Explorations in the distributional and semantic similarity of words

A straightforward computation of the list of the words (the `tail words' of the list) that are distributionally most similar to a given word (the `head word' of the list) leads to the question: How semantically similar to the head word are the tail words; that is: how similar are their meanings to its meaning? And can we do better? The experiment was done on nearly 18,000 most frequent nouns in a Finnish newsgroup corpus. These nouns are considered to be distributionally similar to the extent that they occur in the same direct dependency relations with the same nouns, adjectives and verbs. The extent of the similarity of their computational representations is quantified with the information radius. The semantic classification of head-tail pairs is intuitive; some tail words seem to be semantically similar to the head word, some do not. Each such pair is also associated with a number of further distributional variables. Individually, their overlap for the semantic classes is large, but the trained classification-tree models have some success in using combinations to predict the semantic class. The training data consists of a random sample of 400 head-tail pairs with the tail word ranked among the 20 distributionally most similar to the head word, excluding names. The models are then tested on a random sample of another 100 such pairs. The best success rates range from 70% to 92% of the test pairs, where a success means that the model predicted my intuitive semantic class of the pair. This seems somewhat promising when distributional similarity is used to capture semantically similar words. This analysis also includes a general discussion of several different similarity formulas, arranged in three groups: those that apply to sets with graded membership, those that apply to the members of a vector space, and those that apply to probability mass functions.

The Role of Abduction in Self-Similarity

Based on the Aristotelian criterion referred to as 'abductio', Peirce suggests a method of hypothetical inference, which operates in a different way than the deductive and inductive methods. “Abduction is nothing but guessing” (Peirce, 7.219). This principle is of extreme value for the study of our understanding of mathematical self-similarity in both of its typical presentations: relative or absolute. For the first case, abduction incarnates the quantitative/qualitative relationships of a self-similar object or process; for the second case, abduction makes understandable the statistical treatment of self-similarity, 'guessing' the continuity of geometric features to the infinity through the use of a systematic stereotype (for instance, the assumption that the general shape of the Sierpiński triangle continuates identically into its particular shapes). The metaphor coined by Peirce, of an exact map containig itself the same exact map (a map of itself), is not only the most important precedent of Mandelbrot’s problem of measuring the boundaries of a continuous irregular surface with a logarithmic ruler, but also still being a useful abstraction for the conceptualisation of relative and absolute self-similarity, and its mechanisms of implementation. It is useful, also, for explaining some of the most basic geometric ontologies as mental constructions: in the notion of infinite convergence of points in the corners of a triangle, or the intuition for defining two parallel straight lines as two lines in a plane that 'never' intersect.

Models of Dispersal and Diversification

Ecology and evolutionary biology is the study of life on this planet. One of the many methods applied to answering the great diversity of questions regarding the lives and characteristics of individual organisms, is the utilization of mathematical models. Such models are used in a wide variety of ways. Some help us to reason, functioning as aids to, or substitutes for, our own fallible logic, thus making argumentation and thinking clearer. Models which help our reasoning can lead to conceptual clarification; by expressing ideas in algebraic terms, the relationship between different concepts become clearer. Other mathematical models are used to better understand yet more complicated models, or to develop mathematical tools for their analysis. Though helping us to reason and being used as tools in the craftmanship of science, many models do not tell us much about the real biological phenomena we are, at least initially, interested in. The main reason for this is that any mathematical model is a simplification of the real world, reducing the complexity and variety of interactions and idiosynchracies of individual organisms. What such models can tell us, however, both is and has been very valuable throughout the history of ecology and evolution. Minimally, a model simplifying the complex world can tell us that in principle, the patterns produced in a model could also be produced in the real world. We can never know how different a simplified mathematical representation is from the real world, but the similarity models do strive for, gives us confidence that their results could apply. This thesis deals with a variety of different models, used for different purposes. One model deals with how one can measure and analyse invasions; the expanding phase of invasive species. Earlier analyses claims to have shown that such invasions can be a regulated phenomena, that higher invasion speeds at a given point in time will lead to a reduction in speed. Two simple mathematical models show that analysis on this particular measure of invasion speed need not be evidence of regulation. In the context of dispersal evolution, two models acting as proof-of-principle are presented. Parent-offspring conflict emerges when there are different evolutionary optima for adaptive behavior for parents and offspring. We show that the evolution of dispersal distances can entail such a conflict, and that under parental control of dispersal (as, for example, in higher plants) wider dispersal kernels are optimal. We also show that dispersal homeostasis can be optimal; in a setting where dispersal decisions (to leave or stay in a natal patch) are made, strategies that divide their seeds or eggs into fractions that disperse or not, as opposed to randomized for each seed, can prevail. We also present a model of the evolution of bet-hedging strategies; evolutionary adaptations that occur despite their fitness, on average, being lower than a competing strategy. Such strategies can win in the long run because they have a reduced variance in fitness coupled with a reduction in mean fitness, and fitness is of a multiplicative nature across generations, and therefore sensitive to variability. This model is used for conceptual clarification; by developing a population genetical model with uncertain fitness and expressing genotypic variance in fitness as a product between individual level variance and correlations between individuals of a genotype. We arrive at expressions that intuitively reflect two of the main categorizations of bet-hedging strategies; conservative vs diversifying and within- vs between-generation bet hedging. In addition, this model shows that these divisions in fact are false dichotomies.

On Musical Self-Similarity : Intersemiosis as Synecdoche and Analogy

Self-similarity, a concept taken from mathematics, is gradually becoming a keyword in musicology. Although a polysemic term, self-similarity often refers to the multi-scalar feature repetition in a set of relationships, and it is commonly valued as an indication for musical coherence and consistency . This investigation provides a theory of musical meaning formation in the context of intersemiosis, that is, the translation of meaning from one cognitive domain to another cognitive domain (e.g. from mathematics to music, or to speech or graphic forms). From this perspective, the degree of coherence of a musical system relies on a synecdochic intersemiosis: a system of related signs within other comparable and correlated systems. This research analyzes the modalities of such correlations, exploring their general and particular traits, and their operational bounds. Looking forward in this direction, the notion of analogy is used as a rich concept through its two definitions quoted by the Classical literature: proportion and paradigm, enormously valuable in establishing measurement, likeness and affinity criteria. Using quantitative qualitative methods, evidence is presented to justify a parallel study of different modalities of musical self-similarity. For this purpose, original arguments by Benoît B. Mandelbrot are revised, alongside a systematic critique of the literature on the subject. Furthermore, connecting Charles S. Peirce s synechism with Mandelbrot s fractality is one of the main developments of the present study. This study provides elements for explaining Bolognesi s (1983) conjecture, that states that the most primitive, intuitive and basic musical device is self-reference, extending its functions and operations to self-similar surfaces. In this sense, this research suggests that, with various modalities of self-similarity, synecdochic intersemiosis acts as system of systems in coordination with greater or lesser development of structural consistency, and with a greater or lesser contextual dependence.

Legal Reasoning in Context

This study in EU law analyses the reasoning of the Court of Justice (the Court of Justice of the European Union) in a set of its preliminary rulings. Preliminary rulings are answers to national courts questions on the interpretation (and validity) of EU law called preliminary references. These questions concern specific legal issues that have arisen in legal disputes before the national courts. The Court of Justice alone has the ultimate authority to interpret EU law. The preliminary rulings bind the national courts in the cases giving rise to the preliminary reference, and the interpretations of EU law offered in the preliminary rulings are considered generally binding on all instances applying EU law. EU law is often described as a dynamic legal order and the Court of Justice as at the vanguard of developing it. It is generally assumed that the Court of Justice is striving to realise the EU s meta-level purpose (telos): integration. Against this backdrop one can understand the criticism the Court of Justice is often faced with in certain fields of EU law that can be described as developing. This criticism concerns the Court s (negatively) activist way of not just stating the law but developing or even making law. It is difficult to analyse or prove wrong this accusation as it is not in methodological terms clearly established what constitutes judicial activism, or more exactly where the threshold of negative activism lies. Moreover, one popular approach to assessing the role of the Court of Justice described as integration through law has become fairly political, neglecting to take into consideration the special nature of law as both facilitating and constraining action, not merely a medium for furthering integration. This study offers a legal reasoning approach of a more legalist nature, in order to balance the existing mix of approaches to explaining what the Court of Justice does and how. Reliance on legal reasoning is found to offer a working framework for analysis, whereas the tools for an analysis based on activism are found lacking. The legal reasoning approach enables one to assess whether or not the Court of Justice is pertaining to its own established criteria of interpretation of EU law, and if it is not, one should look more in detail at how the interpretation fits with earlier case-law and doctrines of EU law. This study examines the reasoning of the Court of Justice in a set of objectively chosen cases. The emphasis of the study is on analysing how the Court of Justice applies the established criteria of interpretation it has assumed for itself. Moreover, the judgments are assessed not only in terms of reasoning but also for meaningful silences they contain. The analysis is furthermore contextualised by taking into consideration how the cases were commented by legal scholars, their substantive EU law context, and also their larger politico-historical context. In this study, the analysis largely shows that the Court of Justice is interpreting EU law in accordance with its previous practice. Its reasoning retains connection with the linguistic or semiotic criteria of interpretation, while emphasis lies on systemic reasoning. Moreover, although there are a few judgments where the Court of Justice offers clearly dynamic reasoning or what can be considered as substantive reasoning stemming from, for example, common sense or reasonableness, such reasons are most often given in addition to systemic ones. In this sense and even when considered in its broader context, the case-law analysed in this study does not portray a specifically activist image of the Court of Justice. The legal reasoning approach is a valid alternative for explaining how and why the Court of Justice interprets EU law as it does.