Effect of boiling on deposition of metallic colloids

In this study the relationship between heterogeneous nucleate boiling surfaces and deposition of suspended metallic colloidal particles, popularly known as crud or corrosion products in process industries, on those heterogeneous sites is investigated. Various researchers have reported that hematite is a major constituent of crud which makes it the primary material of interest; however the models developed in this work are irrespective of material choice. Qualitative hypotheses on the deposition process under boiling as proposed by previous researchers have been tested, which fail to provide explanations for several physical mechanisms observed and analyzed. In this study a quantitative model of deposition rate has been developed on the basis of bubble dynamics and colloid-surface interaction potential. Boiling from a heating surface aids in aggregation of the metallic particulates viz. nano-particles, crud particulate, etc. suspended in a liquid, which helps in transporting them to heating surfaces. Consequently, clusters of particles deposit onto the heating surfaces due to various interactive forces, resulting in formation of porous or impervious layers. The deposit layer grows or recedes depending upon variations in interparticle and surface forces, fluid shear, fluid chemistry, etc. This deposit layer in turn affects the rate of bubble generation, formation of porous chimneys, critical heat flux (CHF) of surfaces, activation and deactivation of nucleation sites on the heating surfaces. Several problems are posed due to the effect of boiling on colloidal deposition, which range from research initiatives involving nano-fluids as a heat transfer medium to industrial applications such as light water nuclear reactors. In this study, it is attempted to integrate colloid and surface science with vapor bubble dynamics, boiling heat transfer and evaporation rate. Pool boiling experiments with dilute metallic colloids have been conducted to investigate several parameters impacting the system. The experimental data available in the literature is obtained by flow experiments, which do not help in correlating boiling mechanism with the deposition amount or structure. With the help of experimental evidences and analysis, previously proposed hypothesis for particle transport to the contact line due to hydrophobicity has been challenged. The experimental observations suggest that deposition occurs around the bubble surface contact line and extends underneath area of the bubble microlayer as well. During the evaporation the concentration gradient of a non-volatile species is created, which induces osmotic pressure. The osmotic pressure developed inside the microlayer draws more particles inside the microlayer region or towards contact line. The colloidal escape time is slower than the evaporation time, which leads to the aggregation of particles in the evaporating micro-layer. These aggregated particles deposit onto or are removed from the heating surface, depending upon their total interaction potential. Interaction potential has been computed with the help of surface charge and van der Waals potential for the materials in aqueous solutions. Based upon the interaction-force boundary layer thickness, which is governed by debye radius (or ionic concentration and pH), a simplified quantitative model for the attachment kinetics is proposed. This attachment kinetics model gives reasonable results in predicting attachment rate against data reported by previous researchers. The attachment kinetics study has been done for different pH levels and particle sizes for hematite particles. Quantification of colloidal transport under boiling scenarios is done with the help of overall average evaporation rates because generally waiting times for bubbles at the same position is much larger than growth times. In other words, from a larger measurable scale perspective, frequency of bubbles dictates the rate of collection of particles rather than evaporation rate during micro-layer evaporation of one bubble. The combination of attachment kinetics and colloidal transport kinetics has been used to make a consolidated model for prediction of the amount of deposition and is validated with the help of high fidelity experimental data. In an attempt to understand and explain boiling characteristics, high speed visualization of bubble dynamics from a single artificial large cavity and multiple naturally occurring cavities is conducted. A bubble growth and departure dynamics model is developed for artificial active sites and is validated with the experimental data. The variation of bubble departure diameter with wall temperature is analyzed with experimental results and shows coherence with earlier studies. However, deposit traces after boiling experiments show that bubble contact diameter is essential to predict bubble departure dynamics, which has been ignored previously by various researchers. The relationship between porosity of colloid deposits and bubbles under the influence of Jakob number, sub-cooling and particle size has been developed. This also can be further utilized in variational wettability of the surface. Designing porous surfaces can having vast range of applications varying from high wettability, such as high critical heat flux boilers, to low wettability, such as efficient condensers.

Design and implementation of a floating point unit for rigel, a massively parallel accelerator

Scientific applications rely heavily on floating point data types. Floating point operations are complex and require complicated hardware that is both area and power intensive. The emergence of massively parallel architectures like Rigel creates new challenges and poses new questions with respect to floating point support. The massively parallel aspect of Rigel places great emphasis on area efficient, low power designs. At the same time, Rigel is a general purpose accelerator and must provide high performance for a wide class of applications. This thesis presents an analysis of various floating point unit (FPU) components with respect to Rigel, and attempts to present a candidate design of an FPU that balances performance, area, and power and is suitable for massively parallel architectures like Rigel.

Incomplete information games of conflict and collective action

My thesis consists of three essays that investigate strategic interactions between individuals engaging in risky collective action in uncertain environments. The first essay analyzes a broad class of incomplete information coordination games with a wide range of applications in economics and politics. The second essay draws from the general model developed in the first essay to study decisions by individuals of whether to engage in protest/revolution/coup/strike. The final essay explicitly integrates state response to the analysis. The first essay, Coordination Games with Strategic Delegation of Pivotality, exhaustively analyzes a class of binary action, two-player coordination games in which players receive stochastic payoffs only if both players take a ``stochastic-coordination action''. Players receive conditionally-independent noisy private signals about the normally distributed stochastic payoffs. With this structure, each player can exploit the information contained in the other player's action only when he takes the “pivotalizing action”. This feature has two consequences: (1) When the fear of miscoordination is not too large, in order to utilize the other player's information, each player takes the “pivotalizing action” more often than he would based solely on his private information, and (2) best responses feature both strategic complementarities and strategic substitutes, implying that the game is not supermodular nor a typical global game. This class of games has applications in a wide range of economic and political phenomena, including war and peace, protest/revolution/coup/ strike, interest groups lobbying, international trade, and adoption of a new technology. My second essay, Collective Action with Uncertain Payoffs, studies the decision problem of citizens who must decide whether to submit to the status quo or mount a revolution. If they coordinate, they can overthrow the status quo. Otherwise, the status quo is preserved and participants in a failed revolution are punished. Citizens face two types of uncertainty. (a) non-strategic: they are uncertain about the relative payoffs of the status quo and revolution, (b) strategic: they are uncertain about each other's assessments of the relative payoff. I draw on the existing literature and historical evidence to argue that the uncertainty in the payoffs of status quo and revolution is intrinsic in politics. Several counter-intuitive findings emerge: (1) Better communication between citizens can lower the likelihood of revolution. In fact, when the punishment for failed protest is not too harsh and citizens' private knowledge is accurate, then further communication reduces incentives to revolt. (2) Increasing strategic uncertainty can increase the likelihood of revolution attempts, and even the likelihood of successful revolution. In particular, revolt may be more likely when citizens privately obtain information than when they receive information from a common media source. (3) Two dilemmas arise concerning the intensity and frequency of punishment (repression), and the frequency of protest. Punishment Dilemma 1: harsher punishments may increase the probability that punishment is materialized. That is, as the state increases the punishment for dissent, it might also have to punish more dissidents. It is only when the punishment is sufficiently harsh, that harsher punishment reduces the frequency of its application. Punishment Dilemma 1 leads to Punishment Dilemma 2: the frequencies of repression and protest can be positively or negatively correlated depending on the intensity of repression. My third essay, The Repression Puzzle, investigates the relationship between the intensity of grievances and the likelihood of repression. First, I make the observation that the occurrence of state repression is a puzzle. If repression is to succeed, dissidents should not rebel. If it is to fail, the state should concede in order to save the costs of unsuccessful repression. I then propose an explanation for the “repression puzzle” that hinges on information asymmetries between the state and dissidents about the costs of repression to the state, and hence the likelihood of its application by the state. I present a formal model that combines the insights of grievance-based and political process theories to investigate the consequences of this information asymmetry for the dissidents' contentious actions and for the relationship between the magnitude of grievances (formulated here as the extent of inequality) and the likelihood of repression. The main contribution of the paper is to show that this relationship is non-monotone. That is, as the magnitude of grievances increases, the likelihood of repression might decrease. I investigate the relationship between inequality and the likelihood of repression in all country-years from 1981 to 1999. To mitigate specification problem, I estimate the probability of repression using a generalized additive model with thin-plate splines (GAM-TPS). This technique allows for flexible relationship between inequality, the proxy for the costs of repression and revolutions (income per capita), and the likelihood of repression. The empirical evidence support my prediction that the relationship between the magnitude of grievances and the likelihood of repression is non-monotone.