Antimony-based type-II superlattice infrared detectors

Numerous applications within the mid- and long-wavelength infrared are driving the search for efficient and cost effective detection technologies in this regime. Theoretical calculations have predicted high performance for InAs/GaSb type-II superlattice structures, which rely on mature growth of III-V semiconductors and offer many levels of freedom in design due to band structure engineering. This work focuses on the fabrication and characterization of type-II superlattice infrared detectors. Standard UV-based photolithography was used combined with chemical wet or dry etching techniques in order to fabricate antinomy-based type-II superlattice infrared detectors. Subsequently, Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy and radiometric techniques were applied for optical characterization in order to obtain a detector's spectrum and response, as well as the overall detectivity in combination with electrical characterization. Temperature dependent electrical characterization was used to extract information about the limiting dark current processes. This work resulted in the first demonstration of an InAs/GaSb type-II superlattice infrared photodetector grown by metalorganic chemical vapor deposition. A peak detectivity of 1.6x10^9 Jones at 78 K was achieved for this device with a 11 micrometer zero cutoff wavelength. Furthermore the interband tunneling detector designed for the mid-wavelength infrared regime was studied. Similar results to those previously published were obtained.

Preventing encrypted traffic analysis

Many existing encrypted Internet protocols leak information through packet sizes and timing. Though seemingly innocuous, prior work has shown that such leakage can be used to recover part or all of the plaintext being encrypted. The prevalence of encrypted protocols as the underpinning of such critical services as e-commerce, remote login, and anonymity networks and the increasing feasibility of attacks on these services represent a considerable risk to communications security. Existing mechanisms for preventing traffic analysis focus on re-routing and padding. These prevention techniques have considerable resource and overhead requirements. Furthermore, padding is easily detectable and, in some cases, can introduce its own vulnerabilities. To address these shortcomings, we propose embedding real traffic in synthetically generated encrypted cover traffic. Novel to our approach is our use of realistic network protocol behavior models to generate cover traffic. The observable traffic we generate also has the benefit of being indistinguishable from other real encrypted traffic further thwarting an adversary's ability to target attacks. In this dissertation, we introduce the design of a proxy system called TrafficMimic that implements realistic cover traffic tunneling and can be used alone or integrated with the Tor anonymity system. We describe the cover traffic generation process including the subtleties of implementing a secure traffic generator. We show that TrafficMimic cover traffic can fool a complex protocol classification attack with 91% of the accuracy of real traffic. TrafficMimic cover traffic is also not detected by a binary classification attack specifically designed to detect TrafficMimic. We evaluate the performance of tunneling with independent cover traffic models and find that they are comparable, and, in some cases, more efficient than generic constant-rate defenses. We then use simulation and analytic modeling to understand the performance of cover traffic tunneling more deeply. We find that we can take measurements from real or simulated traffic with no tunneling and use them to estimate parameters for an accurate analytic model of the performance impact of cover traffic tunneling. Once validated, we use this model to better understand how delay, bandwidth, tunnel slowdown, and stability affect cover traffic tunneling. Finally, we take the insights from our simulation study and develop several biasing techniques that we can use to match the cover traffic to the real traffic while simultaneously bounding external information leakage. We study these bias methods using simulation and evaluate their security using a Bayesian inference attack. We find that we can safely improve performance with biasing while preventing both traffic analysis and defense detection attacks. We then apply these biasing methods to the real TrafficMimic implementation and evaluate it on the Internet. We find that biasing can provide 3-5x improvement in bandwidth for bulk transfers and 2.5-9.5x speedup for Web browsing over tunneling without biasing.

The effect of neutron irradiation on the density of low-energy excitations in vitreous silica

Systematic low-temperature measurements of the thermal conductivity, specific heat, dielectric constant, and temperature-dependent ultrasound velocity have been made on a single piece of vitreous silica. These measurements were repeated after fast neutron irradiation of the material. It was found that the irradiation produced changes of the same relative magnitude in the low-temperature excess specific heat C , the thermal conductivity K, ex and the anomalous temperature dependence of the ultrasound velocity Deltav/v. A corresponding change in the temperature dependent dielectric constant was not observed. It is therefore likely that K and Deltav/v are determined by the same localized excitations responsible for C , but the temperature dependence of the dielectric constant may have a different, though possibly related, origin. Furthermore, a consistent account for the measured C , K, ex and Deltav/v of unirradiated silica is given by the tunneling-state model with a single, energy-dependent density of states. Changes in these three properties due to irradiation can be explained by altering only the density of tunneling states incorporated in the model.