Market work and household production in Brazil

This thesis is composed of three papers in which the research questions are related to the double burden that accrues to Brazilian women. The first and second papers address this issue by looking at expenditure decisions about home production. The first paper examines whether the expenditure decisions about production goods, such as white appliances, relative to entertainment goods, such as TVs, are the outcome of a bargaining process between husbands and wives. The second paper looks at the demand for maid services and for production durable goods, examining the extent to which other household members substitute for maid services and durable goods in home production. The third paper addresses the effects of Brazilian women's double burden on their labor market participation by examining whether the occupational choice of Brazilian women is affected by their gender roles and whether entry into other occupations that are not identified as female occupations has become easier since the introduction of anti-discrimination laws in the labor market. The first paper combines two Brazilian data sets: a Brazilian household expenditure survey, Pesquisa de Orçamento Familiares (POF), and a Brazilian household survey, Pesquisa Nacional Por Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD). The results of the first paper indicate that the decision about durable goods ownership is the outcome of a bargaining process between husband and wife. The test on the coefficients of the marriage market variable and the indicators of households in which only the wife and households in which only the husband makes expenditure decisions corroborate the expectations about wives' preferences for production goods. The same data sets as the first paper are used in the second paper. The finding of the second paper indicates that if the marriage market is favorable to women, that is if the ratio of women to men goes from 1.07 to 0.96, the increment in the household probability of owning at least one maid's substitute durable goods is equivalent to 24% the impact of moving a household up one income quintile. Moreover, the results indicate that daughters' time substitutes for wives' time and maid services in home production. Parents may want daughters trained in home production to be able to perform their future role as wives. However, this training comes at a cost to daughters' investment in formal education, narrowing their future career options. The data used in the third paper come from a Brazilian household survey, Pesquisa Nacional Por Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD). Gender roles are responsible for women to choose female-dominated occupations, married women are 1.14 times more likely to work in female-dominated occupations and having a child six years and older increases on average by 12% the probability that women work in female-dominated occupations instead of genderintegrated occupations in 2001. However, it becomes easier for all types of women to enter into male-dominated and gender-integrated occupations in 2001 compared to 1981.

Paths to peace: conflict management trajectories in militarized interstate disputes

When multiple third-parties (states, coalitions, and international organizations) intervene in the same conflict, do their efforts inform one another? Anecdotal evidence suggests such a possibility, but research to date has not attempted to model this interdependence directly. The current project breaks with that tradition. In particular, it proposes three competing explanations of how previous intervention efforts affect current intervention decisions: a cost model (and a variant on it, a limited commitments model), a learning model, and a random model. After using a series of Markov transition (regime-switching) models to evaluate conflict management behavior within militarized interstate disputes in the 1946-2001 period, this study concludes that third-party intervention efforts inform one another. More specifically, third-parties examine previous efforts and balance their desire to manage conflict with their need to minimize intervention costs (the cost and limited commitments models). As a result, third-parties intervene regularly using verbal pleas and mediation, but rely significantly less frequently on legal, administrative, or peace operations strategies. This empirical threshold to the intervention costs that third-parties are willing to bear has strong theoretical foundations and holds across different time periods and third-party actors. Furthermore, the analysis indicates that the first third-party to intervene in a conflict is most likely to use a strategy designed to help the disputants work toward a resolution of their dispute. After this initial intervention, the level of third-party involvement declines and often devolves into a series of verbal pleas for peace. Such findings cumulatively suggest that disputants hold the key to effective conflict management. If the disputants adopt and maintain an extreme bargaining position or fail to encourage third-parties to accept greater intervention costs, their dispute will receive little more than verbal pleas for negotiations and peace.