Connecting: the use of information and communication technologies by older adults in a retirement community

This is a long-term study of the use of information and communication technologies by 30 older adults (ages 70–97) living in a large retirement community. The study spanned the years of 1996 to 2008, during which time the research participants grappled with the challenges of computer use while aging 12 years. The researcher, herself a ‘mature learner,’ used a qualitative research design which included observations and open-ended interviews. Using a strategy of “intermittent immersion,” she spent an average of two weeks per visit on site and participated in the lives of the research population in numerous ways, including service as their computer tutor. With e-mail and telephone contact, she was able to continue her interactions with participants throughout the 12-year period. A long-term perspective afforded the view of the evolution, devolution or cessation of the technology use by these older adults, and this process is chronicled in detail through five individual “profiles.” Three research questions dominated the inquiry: What function do computers serve in the lives of older adults? Does computer use foster or interfere with social ties? Is social support necessary for success in the face of challenging learning tasks? In answer to the first question, it became clear that computers were valued as a symbol of competence and intelligence. Some individuals brought their computers with them when transferred to the single-room residences of assisted living or nursing care facilities. Even when use had ceased, their computers were displayed to signal that their owners were or had once been keeping up to date. In answer to the second question, computer owners socialized around computing use (with in-person family members or friends) more than, or as much as, they socialized through their computers in the digital realm of the Internet. And in answer to the third question, while the existence of social support did facilitate computer exploration, more important was the social support network generated and developed among fellow computer users.

The relationship between personal cognition, social context, and knowledge sharing in global communities of practice

The purpose of this study was to identify the structural pathways of personal cognition and social context as they influence knowledge sharing behaviors in communities of practice. Based on the existing literature, ten hypotheses and a conceptual model built on the basis of the social cognitive theory were developed regarding the interrelationships of the five constructs: self-efficacy for knowledge sharing, outcome expectations, sense of community, leadership of a community, and knowledge sharing. The data were collected through an online questionnaire from the employees who have participated in communities of practice in a Fortune 100 corporation. A total of 438 usable questionnaires were collected. Overall, three analyses were conducted in order to prove the given hypotheses: (a) hypothesized measurement model fit, (b) relational and influential associations among the constructs, and (c) structural equation model analysis (SEM). In addition, open-ended responses were analyzed. The results presented that (a) hypothesized measurement models were valid and reliable, (b) personal cognitive factors, self-efficacy and outcome expectations for knowledge sharing, were found to be significant predictors of community members’ sense of community and knowledge sharing behaviors, (c) sense of community had the most significant impact on the knowledge sharing, (d) as the perceived social context, sense of community mediated the effects of personal cognition on knowledge sharing behaviors, and (e) personal cognition and social context jointly contributed to knowledge sharing. In brief, all of the hypotheses were positively supported. A conclusive summary is provided along with contributive discussion. Implications and contributions to HRD researchers and practitioners are discussed, and recommendations are provided.

Incomplete information games of conflict and collective action

My thesis consists of three essays that investigate strategic interactions between individuals engaging in risky collective action in uncertain environments. The first essay analyzes a broad class of incomplete information coordination games with a wide range of applications in economics and politics. The second essay draws from the general model developed in the first essay to study decisions by individuals of whether to engage in protest/revolution/coup/strike. The final essay explicitly integrates state response to the analysis. The first essay, Coordination Games with Strategic Delegation of Pivotality, exhaustively analyzes a class of binary action, two-player coordination games in which players receive stochastic payoffs only if both players take a ``stochastic-coordination action''. Players receive conditionally-independent noisy private signals about the normally distributed stochastic payoffs. With this structure, each player can exploit the information contained in the other player's action only when he takes the “pivotalizing action”. This feature has two consequences: (1) When the fear of miscoordination is not too large, in order to utilize the other player's information, each player takes the “pivotalizing action” more often than he would based solely on his private information, and (2) best responses feature both strategic complementarities and strategic substitutes, implying that the game is not supermodular nor a typical global game. This class of games has applications in a wide range of economic and political phenomena, including war and peace, protest/revolution/coup/ strike, interest groups lobbying, international trade, and adoption of a new technology. My second essay, Collective Action with Uncertain Payoffs, studies the decision problem of citizens who must decide whether to submit to the status quo or mount a revolution. If they coordinate, they can overthrow the status quo. Otherwise, the status quo is preserved and participants in a failed revolution are punished. Citizens face two types of uncertainty. (a) non-strategic: they are uncertain about the relative payoffs of the status quo and revolution, (b) strategic: they are uncertain about each other's assessments of the relative payoff. I draw on the existing literature and historical evidence to argue that the uncertainty in the payoffs of status quo and revolution is intrinsic in politics. Several counter-intuitive findings emerge: (1) Better communication between citizens can lower the likelihood of revolution. In fact, when the punishment for failed protest is not too harsh and citizens' private knowledge is accurate, then further communication reduces incentives to revolt. (2) Increasing strategic uncertainty can increase the likelihood of revolution attempts, and even the likelihood of successful revolution. In particular, revolt may be more likely when citizens privately obtain information than when they receive information from a common media source. (3) Two dilemmas arise concerning the intensity and frequency of punishment (repression), and the frequency of protest. Punishment Dilemma 1: harsher punishments may increase the probability that punishment is materialized. That is, as the state increases the punishment for dissent, it might also have to punish more dissidents. It is only when the punishment is sufficiently harsh, that harsher punishment reduces the frequency of its application. Punishment Dilemma 1 leads to Punishment Dilemma 2: the frequencies of repression and protest can be positively or negatively correlated depending on the intensity of repression. My third essay, The Repression Puzzle, investigates the relationship between the intensity of grievances and the likelihood of repression. First, I make the observation that the occurrence of state repression is a puzzle. If repression is to succeed, dissidents should not rebel. If it is to fail, the state should concede in order to save the costs of unsuccessful repression. I then propose an explanation for the “repression puzzle” that hinges on information asymmetries between the state and dissidents about the costs of repression to the state, and hence the likelihood of its application by the state. I present a formal model that combines the insights of grievance-based and political process theories to investigate the consequences of this information asymmetry for the dissidents' contentious actions and for the relationship between the magnitude of grievances (formulated here as the extent of inequality) and the likelihood of repression. The main contribution of the paper is to show that this relationship is non-monotone. That is, as the magnitude of grievances increases, the likelihood of repression might decrease. I investigate the relationship between inequality and the likelihood of repression in all country-years from 1981 to 1999. To mitigate specification problem, I estimate the probability of repression using a generalized additive model with thin-plate splines (GAM-TPS). This technique allows for flexible relationship between inequality, the proxy for the costs of repression and revolutions (income per capita), and the likelihood of repression. The empirical evidence support my prediction that the relationship between the magnitude of grievances and the likelihood of repression is non-monotone.