nodes do not forward the broadcast packets. All existing protocols for broadcast assume that nodes forward the transit packets. So, there is need for developing new broadcast protocols to overcome node selfishness. In our paper [5], we develop a strategy proof pricing mechanism which we call immediate predecessor node pricing mechanism (IPNPM) and an efficient new broadcast protocol based on IPNPM. We show the efficacy of our proposed broadcast protocol using simulation results.

Learning dynamic prices in multiseller electronic retail markets with price sensitive customers, stochastic demands, and inventory replenishments

In this paper, we use reinforcement learning (RL) as a tool to study price dynamics in an electronic retail market consisting of two competing sellers, and price sensitive and lead time sensitive customers. Sellers, offering identical products, compete on price to satisfy stochastically arriving demands (customers), and follow standard inventory control and replenishment policies to manage their inventories. In such a generalized setting, RL techniques have not previously been applied. We consider two representative cases: 1) no information case, were none of the sellers has any information about customer queue levels, inventory levels, or prices at the competitors; and 2) partial information case, where every seller has information about the customer queue levels and inventory levels of the competitors. Sellers employ automated pricing agents, or pricebots, which use RL-based pricing algorithms to reset the prices at random intervals based on factors such as number of back orders, inventory levels, and replenishment lead times, with the objective of maximizing discounted cumulative profit. In the no information case, we show that a seller who uses Q-learning outperforms a seller who uses derivative following (DF). In the partial information case, we model the problem as a Markovian game and use actor-critic based RL to learn dynamic prices. We believe our approach to solving these problems is a new and promising way of setting dynamic prices in multiseller environments with stochastic demands, price sensitive customers, and inventory replenishments.

Patent Price Dynamics in the Context of Patent Age and Patent Latent Variables

The decision to patent a technology is a difficult one to make for the top management of any organization. The expected value that the patent might deliver in the market is an important factor that impacts this judgement. Earlier researchers have suggested that patent prices are better indicators of value of a patent and that auction prices are the best way of determining value. However, the lack of public data on pricing has prevented research on understanding the dynamics of patent pricing. Our paper uses singleton patent auction price data of Ocean Tomo LLC to study the prices of patents. We describe price characteristics of these patents. The price of these patents was correlated with their age, and a significant correlation was found. A price - age matrix was developed and we describe the price characteristics of patents using four quadrants of the matrix, namely young and old patents with low and high prices. We also found that patents owned by small firms get transacted more often and inventor owned patents attracted a better price than assignee owned patents.

Social selection and the evolution of cooperative groups: The example of the cellular slime moulds

In social selection the phenotype of an individual depends on its own genotype as well as on the phenotypes, and so genotypes, of other individuals. This makes it impossible to associate an invariant phenotype with a genotype: the social context is crucial. Descriptions of metazoan development, which often is viewed as the acme of cooperative social behaviour, ignore or downplay this fact. The implicit justification for doing so is based on a group-selectionist point of view. Namely, embryos are clones, therefore all cells have the same evolutionary interest, and the visible differences between cells result from a common strategy. The reasoning is flawed, because phenotypic heterogeneity within groups can result from contingent choices made by cells from a flexible repertoire as in multicellular development. What makes that possible is phenotypic plasticity, namely the ability of a genotype to exhibit different phenotypes. However, co-operative social behaviour with division of labour requires that different phenotypes interact appropriately, not that they belong to the same genotype, or have overlapping genetic interests. We sketch a possible route to the evolution of social groups that involves many steps: (a) individuals that happen to be in spatial proximity benefit simply by virtue of their number; (b) traits that are already present act as preadaptations and improve the efficiency of the group; and (c) new adaptations evolve under selection in the social context-that is, via interactions between individuals-and further strengthen group behaviour. The Dictyostelid or cellular slime mould amoebae (CSMs) become multicellular in an unusual way, by the aggregation of free-living cells. In nature the resulting group can be genetically homogeneous (clonal) or heterogeneous (polyclonal); in either case its development, which displays strong cooperation between cells (to the extent of so-called altruism) is not affected. This makes the CSMs exemplars for the study of social behaviour.

Nonneutral network and the role of bargaining power in side payments

Representatives of several Internet access providers have expressed their wish to see a substantial change in the pricing policies of the Internet. In particular, they would like to see content providers pay for use of the network, given the large amount of resources they use. This would be in clear violation of the �network neutrality� principle that had characterized the development of the wireline Internet. Our first goal in this paper is to propose and study possible ways of implementing such payments and of regulating their amount. We introduce a model that includes the internaut�s behavior, the utilities of the ISP and of the content providers, and the monetary flow that involves the internauts, the ISP and content provider, and in particular, the content provider�s revenues from advertisements. We consider various game models and study the resulting equilibrium; they are all combinations of a noncooperative game (in which the service and content providers determine how much they will charge the internauts) with a cooperative one - the content provider and the service provider bargain with each other over payments to one another. We include in our model a possible asymmetric bargaining power which is represented by a parameter (that varies between zero to one). We then extend our model to study the case of several content providers. We also provide a very brief study of the equilibria that arise when one of the content providers enters into an exclusive contract with the ISP.

A new approach to the design of electronic exchanges

Electronic Exchanges are double-sided marketplaces that allows multiple buyers to trade with multiple sellers, with aggregation of demand and supply across the bids to maximize the revenue in the market. In this paper, we propose a new design approach for an one-shot exchange that collects bids from buyers and sellers and clears the market at the end of the bidding period. The main principle of the approach is to decouple the allocation from pricing. It is well known that it is impossible for an exchange with voluntary participation to be efficient and budget-balanced. Budget-balance is a mandatory requirement for an exchange to operate in profit. Our approach is to allocate the trade to maximize the reported values of the agents. The pricing is posed as payoff determination problem that distributes the total payoff fairly to all agents with budget-balance imposed as a constraint. We devise an arbitration scheme by axiomatic approach to solve the payoff determination problem using the added-value concept of game theory.

The Case for Non-Cooperative Multihoming of Users to Access Points in IEEE 802.11 WLANs

In many cases, a mobile user has the option of connecting to one of several IEEE 802.11 access points (APs),each using an independent channel. User throughput in each AP is determined by the number of other users as well as the frame size and physical rate being used. We consider the scenario where users could multihome, i.e., split their traffic amongst all the available APs, based on the throughput they obtain and the price charged. Thus, they are involved in a non-cooperative game with each other. We convert the problem into a fluid model and show that under a pricing scheme, which we call the cost price mechanism, the total system throughput is maximized,i.e., the system suffers no loss of efficiency due to selfish dynamics. We also study the case where the Internet Service Provider (ISP) could charge prices greater than that of the cost price mechanism. We show that even in this case multihoming outperforms unihoming, both in terms of throughput as well as profit to the ISP.

Provider-Customer Coalitional Games

Efficacy of commercial wireless networks can be substantially enhanced through large-scale cooperation among involved entities such as providers and customers. The success of such cooperation is contingent upon the design of judicious resource allocation strategies that ensure that the individuals' payoffs are commensurate to the resources they offer to the coalition. The resource allocation strategies depend on which entities are decision-makers and whether and how they share their aggregate payoffs. Initially, we consider the scenario where the providers are the only decision-makers and they do not share their payoffs. We formulate the resource allocation problem as a nontransferable payoff coalitional game and show that there exists a cooperation strategy that leaves no incentive for any subset of providers to split from the grand coalition, i.e., the core of the game is nonempty. To compute this cooperation strategy and the corresponding payoffs, we subsequently relate this game and its core to an exchange market setting and its equilibrium, which can be computed by several efficient algorithms. Next, we investigate cooperation when customers are also decision-makers and decide which provider to subscribe to based on whether there is cooperation. We formulate a coalitional game in this setting and show that it has a nonempty core. Finally, we extend the formulations and results to the cases where the payoffs are vectors and can be shared selectively.

Dynamics between patent latent variables and patent price

This paper focuses on studying the relationship between patent latent variables and patent price. From the existing literature, seven patent latent variables, namely age, generality, originality, foreign filings, technology field, forward citations, and backward citations were identified as having an influence on patent value. We used Ocean Tomo's patent auction price data in this study. We transformed the price and the predictor variables (excluding the dummy variables) to its logarithmic value. The OLS estimates revealed that forward citations and foreign filings were positively correlated to price. Both the variables jointly explained 14.79% of the variance in patent pricing. We did not find sufficient evidence to come up with any definite conclusions on the relationship between price and the variables such as age, technology field, generality, backward citations and originality. The Heckman two-stage sample selection model was used to test for selection bias. (C) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Trade determination in multi-attribute exchanges

Electronic exchanges are double-sided marketplaces that allow multiple buyers to trade with multiple sellers, with aggregation of demand and supply across the bids to maximize the revenue in the market. Two important issues in the design of exchanges are (1) trade determination (determining the number of goods traded between any buyer-seller pair) and (2) pricing. In this paper we address the trade determination issue for one-shot, multi-attribute exchanges that trade multiple units of the same good. The bids are configurable with separable additive price functions over the attributes and each function is continuous and piecewise linear. We model trade determination as mixed integer programming problems for different possible bid structures and show that even in two-attribute exchanges, trade determination is NP-hard for certain bid structures. We also make some observations on the pricing issues that are closely related to the mixed integer formulations.