The magical realism of metaphor: cross-cultural comparisons in use of metaphor in cognition

Three experiments explore the hypothesis that due to linguistic and cultural factors, metaphor usage – or thinking in terms of what something is like – differs across cultures. In Experiment 1, a lexical decision task supported the hypothesis that perception of what something is like tends to be faster and more automatic in Latino participants than in Anglo participants. In Experiment 2, Anglo participants were less able to solve a problem framed metaphorically than Latino participants were. To ensure that a preference for metaphor is not applicable to all bilingual populations, we included bilingual Asian participants in Experiment 3. In this study, Latino participants rated arguments presented with metaphors as more persuasive than arguments that did not have metaphors, while the opposite pattern was found in Anglo and Asian participants. The findings from these three studies provide support for the hypothesis that the Latino preference for metaphor is real and pervasive. Implications in the domains of education and public health interventions are briefly noted.

The role of relevant information in functional counterfactual thinking

Although counterfactual thinking is typically activated by a negative outcome, it can have positive effects by helping to regulate and improve future behavior. Known as the content-specific pathway, these counterfactual ruminations use relevant information (i.e., information that is directly related to the problem at hand) to elicit insights about the problem, create a connection between the counterfactual and the desired behavior, and strengthen relevant behavioral intentions. The current research examines how changing the type of relevant information provided (i.e., so that it is either concrete and detailed or general and abstract) influences the relationship between counterfactual thinking and behavioral intentions. Experiments 1 and 2 found that counterfactual thinking facilitated relevant intentions when these statements involved detailed information (Experiment 1) or specific behaviors (Experiment 2) compared to general information (Experiment 1), categories of behavior, or traits (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 found that counterfactuals containing a category of behavior facilitated specific behavioral intentions, relative to counterfactuals focusing on a trait. However, counterfactuals only facilitated intentions that included specific behaviors, but not when intentions focused on categories of behaviors or traits (Experiment 4). Finally, this effect generalized to other relevant specific behaviors; a counterfactual based on one relevant specific behavior facilitated an intention based on another relevant specific behavior (Experiment 5). Together, these studies further clarify our understanding of the content-specific pathway and provide a more comprehensive understanding of functional counterfactual thinking.