The influence of past behavior on future behavior: a mind-set perspective

A behavioral mind-set refers to the effect of performing a behavior in one situation (e.g., deciding which animals jump higher, dolphins or sea lions) on the likelihood of performing a conceptually similar behavior in subsequent, unrelated situations (e.g., deciding which of two candies to purchase). It reflects the activation and persistence of procedural knowledge. My dissertation circumscribes the construct of a behavioral mind-set and proposes a theoretical framework describing how mind-sets operate as well as their cognitive and motivational determinants. Three sets of studies investigated the role of mind-sets in different domains. The first set of studies explored the influence of making comparative judgments on subsequent decision making. Specifically, I found that making comparative judgment in one situation activates a which-to-buy mind-set that increases the willingness to decide which of two products to purchase in a later situation without considering the option of not buying anything at all. This mind-set can be activated not only by stating preferences for one of two products but also by comparing the relative attractiveness of wild animals, comparing the animals with respect to physical attributes, and estimating how similar one object is to another. Furthermore, the mind-set, once activated, influences not only purchase intentions in hypothetical situations but the actual decisions to purchase one of different types of products that are on sale after the experiment. The second set of studies investigated whether generating supportive elaborations or counterarguments in one situation will influence people’s tendency to engage in similar behavior in a subsequent, unrelated situation. I found that making supportive elaborations in one situation gives rise to a bolstering mind-set that, once activated, increases participants’ disposition to generate supportive thoughts in response to persuasive communications that they receive later and, therefore, increases the effectiveness of persuasion. Correspondingly, generating opposing arguments in an initial situation activates a counterarguing mind-set that increases the tendency to argue against the persuasive communications and decreases its effectiveness. However, a counterarguing mind-set may increase the effectiveness of persuasion if the messages are difficult to be refuted. The third set of studies distinguished between the influence of motivation on consumer behavior and the influence of a mind-set that is activated by this motivation. Specifically, I found that appetitive motivation, which naturally increases people’s tendency to acquire food products, can give rise to a cognition-based acquisition mind-set that increases people’s disposition to acquire non-food products as well. This acquisition mind-set may persist even when the appetitive motivation that gave rise to it is satiated by eating. Moreover, the disposition to acquire non-food products is not mediated by the products’ attractiveness. The studies suggest that motivation and mind-sets may independently influence consumers’ evaluation of a product and their dispositions to acquire it. Motivation is more likely to influence product evaluations whereas a mind-set is more likely to influence consumers’ acquisition dispositions. In summary, a behavioral mind-set can be activated in the process of performing a behavior. And the mind-set may influence people’s subsequent behaviors in unrelated situations in which the activated procedure is applicable. Moreover, motivation to engage in one behavior could also elicit a cognition-based mind-set, which may change people’s subsequent behaviors.

Incomplete information games of conflict and collective action

My thesis consists of three essays that investigate strategic interactions between individuals engaging in risky collective action in uncertain environments. The first essay analyzes a broad class of incomplete information coordination games with a wide range of applications in economics and politics. The second essay draws from the general model developed in the first essay to study decisions by individuals of whether to engage in protest/revolution/coup/strike. The final essay explicitly integrates state response to the analysis. The first essay, Coordination Games with Strategic Delegation of Pivotality, exhaustively analyzes a class of binary action, two-player coordination games in which players receive stochastic payoffs only if both players take a ``stochastic-coordination action''. Players receive conditionally-independent noisy private signals about the normally distributed stochastic payoffs. With this structure, each player can exploit the information contained in the other player's action only when he takes the “pivotalizing action”. This feature has two consequences: (1) When the fear of miscoordination is not too large, in order to utilize the other player's information, each player takes the “pivotalizing action” more often than he would based solely on his private information, and (2) best responses feature both strategic complementarities and strategic substitutes, implying that the game is not supermodular nor a typical global game. This class of games has applications in a wide range of economic and political phenomena, including war and peace, protest/revolution/coup/ strike, interest groups lobbying, international trade, and adoption of a new technology. My second essay, Collective Action with Uncertain Payoffs, studies the decision problem of citizens who must decide whether to submit to the status quo or mount a revolution. If they coordinate, they can overthrow the status quo. Otherwise, the status quo is preserved and participants in a failed revolution are punished. Citizens face two types of uncertainty. (a) non-strategic: they are uncertain about the relative payoffs of the status quo and revolution, (b) strategic: they are uncertain about each other's assessments of the relative payoff. I draw on the existing literature and historical evidence to argue that the uncertainty in the payoffs of status quo and revolution is intrinsic in politics. Several counter-intuitive findings emerge: (1) Better communication between citizens can lower the likelihood of revolution. In fact, when the punishment for failed protest is not too harsh and citizens' private knowledge is accurate, then further communication reduces incentives to revolt. (2) Increasing strategic uncertainty can increase the likelihood of revolution attempts, and even the likelihood of successful revolution. In particular, revolt may be more likely when citizens privately obtain information than when they receive information from a common media source. (3) Two dilemmas arise concerning the intensity and frequency of punishment (repression), and the frequency of protest. Punishment Dilemma 1: harsher punishments may increase the probability that punishment is materialized. That is, as the state increases the punishment for dissent, it might also have to punish more dissidents. It is only when the punishment is sufficiently harsh, that harsher punishment reduces the frequency of its application. Punishment Dilemma 1 leads to Punishment Dilemma 2: the frequencies of repression and protest can be positively or negatively correlated depending on the intensity of repression. My third essay, The Repression Puzzle, investigates the relationship between the intensity of grievances and the likelihood of repression. First, I make the observation that the occurrence of state repression is a puzzle. If repression is to succeed, dissidents should not rebel. If it is to fail, the state should concede in order to save the costs of unsuccessful repression. I then propose an explanation for the “repression puzzle” that hinges on information asymmetries between the state and dissidents about the costs of repression to the state, and hence the likelihood of its application by the state. I present a formal model that combines the insights of grievance-based and political process theories to investigate the consequences of this information asymmetry for the dissidents' contentious actions and for the relationship between the magnitude of grievances (formulated here as the extent of inequality) and the likelihood of repression. The main contribution of the paper is to show that this relationship is non-monotone. That is, as the magnitude of grievances increases, the likelihood of repression might decrease. I investigate the relationship between inequality and the likelihood of repression in all country-years from 1981 to 1999. To mitigate specification problem, I estimate the probability of repression using a generalized additive model with thin-plate splines (GAM-TPS). This technique allows for flexible relationship between inequality, the proxy for the costs of repression and revolutions (income per capita), and the likelihood of repression. The empirical evidence support my prediction that the relationship between the magnitude of grievances and the likelihood of repression is non-monotone.