Sense-making in theory and practice: a metatheoretical foundation and application for health information seeking

This thesis attempts to provide deeper historical and theoretical grounding for sense-making, thereby illustrating its applicability to practical information seeking research. In Chapter One I trace the philosophical origins of Brenda Dervin’s theory known as “sense making,” reaching beyond current scholarship that locates the origins of sense-making in twentieth-century Phenomenology and Communication theory and find its rich ontological, epistemological, and etymological heritage that dates back to the Pre-Socratics. After exploring sense-making’s Greek roots, I examine sense-making’s philosophical undercurrents found in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), where he also returns to the simplicity of the Greeks for his concept of sense. With Chapter Two I explore sense-making methodology and find, in light of the Greek and Hegelian dialectic, a dialogical bridge connecting sense-making’s theory with pragmatic uses. This bridge between Dervin’s situation and use occupies a distinct position in sense-making theory. Moreover, building upon Brenda Dervin’s model of sense-making, I use her metaphors of gap and bridge analogy to discuss the dialectic and dialogic components of sense making. The purpose of Chapter Three is pragmatic – to gain insight into the online information-seeking needs, experiences, and motivation of first-degree relatives (FDRs) of breast cancer survivors through the lens of sense-making. This research analyses four questions: 1) information-seeking behavior among FDRs of cancer survivors compared to survivors and to undiagnosed, non-related online cancer information seekers in the general population, 2) types of and places where information is sought, 3) barriers or gaps and satisfaction rates FDRs face in their cancer information quest, and 4) types and degrees of cancer information and resources FDRs want and use in their information search for themselves and other family members. An online survey instrument designed to investigate these questions was developed and pilot tested. Via an email communication, the Susan Love Breast Cancer Research Foundation distributed 322,000 invitations to its membership to complete the survey, and from March 24th to April 5th 10,692 women agreed to take the survey with 8,804 volunteers actually completing survey responses. Of the 8,804 surveys, 95% of FDRs have searched for cancer information online, and 84% of FDRs use the Internet as a sense-making tool for additional information they have received from doctors or nurses. FDRs report needing much more information than either survivors or family/friends in ten out of fifteen categories related to breast and ovarian cancer. When searching for cancer information online, FDRs also rank highest in several of sense-making’s emotional levels: uncertainty, confusion, frustration, doubt, and disappointment than do either survivors or friends and family. The sense-making process has existed in theory and praxis since the early Greeks. In applying sense–making’s theory to a contemporary problem, the survey reveals unaddressed situations and gaps of FDRs’ information search process. FDRs are a highly motivated group of online information seekers whose needs are largely unaddressed as a result of gaps in available online information targeted to address their specific needs. Since FDRs represent a quarter of the population, further research addressing their specific online information needs and experiences is necessary.

The influence of past behavior on future behavior: a mind-set perspective

A behavioral mind-set refers to the effect of performing a behavior in one situation (e.g., deciding which animals jump higher, dolphins or sea lions) on the likelihood of performing a conceptually similar behavior in subsequent, unrelated situations (e.g., deciding which of two candies to purchase). It reflects the activation and persistence of procedural knowledge. My dissertation circumscribes the construct of a behavioral mind-set and proposes a theoretical framework describing how mind-sets operate as well as their cognitive and motivational determinants. Three sets of studies investigated the role of mind-sets in different domains. The first set of studies explored the influence of making comparative judgments on subsequent decision making. Specifically, I found that making comparative judgment in one situation activates a which-to-buy mind-set that increases the willingness to decide which of two products to purchase in a later situation without considering the option of not buying anything at all. This mind-set can be activated not only by stating preferences for one of two products but also by comparing the relative attractiveness of wild animals, comparing the animals with respect to physical attributes, and estimating how similar one object is to another. Furthermore, the mind-set, once activated, influences not only purchase intentions in hypothetical situations but the actual decisions to purchase one of different types of products that are on sale after the experiment. The second set of studies investigated whether generating supportive elaborations or counterarguments in one situation will influence people’s tendency to engage in similar behavior in a subsequent, unrelated situation. I found that making supportive elaborations in one situation gives rise to a bolstering mind-set that, once activated, increases participants’ disposition to generate supportive thoughts in response to persuasive communications that they receive later and, therefore, increases the effectiveness of persuasion. Correspondingly, generating opposing arguments in an initial situation activates a counterarguing mind-set that increases the tendency to argue against the persuasive communications and decreases its effectiveness. However, a counterarguing mind-set may increase the effectiveness of persuasion if the messages are difficult to be refuted. The third set of studies distinguished between the influence of motivation on consumer behavior and the influence of a mind-set that is activated by this motivation. Specifically, I found that appetitive motivation, which naturally increases people’s tendency to acquire food products, can give rise to a cognition-based acquisition mind-set that increases people’s disposition to acquire non-food products as well. This acquisition mind-set may persist even when the appetitive motivation that gave rise to it is satiated by eating. Moreover, the disposition to acquire non-food products is not mediated by the products’ attractiveness. The studies suggest that motivation and mind-sets may independently influence consumers’ evaluation of a product and their dispositions to acquire it. Motivation is more likely to influence product evaluations whereas a mind-set is more likely to influence consumers’ acquisition dispositions. In summary, a behavioral mind-set can be activated in the process of performing a behavior. And the mind-set may influence people’s subsequent behaviors in unrelated situations in which the activated procedure is applicable. Moreover, motivation to engage in one behavior could also elicit a cognition-based mind-set, which may change people’s subsequent behaviors.

The role of relevant information in functional counterfactual thinking

Although counterfactual thinking is typically activated by a negative outcome, it can have positive effects by helping to regulate and improve future behavior. Known as the content-specific pathway, these counterfactual ruminations use relevant information (i.e., information that is directly related to the problem at hand) to elicit insights about the problem, create a connection between the counterfactual and the desired behavior, and strengthen relevant behavioral intentions. The current research examines how changing the type of relevant information provided (i.e., so that it is either concrete and detailed or general and abstract) influences the relationship between counterfactual thinking and behavioral intentions. Experiments 1 and 2 found that counterfactual thinking facilitated relevant intentions when these statements involved detailed information (Experiment 1) or specific behaviors (Experiment 2) compared to general information (Experiment 1), categories of behavior, or traits (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 found that counterfactuals containing a category of behavior facilitated specific behavioral intentions, relative to counterfactuals focusing on a trait. However, counterfactuals only facilitated intentions that included specific behaviors, but not when intentions focused on categories of behaviors or traits (Experiment 4). Finally, this effect generalized to other relevant specific behaviors; a counterfactual based on one relevant specific behavior facilitated an intention based on another relevant specific behavior (Experiment 5). Together, these studies further clarify our understanding of the content-specific pathway and provide a more comprehensive understanding of functional counterfactual thinking.