Devolution of forest-related rights: Comparative analyses of six developing countries

The study focused on the different ways that forest-related rights can be devolved to the local level according to the current legal frameworks in Laos, Nepal, Vietnam, Kenya, Mozambique and Tanzania. The eleven case studies represented the main ways in which forest-related rights can be devolved to communities or households in these countries. The objectives of this study were to 1) analyse the contents and extent of forest-related rights that can be devolved to the local level, 2) develop an empirical typology that represents the main types of devolution, and 3) compare the cases against a theoretical ideal type to assess in what way and to what extent the cases are similar to or differ from the theoretical construct. Fuzzy set theory, Qualitative Comparative Analysis and ideal type analysis were used in analysing the case studies and in developing an empirical typology. The theoretical framework, which guided data collection and analyses, was based on institutional economics and theories on property rights, common pool resources and collective action. On the basis of the theoretical and empirical knowledge, the most important attributes of rights were defined as use rights, management rights, exclusion rights, transfer rights and the duration and security of the rights. The ideal type was defined as one where local actors have been devolved comprehensive use rights, extensive management rights, rights to exclude others from the resource and rights to transfer these rights. In addition, the rights are to be secure and held perpetually. The ideal type was used to structure the analysis and as a tool against which the cases were analysed. The contents, extent and duration of the devolved rights varied greatly. In general, the results show that devolution has mainly meant the transfer of use rights to the local level, and has not really changed the overall state control over forest resources. In most cases the right holders participate, or have a limited role in the decision making regarding the harvesting and management of the resource. There was a clear tendency to devolve the rights to enforce rules and to monitor resource use and condition more extensively than the powers to decide on the management and development of the resource. The empirical typology of the cases differentiated between five different types of devolution. The types can be characterised by the devolution of 1) restricted use and control rights, 2) extensive use rights but restricted control rights, 3) extensive rights, 4) insecure, short term use and restricted control rights, and 5) insecure extensive rights. Overall, the case studies conformity to the ideal type was very low: only two cases were similar to the ideal type, all other cases differed considerably from the ideal type. The restricted management rights were the most common reason for the low conformity to the ideal type (eight cases). In three cases, the short term of the rights, restricted transfer rights, restricted use rights or restricted exclusion rights were the reason or one of the reasons for the low conformity to the ideal type. In two cases the rights were not secure.