Word Sense Discovery and Disambiguation

The work is based on the assumption that words with similar syntactic usage have similar meaning, which was proposed by Zellig S. Harris (1954,1968). We study his assumption from two aspects: Firstly, different meanings (word senses) of a word should manifest themselves in different usages (contexts), and secondly, similar usages (contexts) should lead to similar meanings (word senses). If we start with the different meanings of a word, we should be able to find distinct contexts for the meanings in text corpora. We separate the meanings by grouping and labeling contexts in an unsupervised or weakly supervised manner (Publication 1, 2 and 3). We are confronted with the question of how best to represent contexts in order to induce effective classifiers of contexts, because differences in context are the only means we have to separate word senses. If we start with words in similar contexts, we should be able to discover similarities in meaning. We can do this monolingually or multilingually. In the monolingual material, we find synonyms and other related words in an unsupervised way (Publication 4). In the multilingual material, we ?nd translations by supervised learning of transliterations (Publication 5). In both the monolingual and multilingual case, we first discover words with similar contexts, i.e., synonym or translation lists. In the monolingual case we also aim at finding structure in the lists by discovering groups of similar words, e.g., synonym sets. In this introduction to the publications of the thesis, we consider the larger background issues of how meaning arises, how it is quantized into word senses, and how it is modeled. We also consider how to define, collect and represent contexts. We discuss how to evaluate the trained context classi?ers and discovered word sense classifications, and ?nally we present the word sense discovery and disambiguation methods of the publications. This work supports Harris' hypothesis by implementing three new methods modeled on his hypothesis. The methods have practical consequences for creating thesauruses and translation dictionaries, e.g., for information retrieval and machine translation purposes. Keywords: Word senses, Context, Evaluation, Word sense disambiguation, Word sense discovery.

On the Origin of Ideas : An Abductivist Approach to Discovery

The purpose of this study is to analyze and develop various forms of abduction as a means of conceptualizing processes of discovery. Abduction was originally presented by Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) as a "weak", third main mode of inference -- besides deduction and induction -- one which, he proposed, is closely related to many kinds of cognitive processes, such as instincts, perception, practices and mediated activity in general. Both abduction and discovery are controversial issues in philosophy of science. It is often claimed that discovery cannot be a proper subject area for conceptual analysis and, accordingly, abduction cannot serve as a "logic of discovery". I argue, however, that abduction gives essential means for understanding processes of discovery although it cannot give rise to a manual or algorithm for making discoveries. In the first part of the study, I briefly present how the main trend in philosophy of science has, for a long time, been critical towards a systematic account of discovery. Various models have, however, been suggested. I outline a short history of abduction; first Peirce's evolving forms of his theory, and then later developments. Although abduction has not been a major area of research until quite recently, I review some critiques of it and look at the ways it has been analyzed, developed and used in various fields of research. Peirce's own writings and later developments, I argue, leave room for various subsequent interpretations of abduction. The second part of the study consists of six research articles. First I treat "classical" arguments against abduction as a logic of discovery. I show that by developing strategic aspects of abductive inference these arguments can be countered. Nowadays the term 'abduction' is often used as a synonym for the Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) model. I argue, however, that it is useful to distinguish between IBE ("Harmanian abduction") and "Hansonian abduction"; the latter concentrating on analyzing processes of discovery. The distinctions between loveliness and likeliness, and between potential and actual explanations are more fruitful within Hansonian abduction. I clarify the nature of abduction by using Peirce's distinction between three areas of "semeiotic": grammar, critic, and methodeutic. Grammar (emphasizing "Firstnesses" and iconicity) and methodeutic (i.e., a processual approach) especially, give new means for understanding abduction. Peirce himself held a controversial view that new abductive ideas are products of an instinct and an inference at the same time. I maintain that it is beneficial to make a clear distinction between abductive inference and abductive instinct, on the basis of which both can be developed further. Besides these, I analyze abduction as a part of distributed cognition which emphasizes a long-term interaction with the material, social and cultural environment as a source for abductive ideas. This approach suggests a "trialogical" model in which inquirers are fundamentally connected both to other inquirers and to the objects of inquiry. As for the classical Meno paradox about discovery, I show that abduction provides more than one answer. As my main example of abductive methodology, I analyze the process of Ignaz Semmelweis' research on childbed fever. A central basis for abduction is the claim that discovery is not a sequence of events governed only by processes of chance. Abduction treats those processes which both constrain and instigate the search for new ideas; starting from the use of clues as a starting point for discovery, but continuing in considerations like elegance and 'loveliness'. The study then continues a Peircean-Hansonian research programme by developing abduction as a way of analyzing processes of discovery.