Financial stocks and political bonds: stock market participation and political behavior in the United States and Britain

This dissertation investigates the effect of stock market participation on political behavior. Some observers claim that financial assets—stocks and mutual funds—have a causal effect on political behavior. The “investor class theory” asserts that as people invest in the stock market their partisan attachments shift rightward. The “asset effect theory” claims that financial investments increase political interest and participation. I examine these claims with longitudinal data from the United States and Great Britain covering a twenty-year period from the early 1980s through the mid-2000’s. I also examine the effect of financial asset ownership on political attitudes in the United States during the 2008 stock market crash. I find no evidence to support the argument that stock market participation has any causal effect on partisanship, participation, or political attitudes.

Paths to peace: conflict management trajectories in militarized interstate disputes

When multiple third-parties (states, coalitions, and international organizations) intervene in the same conflict, do their efforts inform one another? Anecdotal evidence suggests such a possibility, but research to date has not attempted to model this interdependence directly. The current project breaks with that tradition. In particular, it proposes three competing explanations of how previous intervention efforts affect current intervention decisions: a cost model (and a variant on it, a limited commitments model), a learning model, and a random model. After using a series of Markov transition (regime-switching) models to evaluate conflict management behavior within militarized interstate disputes in the 1946-2001 period, this study concludes that third-party intervention efforts inform one another. More specifically, third-parties examine previous efforts and balance their desire to manage conflict with their need to minimize intervention costs (the cost and limited commitments models). As a result, third-parties intervene regularly using verbal pleas and mediation, but rely significantly less frequently on legal, administrative, or peace operations strategies. This empirical threshold to the intervention costs that third-parties are willing to bear has strong theoretical foundations and holds across different time periods and third-party actors. Furthermore, the analysis indicates that the first third-party to intervene in a conflict is most likely to use a strategy designed to help the disputants work toward a resolution of their dispute. After this initial intervention, the level of third-party involvement declines and often devolves into a series of verbal pleas for peace. Such findings cumulatively suggest that disputants hold the key to effective conflict management. If the disputants adopt and maintain an extreme bargaining position or fail to encourage third-parties to accept greater intervention costs, their dispute will receive little more than verbal pleas for negotiations and peace.