Incomplete information games of conflict and collective action

My thesis consists of three essays that investigate strategic interactions between individuals engaging in risky collective action in uncertain environments. The first essay analyzes a broad class of incomplete information coordination games with a wide range of applications in economics and politics. The second essay draws from the general model developed in the first essay to study decisions by individuals of whether to engage in protest/revolution/coup/strike. The final essay explicitly integrates state response to the analysis. The first essay, Coordination Games with Strategic Delegation of Pivotality, exhaustively analyzes a class of binary action, two-player coordination games in which players receive stochastic payoffs only if both players take a ``stochastic-coordination action''. Players receive conditionally-independent noisy private signals about the normally distributed stochastic payoffs. With this structure, each player can exploit the information contained in the other player's action only when he takes the “pivotalizing action”. This feature has two consequences: (1) When the fear of miscoordination is not too large, in order to utilize the other player's information, each player takes the “pivotalizing action” more often than he would based solely on his private information, and (2) best responses feature both strategic complementarities and strategic substitutes, implying that the game is not supermodular nor a typical global game. This class of games has applications in a wide range of economic and political phenomena, including war and peace, protest/revolution/coup/ strike, interest groups lobbying, international trade, and adoption of a new technology. My second essay, Collective Action with Uncertain Payoffs, studies the decision problem of citizens who must decide whether to submit to the status quo or mount a revolution. If they coordinate, they can overthrow the status quo. Otherwise, the status quo is preserved and participants in a failed revolution are punished. Citizens face two types of uncertainty. (a) non-strategic: they are uncertain about the relative payoffs of the status quo and revolution, (b) strategic: they are uncertain about each other's assessments of the relative payoff. I draw on the existing literature and historical evidence to argue that the uncertainty in the payoffs of status quo and revolution is intrinsic in politics. Several counter-intuitive findings emerge: (1) Better communication between citizens can lower the likelihood of revolution. In fact, when the punishment for failed protest is not too harsh and citizens' private knowledge is accurate, then further communication reduces incentives to revolt. (2) Increasing strategic uncertainty can increase the likelihood of revolution attempts, and even the likelihood of successful revolution. In particular, revolt may be more likely when citizens privately obtain information than when they receive information from a common media source. (3) Two dilemmas arise concerning the intensity and frequency of punishment (repression), and the frequency of protest. Punishment Dilemma 1: harsher punishments may increase the probability that punishment is materialized. That is, as the state increases the punishment for dissent, it might also have to punish more dissidents. It is only when the punishment is sufficiently harsh, that harsher punishment reduces the frequency of its application. Punishment Dilemma 1 leads to Punishment Dilemma 2: the frequencies of repression and protest can be positively or negatively correlated depending on the intensity of repression. My third essay, The Repression Puzzle, investigates the relationship between the intensity of grievances and the likelihood of repression. First, I make the observation that the occurrence of state repression is a puzzle. If repression is to succeed, dissidents should not rebel. If it is to fail, the state should concede in order to save the costs of unsuccessful repression. I then propose an explanation for the “repression puzzle” that hinges on information asymmetries between the state and dissidents about the costs of repression to the state, and hence the likelihood of its application by the state. I present a formal model that combines the insights of grievance-based and political process theories to investigate the consequences of this information asymmetry for the dissidents' contentious actions and for the relationship between the magnitude of grievances (formulated here as the extent of inequality) and the likelihood of repression. The main contribution of the paper is to show that this relationship is non-monotone. That is, as the magnitude of grievances increases, the likelihood of repression might decrease. I investigate the relationship between inequality and the likelihood of repression in all country-years from 1981 to 1999. To mitigate specification problem, I estimate the probability of repression using a generalized additive model with thin-plate splines (GAM-TPS). This technique allows for flexible relationship between inequality, the proxy for the costs of repression and revolutions (income per capita), and the likelihood of repression. The empirical evidence support my prediction that the relationship between the magnitude of grievances and the likelihood of repression is non-monotone.

Nietzsche's orphans: music and the search for unity in revolutionary Russia, 1905-1921

At the dawn of the twentieth century, Imperial Russia was in the throes of immense social, political and cultural upheaval. The effects of rapid industrialization, rising capitalism and urbanization, as well as the trauma wrought by revolution and war, reverberated through all levels of society and every cultural sphere. In the aftermath of the 1905 revolution, amid a growing sense of panic over the chaos and divisions emerging in modern life, a portion of Russian educated society (obshchestvennost’) looked to the transformative and unifying power of music as a means of salvation from the personal, social and intellectual divisions of the contemporary world. Transcending professional divisions, these “orphans of Nietzsche” comprised a distinct aesthetic group within educated Russian society. While lacking a common political, religious or national outlook, these philosophers, poets, musicians and other educated members of the upper and middle strata were bound together by their shared image of music’s unifying power, itself built upon a synthesis of Russian and European ideas. They yearned for a “musical Orpheus,” a composer capable of restoring wholeness to society through his music. My dissertation is a study in what I call “musical metaphysics,” an examination of the creation, development, crisis and ultimate failure of this Orphic worldview. To begin, I examine the institutional foundations of musical life in late Imperial Russia, as well as the explosion of cultural life in the aftermath of the 1905 Revolution, a vibrant social context which nourished the formation of musical metaphysics. From here, I assess the intellectual basis upon which musical metaphysics rested: central concepts (music, life-transformation, theurgy, unity, genius, nation), as well as the philosophical heritage of Nietzsche and the Christian thinkers Vladimir Solov’ev, Aleksei Khomiakov, Ivan Kireevskii and Lev Tolstoi. Nietzsche’s orphans’ struggle to reconcile an amoral view of reality with a deeply felt sense of religious purpose gave rise to neo-Slavophile interpretations of history, in which the Russian nation (narod) was singled out as the savior of humanity from the materialism of modern life. This nationalizing tendency existed uneasily within the framework of the multi-ethnic empire. From broad social and cultural trends, I turn to detailed analysis of three of Moscow’s most admired contemporary composers, whose individual creative voices intersected with broader social concerns. The music of Aleksandr Scriabin (1871-1915) was associated with images of universal historical progress. Nikolai Medtner (1879-1951) embodied an “Imperial” worldview, in which musical style was imbued with an eternal significance which transcended the divisions of nation. The compositions of Sergei Rachmaninoff (1873-1943) were seen as the expression of a Russian “national” voice. Heightened nationalist sentiment and the impact of the Great War spelled the doom of this musical worldview. Music became an increasingly nationalized sphere within which earlier, Imperial definitions of belonging grew ever more problematic. As the Germanic heritage upon which their vision was partially based came under attack, Nietzsche’s orphans found themselves ever more divided and alienated from society as a whole. Music’s inability to physically transform the world ultimately came to symbolize the failure of Russia’s educated strata to effectively deal with the pressures of a modernizing society. In the aftermath of the 1917 revolutions, music was transformed from a symbol of active, unifying power into a space of memory, a means of commemorating, reinterpreting, and idealizing the lost world of Imperial Russia itself.