153 resultados para PACKING PROBLEMS
Resumo:
In this article, an abstract framework for the error analysis of discontinuous Galerkin methods for control constrained optimal control problems is developed. The analysis establishes the best approximation result from a priori analysis point of view and delivers a reliable and efficient a posteriori error estimator. The results are applicable to a variety of problems just under the minimal regularity possessed by the well-posedness of the problem. Subsequently, the applications of C-0 interior penalty methods for a boundary control problem as well as a distributed control problem governed by the biharmonic equation subject to simply supported boundary conditions are discussed through the abstract analysis. Numerical experiments illustrate the theoretical findings.
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We give an overview of recent results and techniques in parameterized algorithms for graph modification problems.
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In the POSSIBLE WINNER problem in computational social choice theory, we are given a set of partial preferences and the question is whether a distinguished candidate could be made winner by extending the partial preferences to linear preferences. Previous work has provided, for many common voting rules, fixed parameter tractable algorithms for the POSSIBLE WINNER problem, with number of candidates as the parameter. However, the corresponding kernelization question is still open and in fact, has been mentioned as a key research challenge 10]. In this paper, we settle this open question for many common voting rules. We show that the POSSIBLE WINNER problem for maximin, Copeland, Bucklin, ranked pairs, and a class of scoring rules that includes the Borda voting rule does not admit a polynomial kernel with the number of candidates as the parameter. We show however that the COALITIONAL MANIPULATION problem which is an important special case of the POSSIBLE WINNER problem does admit a polynomial kernel for maximin, Copeland, ranked pairs, and a class of scoring rules that includes the Borda voting rule, when the number of manipulators is polynomial in the number of candidates. A significant conclusion of our work is that the POSSIBLE WINNER problem is harder than the COALITIONAL MANIPULATION problem since the COALITIONAL MANIPULATION problem admits a polynomial kernel whereas the POSSIBLE WINNER problem does not admit a polynomial kernel. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.