Data-driven Automatic Edge Sharpening

Sharpening is a powerful image transformation because sharp edges can bring out image details. Sharpness is achieved by increasing local contrast and reducing edge widths. We present a method that enhances sharpness of images and thereby their perceptual quality. Most existing enhancement techniques require user input to improve the perception of the scene in a manner most pleasing to the particular user. Our goal of image enhancement is to improve the perception of sharpness in digital images for human viewers. We consider two parameters in order to exaggerate the differences between local intensities. The two parameters exploit local contrast and widths of edges. We start from the assumption that color, texture, or objects of focus such as faces affect the human perception of photographs. When human raters are presented with a collection of images with different sharpness and asked to rank them according to perceived sharpness, the results have shown that there is a statistical consensus among the raters. We introduce a ramp enhancement technique by modifying the optimal overshoot in the ramp for different region contrasts as well as the new ramp width. Optimal parameter values are searched to be applied to regions under the criteria mentioned above. In this way, we aim to enhance digital images automatically to create pleasing image output for common users.

Preventing encrypted traffic analysis

Many existing encrypted Internet protocols leak information through packet sizes and timing. Though seemingly innocuous, prior work has shown that such leakage can be used to recover part or all of the plaintext being encrypted. The prevalence of encrypted protocols as the underpinning of such critical services as e-commerce, remote login, and anonymity networks and the increasing feasibility of attacks on these services represent a considerable risk to communications security. Existing mechanisms for preventing traffic analysis focus on re-routing and padding. These prevention techniques have considerable resource and overhead requirements. Furthermore, padding is easily detectable and, in some cases, can introduce its own vulnerabilities. To address these shortcomings, we propose embedding real traffic in synthetically generated encrypted cover traffic. Novel to our approach is our use of realistic network protocol behavior models to generate cover traffic. The observable traffic we generate also has the benefit of being indistinguishable from other real encrypted traffic further thwarting an adversary's ability to target attacks. In this dissertation, we introduce the design of a proxy system called TrafficMimic that implements realistic cover traffic tunneling and can be used alone or integrated with the Tor anonymity system. We describe the cover traffic generation process including the subtleties of implementing a secure traffic generator. We show that TrafficMimic cover traffic can fool a complex protocol classification attack with 91% of the accuracy of real traffic. TrafficMimic cover traffic is also not detected by a binary classification attack specifically designed to detect TrafficMimic. We evaluate the performance of tunneling with independent cover traffic models and find that they are comparable, and, in some cases, more efficient than generic constant-rate defenses. We then use simulation and analytic modeling to understand the performance of cover traffic tunneling more deeply. We find that we can take measurements from real or simulated traffic with no tunneling and use them to estimate parameters for an accurate analytic model of the performance impact of cover traffic tunneling. Once validated, we use this model to better understand how delay, bandwidth, tunnel slowdown, and stability affect cover traffic tunneling. Finally, we take the insights from our simulation study and develop several biasing techniques that we can use to match the cover traffic to the real traffic while simultaneously bounding external information leakage. We study these bias methods using simulation and evaluate their security using a Bayesian inference attack. We find that we can safely improve performance with biasing while preventing both traffic analysis and defense detection attacks. We then apply these biasing methods to the real TrafficMimic implementation and evaluate it on the Internet. We find that biasing can provide 3-5x improvement in bandwidth for bulk transfers and 2.5-9.5x speedup for Web browsing over tunneling without biasing.