Incomplete information games of conflict and collective action

My thesis consists of three essays that investigate strategic interactions between individuals engaging in risky collective action in uncertain environments. The first essay analyzes a broad class of incomplete information coordination games with a wide range of applications in economics and politics. The second essay draws from the general model developed in the first essay to study decisions by individuals of whether to engage in protest/revolution/coup/strike. The final essay explicitly integrates state response to the analysis. The first essay, Coordination Games with Strategic Delegation of Pivotality, exhaustively analyzes a class of binary action, two-player coordination games in which players receive stochastic payoffs only if both players take a ``stochastic-coordination action''. Players receive conditionally-independent noisy private signals about the normally distributed stochastic payoffs. With this structure, each player can exploit the information contained in the other player's action only when he takes the “pivotalizing action”. This feature has two consequences: (1) When the fear of miscoordination is not too large, in order to utilize the other player's information, each player takes the “pivotalizing action” more often than he would based solely on his private information, and (2) best responses feature both strategic complementarities and strategic substitutes, implying that the game is not supermodular nor a typical global game. This class of games has applications in a wide range of economic and political phenomena, including war and peace, protest/revolution/coup/ strike, interest groups lobbying, international trade, and adoption of a new technology. My second essay, Collective Action with Uncertain Payoffs, studies the decision problem of citizens who must decide whether to submit to the status quo or mount a revolution. If they coordinate, they can overthrow the status quo. Otherwise, the status quo is preserved and participants in a failed revolution are punished. Citizens face two types of uncertainty. (a) non-strategic: they are uncertain about the relative payoffs of the status quo and revolution, (b) strategic: they are uncertain about each other's assessments of the relative payoff. I draw on the existing literature and historical evidence to argue that the uncertainty in the payoffs of status quo and revolution is intrinsic in politics. Several counter-intuitive findings emerge: (1) Better communication between citizens can lower the likelihood of revolution. In fact, when the punishment for failed protest is not too harsh and citizens' private knowledge is accurate, then further communication reduces incentives to revolt. (2) Increasing strategic uncertainty can increase the likelihood of revolution attempts, and even the likelihood of successful revolution. In particular, revolt may be more likely when citizens privately obtain information than when they receive information from a common media source. (3) Two dilemmas arise concerning the intensity and frequency of punishment (repression), and the frequency of protest. Punishment Dilemma 1: harsher punishments may increase the probability that punishment is materialized. That is, as the state increases the punishment for dissent, it might also have to punish more dissidents. It is only when the punishment is sufficiently harsh, that harsher punishment reduces the frequency of its application. Punishment Dilemma 1 leads to Punishment Dilemma 2: the frequencies of repression and protest can be positively or negatively correlated depending on the intensity of repression. My third essay, The Repression Puzzle, investigates the relationship between the intensity of grievances and the likelihood of repression. First, I make the observation that the occurrence of state repression is a puzzle. If repression is to succeed, dissidents should not rebel. If it is to fail, the state should concede in order to save the costs of unsuccessful repression. I then propose an explanation for the “repression puzzle” that hinges on information asymmetries between the state and dissidents about the costs of repression to the state, and hence the likelihood of its application by the state. I present a formal model that combines the insights of grievance-based and political process theories to investigate the consequences of this information asymmetry for the dissidents' contentious actions and for the relationship between the magnitude of grievances (formulated here as the extent of inequality) and the likelihood of repression. The main contribution of the paper is to show that this relationship is non-monotone. That is, as the magnitude of grievances increases, the likelihood of repression might decrease. I investigate the relationship between inequality and the likelihood of repression in all country-years from 1981 to 1999. To mitigate specification problem, I estimate the probability of repression using a generalized additive model with thin-plate splines (GAM-TPS). This technique allows for flexible relationship between inequality, the proxy for the costs of repression and revolutions (income per capita), and the likelihood of repression. The empirical evidence support my prediction that the relationship between the magnitude of grievances and the likelihood of repression is non-monotone.

From the human rights-based approach to an ecological approach on how to achieve successful inclusion in international disability education

The barriers that people with disabilities face around the world are not only inherent to the limitations resulting from the disability itself, but, more importantly, these barriers rest with the societal technologies of exclusion. Using a mixed methodology approach, I conduct a quest to revealing several societal factors that limit full participation of people with disabilities in their communities, which will contribute to understanding and developing a more comprehensive framework for full inclusion of people with disabilities into the society. First, I conduct a multiple regression analysis to seek whether there is a statistical relationship between the national level of development, the level of democratization, and the level of education within a country’s population on one hand, and expressed concern for and preparedness to improve the quality of life for people of disabilities on another hand. The results from the quantitative methodology reveal that people without disabilities are more prepared to take care of people with disabilities when the level of development of the country is higher, when the people have more freedom of expression and hold the government accountable for its actions, and when the level of corruption is under control. However, a greater concern for the well-being of people with disabilities is correlated with a high level of country development, a decreased value of political stability and absence of violence, a decreased level of government effectiveness, and a greater level of law enforcement. None of the dependent variables are significantly correlated with the level of education from a given country. Then, I delve into an interpretive analysis to understand multiple factors that contribute to the construction of attitudes and practices towards people with disabilities. In doing this, I build upon the four main principles outlined by the United Nations as strongly recommended to be embedded in all international programmes: (1) identification of claims of human rights and the corresponding obligations of governments, hence, I assess and analyze disability rights in education, looking at United Nation, United States, and European Union Perspectives Educational Rights Provisions for People with Disabilities (Ch. 3); (2) estimated capacity of individuals to claim their rights and of governments to fulfill their obligations, hence, I look at the people with disabilities as rights-holders and duty-bearers and discuss the importance of investing in special capital in the context of global development (Ch. 4); (3) programmes monitor and evaluate the outcomes and the processes under the auspices of human rights standards, hence, I look at the importance of evaluating the UN World Programme of Action Concerning People with Disabilities from multiple perspectives, as an example of why and how to monitor and evaluate educational human rights outcomes and processes (Ch. 5); and (4) programming should reflect the recommendations of international human rights bodies and mechanisms, hence, I focus on programming that fosters development of the capacity of people with disabilities, that is, planning for an ecology of disabilities and ecoducation for people with disabilities (Ch. 6). Results from both methodologies converge to a certain point, and they further complement each other. One common result for the two methodologies employed is that disability is an evolving concept when viewed in a broader context, which integrates the four spaces that the ecological framework incorporates. Another common result is that factors such as economic, social, legal, political, and natural resources and contexts contribute to the health, education and employment opportunities, and to the overall well-being of people with disabilities. The ecological framework sees all these factors from a meta-systemic perspective, where bi-directional interactions are expected and desired, and also from a human rights point of view, where the inherent value of people is upheld at its highest standard.