Incomplete information games of conflict and collective action

My thesis consists of three essays that investigate strategic interactions between individuals engaging in risky collective action in uncertain environments. The first essay analyzes a broad class of incomplete information coordination games with a wide range of applications in economics and politics. The second essay draws from the general model developed in the first essay to study decisions by individuals of whether to engage in protest/revolution/coup/strike. The final essay explicitly integrates state response to the analysis. The first essay, Coordination Games with Strategic Delegation of Pivotality, exhaustively analyzes a class of binary action, two-player coordination games in which players receive stochastic payoffs only if both players take a ``stochastic-coordination action''. Players receive conditionally-independent noisy private signals about the normally distributed stochastic payoffs. With this structure, each player can exploit the information contained in the other player's action only when he takes the “pivotalizing action”. This feature has two consequences: (1) When the fear of miscoordination is not too large, in order to utilize the other player's information, each player takes the “pivotalizing action” more often than he would based solely on his private information, and (2) best responses feature both strategic complementarities and strategic substitutes, implying that the game is not supermodular nor a typical global game. This class of games has applications in a wide range of economic and political phenomena, including war and peace, protest/revolution/coup/ strike, interest groups lobbying, international trade, and adoption of a new technology. My second essay, Collective Action with Uncertain Payoffs, studies the decision problem of citizens who must decide whether to submit to the status quo or mount a revolution. If they coordinate, they can overthrow the status quo. Otherwise, the status quo is preserved and participants in a failed revolution are punished. Citizens face two types of uncertainty. (a) non-strategic: they are uncertain about the relative payoffs of the status quo and revolution, (b) strategic: they are uncertain about each other's assessments of the relative payoff. I draw on the existing literature and historical evidence to argue that the uncertainty in the payoffs of status quo and revolution is intrinsic in politics. Several counter-intuitive findings emerge: (1) Better communication between citizens can lower the likelihood of revolution. In fact, when the punishment for failed protest is not too harsh and citizens' private knowledge is accurate, then further communication reduces incentives to revolt. (2) Increasing strategic uncertainty can increase the likelihood of revolution attempts, and even the likelihood of successful revolution. In particular, revolt may be more likely when citizens privately obtain information than when they receive information from a common media source. (3) Two dilemmas arise concerning the intensity and frequency of punishment (repression), and the frequency of protest. Punishment Dilemma 1: harsher punishments may increase the probability that punishment is materialized. That is, as the state increases the punishment for dissent, it might also have to punish more dissidents. It is only when the punishment is sufficiently harsh, that harsher punishment reduces the frequency of its application. Punishment Dilemma 1 leads to Punishment Dilemma 2: the frequencies of repression and protest can be positively or negatively correlated depending on the intensity of repression. My third essay, The Repression Puzzle, investigates the relationship between the intensity of grievances and the likelihood of repression. First, I make the observation that the occurrence of state repression is a puzzle. If repression is to succeed, dissidents should not rebel. If it is to fail, the state should concede in order to save the costs of unsuccessful repression. I then propose an explanation for the “repression puzzle” that hinges on information asymmetries between the state and dissidents about the costs of repression to the state, and hence the likelihood of its application by the state. I present a formal model that combines the insights of grievance-based and political process theories to investigate the consequences of this information asymmetry for the dissidents' contentious actions and for the relationship between the magnitude of grievances (formulated here as the extent of inequality) and the likelihood of repression. The main contribution of the paper is to show that this relationship is non-monotone. That is, as the magnitude of grievances increases, the likelihood of repression might decrease. I investigate the relationship between inequality and the likelihood of repression in all country-years from 1981 to 1999. To mitigate specification problem, I estimate the probability of repression using a generalized additive model with thin-plate splines (GAM-TPS). This technique allows for flexible relationship between inequality, the proxy for the costs of repression and revolutions (income per capita), and the likelihood of repression. The empirical evidence support my prediction that the relationship between the magnitude of grievances and the likelihood of repression is non-monotone.

Dynamic-Data Driven Real-Time Identification for Electric Power Systems

Power system engineers face a double challenge: to operate electric power systems within narrow stability and security margins, and to maintain high reliability. There is an acute need to better understand the dynamic nature of power systems in order to be prepared for critical situations as they arise. Innovative measurement tools, such as phasor measurement units, can capture not only the slow variation of the voltages and currents but also the underlying oscillations in a power system. Such dynamic data accessibility provides us a strong motivation and a useful tool to explore dynamic-data driven applications in power systems. To fulfill this goal, this dissertation focuses on the following three areas: Developing accurate dynamic load models and updating variable parameters based on the measurement data, applying advanced nonlinear filtering concepts and technologies to real-time identification of power system models, and addressing computational issues by implementing the balanced truncation method. By obtaining more realistic system models, together with timely updated parameters and stochastic influence consideration, we can have an accurate portrait of the ongoing phenomena in an electrical power system. Hence we can further improve state estimation, stability analysis and real-time operation.

School leaders as both colonized and colonizers: understanding professional identity in an era of no child left behind

This study positioned the federal No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 2002 as a reified colonizing entity, inscribing its hegemonic authority upon the professional identity and work of school principals within their school communities of practice. Pressure on educators and students intensifies each year as the benchmark for Adequate Yearly Progress under the NCLB policy is raised, resulting in standards-based reform, scripted curriculum and pedagogy, absence of elective subjects, and a general lack of autonomy critical to the work of teachers as they approach each unique class and student (Crocco & Costigan, 2007; Mabry & Margolis, 2006). Emphasis on high stakes standardized testing as the indicator for student achievement (Popham, 2005) affects educators’ professional identity through dramatic pedagological and structural changes in schools (Day, Flores, & Viana, 2007). These dramatic changes to the ways our nation conducts schooling must be understood and thought about critically from school leaders’ perspectives as their professional identity is influenced by large scale NCLB school reform. The author explored the impact No Child Left Behind reform had on the professional identity of fourteen, veteran Illinois principals leading in urban, small urban, suburban, and rural middle and elementary schools. Qualitative data were collected during semi-structured interviews and focus groups and analyzed using a dual theoretical framework of postcolonial and identity theories. Postcolonial theory provided a lens from which the author applied a metaphor of colonization to principals’ experiences as colonized-colonizers in a time of school reform. Principal interview data illustrated many examples of NCLB as a colonizing authority having a significant impact on the professional identity of school leaders. This framework was used to interpret data in a unique and alternative way and contributed to the need to better understand the ways school leaders respond to district-level, state-level, and national-level accountability policies (Sloan, 2000). Identity theory situated principals as professionals shaped by the communities of practice in which they lead. Principals’ professional identity has become more data-driven as a result of NCLB and their role as instructional leaders has intensified. The data showed that NCLB has changed the work and professional identity of principals in terms of use of data, classroom instruction, Response to Intervention, and staffing changes. Although NCLB defines success in terms of meeting or exceeding the benchmark for Adequate Yearly Progress, principals’ view AYP as only one measurement of their success. The need to meet the benchmark for AYP is a present reality that necessitates school-wide attention to reading and math achievement. At this time, principals leading in affluent, somewhat homogeneous schools typically experience less pressure and more power under NCLB and are more often labeled “successful” school communities. In contrast, principals leading in schools with more heterogeneity experience more pressure and lack of power under NCLB and are more often labeled “failing” school communities. Implications from this study for practitioners and policymakers include a need to reexamine the intents and outcomes of the policy for all school communities, especially in terms of power and voice. Recommendations for policy reform include moving to a growth model with multi-year assessments that make sense for individual students rather than one standardized test score as the measure for achievement. Overall, the study reveals enhancements and constraints NCLB policy has caused in a variety of school contexts, which have affected the professional identity of school leaders.