Profligate Descent : The Cultural Transformations of Evolutionary Narrative

This dissertation traces a set of historical transformations the Darwinian evolutionary narrative has undergone toward the end of the twentieth century, especially as reflected in Anglo-American popular science books and novels. The study has three objectives. First, it seeks to understand the organizing logic of evolutionary narratives and the role that assumptions about gender and sexuality play in that logic. Second, it asks what kinds of cultural anxieties evolutionary theory raises and how evolutionary narratives negotiate them. Third, it examines the possibilities and limits of narrative transformation both as a historical phenomenon and as a theoretical question. This interdisciplinary dissertation is situated at the intersection of science studies, cultural studies, literary studies, and gender studies. Its understanding of science as a cultural practice that both emerges from and contributes to cultural expectations and institutional structures follows the tradition of science studies. Its focus on the question of popular appeal and the mechanisms of cultural change arises from cultural studies. Its view of narrative as a structural phenomenon is grounded in literary studies in general and feminist narrative theory in particular. Its understanding of gender and sexuality as implicated in discourses of epistemic authority builds on the view of gender and sexuality as contingent cultural categories central to gender studies. The primary material consists of over 25 British and American popular science books and novels, published roughly between 1990 and 2005. In order to highlight historical transformations, these texts are read in the context of Darwin s The Origin of Species and The Descent of Man, on the one hand, and such sociobiological classics as E. O. Wilson s On Human Nature and Richard Dawkins s The Selfish Gene, on the other. The research method combines feminist narrative analysis with cultural and historical contextualization, emphasizing discursive abruptions, recurrent narrative patterns, and underlying continuities. The dissertation demonstrates that the relationship between Darwin s evolutionary narrative and late twentieth-century evolutionary narratives is characterized by reemphasis, omissions, and continuous rewriting. In particular, contemporary evolutionary discourse extends the role assigned to reproduction both sexual and narrative in Darwin s writing, generating a narrative logic that imagines the desire to reproduce as the driving force of evolution and posits the reproductive sex act as the endlessly repeated narrative event that keeps the story going. The study argues that the popular appeal of evolutionary accounts of gender, sexuality, and human nature may arise, to an extent, from this reproductive narrative dynamic. This narrative dynamic, however, is not logically invulnerable. Since the continuation of the evolutionary narrative relies on successful reproduction, the possibility of reproductive failure poses a constant risk to narrative futurity, arousing cultural anxieties that evolutionary narratives need to address. The study argues that evolutionary narratives appease such anxieties by evoking a range of cultural narratives, especially romantic, religious, and national narratives. Furthermore, the study shows that the event-based logic of evolutionary narratives privileges observable acts over emotions, pleasures, identities, and desires, thus engendering a set of conceptual exclusions that limits the imaginative scope of evolution as a cultural narrative.

Constructive Perspectives on Inductive Logic

Constructive (intuitionist, anti-realist) semantics has thus far been lacking an adequate concept of truth in infinity concerning factual (i.e., empirical, non-mathematical) sentences. One consequence of this problem is the difficulty of incorporating inductive reasoning in constructive semantics. It is not possible to formulate a notion for probable truth in infinity if there is no adequate notion of what truth in infinity is. One needs a notion of a constructive possible world based on sensory experience. Moreover, a constructive probability measure must be defined over these constructively possible empirical worlds. This study defines a particular kind of approach to the concept of truth in infinity for Rudolf Carnap's inductive logic. The new approach is based on truth in the consecutive finite domains of individuals. This concept will be given a constructive interpretation. What can be verifiably said about an empirical statement with respect to this concept of truth, will be explained, for which purpose a constructive notion of epistemic probability will be introduced. The aim of this study is also to improve Carnap's inductive logic. The study addresses the problem of justifying the use of an "inductivist" method in Carnap's lambda-continuum. A correction rule for adjusting the inductive method itself in the course of obtaining evidence will be introduced. Together with the constructive interpretation of probability, the correction rule yields positive prior probabilities for universal generalizations in infinite domains.

Contributions to the Theory of Finite-State Based Grammars

This dissertation is a theoretical study of finite-state based grammars used in natural language processing. The study is concerned with certain varieties of finite-state intersection grammars (FSIG) whose parsers define regular relations between surface strings and annotated surface strings. The study focuses on the following three aspects of FSIGs: (i) Computational complexity of grammars under limiting parameters In the study, the computational complexity in practical natural language processing is approached through performance-motivated parameters on structural complexity. Each parameter splits some grammars in the Chomsky hierarchy into an infinite set of subset approximations. When the approximations are regular, they seem to fall into the logarithmic-time hierarchyand the dot-depth hierarchy of star-free regular languages. This theoretical result is important and possibly relevant to grammar induction. (ii) Linguistically applicable structural representations Related to the linguistically applicable representations of syntactic entities, the study contains new bracketing schemes that cope with dependency links, left- and right branching, crossing dependencies and spurious ambiguity. New grammar representations that resemble the Chomsky-Schützenberger representation of context-free languages are presented in the study, and they include, in particular, representations for mildly context-sensitive non-projective dependency grammars whose performance-motivated approximations are linear time parseable. (iii) Compilation and simplification of linguistic constraints Efficient compilation methods for certain regular operations such as generalized restriction are presented. These include an elegant algorithm that has already been adopted as the approach in a proprietary finite-state tool. In addition to the compilation methods, an approach to on-the-fly simplifications of finite-state representations for parse forests is sketched. These findings are tightly coupled with each other under the theme of locality. I argue that the findings help us to develop better, linguistically oriented formalisms for finite-state parsing and to develop more efficient parsers for natural language processing. Avainsanat: syntactic parsing, finite-state automata, dependency grammar, first-order logic, linguistic performance, star-free regular approximations, mildly context-sensitive grammars

Logic as the Universal Science : Bertrand Russell's Early Conception of Logic and Its Philosophical Context

Bertrand Russell (1872 1970) introduced the English-speaking philosophical world to modern, mathematical logic and foundational study of mathematics. The present study concerns the conception of logic that underlies his early logicist philosophy of mathematics, formulated in The Principles of Mathematics (1903). In 1967, Jean van Heijenoort published a paper, Logic as Language and Logic as Calculus, in which he argued that the early development of modern logic (roughly the period 1879 1930) can be understood, when considered in the light of a distinction between two essentially different perspectives on logic. According to the view of logic as language, logic constitutes the general framework for all rational discourse, or meaningful use of language, whereas the conception of logic as calculus regards logic more as a symbolism which is subject to reinterpretation. The calculus-view paves the way for systematic metatheory, where logic itself becomes a subject of mathematical study (model-theory). Several scholars have interpreted Russell s views on logic with the help of the interpretative tool introduced by van Heijenoort,. They have commonly argued that Russell s is a clear-cut case of the view of logic as language. In the present study a detailed reconstruction of the view and its implications is provided, and it is argued that the interpretation is seriously misleading as to what he really thought about logic. I argue that Russell s conception is best understood by setting it in its proper philosophical context. This is constituted by Immanuel Kant s theory of mathematics. Kant had argued that purely conceptual thought basically, the logical forms recognised in Aristotelian logic cannot capture the content of mathematical judgments and reasonings. Mathematical cognition is not grounded in logic but in space and time as the pure forms of intuition. As against this view, Russell argued that once logic is developed into a proper tool which can be applied to mathematical theories, Kant s views turn out to be completely wrong. In the present work the view is defended that Russell s logicist philosophy of mathematics, or the view that mathematics is really only logic, is based on what I term the Bolzanian account of logic . According to this conception, (i) the distinction between form and content is not explanatory in logic; (ii) the propositions of logic have genuine content; (iii) this content is conferred upon them by special entities, logical constants . The Bolzanian account, it is argued, is both historically important and throws genuine light on Russell s conception of logic.

On probability-based inference under data missing by design

Whether a statistician wants to complement a probability model for observed data with a prior distribution and carry out fully probabilistic inference, or base the inference only on the likelihood function, may be a fundamental question in theory, but in practice it may well be of less importance if the likelihood contains much more information than the prior. Maximum likelihood inference can be justified as a Gaussian approximation at the posterior mode, using flat priors. However, in situations where parametric assumptions in standard statistical models would be too rigid, more flexible model formulation, combined with fully probabilistic inference, can be achieved using hierarchical Bayesian parametrization. This work includes five articles, all of which apply probability modeling under various problems involving incomplete observation. Three of the papers apply maximum likelihood estimation and two of them hierarchical Bayesian modeling. Because maximum likelihood may be presented as a special case of Bayesian inference, but not the other way round, in the introductory part of this work we present a framework for probability-based inference using only Bayesian concepts. We also re-derive some results presented in the original articles using the toolbox equipped herein, to show that they are also justifiable under this more general framework. Here the assumption of exchangeability and de Finetti's representation theorem are applied repeatedly for justifying the use of standard parametric probability models with conditionally independent likelihood contributions. It is argued that this same reasoning can be applied also under sampling from a finite population. The main emphasis here is in probability-based inference under incomplete observation due to study design. This is illustrated using a generic two-phase cohort sampling design as an example. The alternative approaches presented for analysis of such a design are full likelihood, which utilizes all observed information, and conditional likelihood, which is restricted to a completely observed set, conditioning on the rule that generated that set. Conditional likelihood inference is also applied for a joint analysis of prevalence and incidence data, a situation subject to both left censoring and left truncation. Other topics covered are model uncertainty and causal inference using posterior predictive distributions. We formulate a non-parametric monotonic regression model for one or more covariates and a Bayesian estimation procedure, and apply the model in the context of optimal sequential treatment regimes, demonstrating that inference based on posterior predictive distributions is feasible also in this case.

Dependence Logic: Investigations into Higher-Order Semantics Defined on Teams

This thesis is a study of a rather new logic called dependence logic and its closure under classical negation, team logic. In this thesis, dependence logic is investigated from several aspects. Some rules are presented for quantifier swapping in dependence logic and team logic. Such rules are among the basic tools one must be familiar with in order to gain the required intuition for using the logic for practical purposes. The thesis compares Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé (EF) games of first order logic and dependence logic and defines a third EF game that characterises a mixed case where first order formulas are measured in the formula rank of dependence logic. The thesis contains detailed proofs of several translations between dependence logic, team logic, second order logic and its existential fragment. Translations are useful for showing relationships between the expressive powers of logics. Also, by inspecting the form of the translated formulas, one can see how an aspect of one logic can be expressed in the other logic. The thesis makes preliminary investigations into proof theory of dependence logic. Attempts focus on finding a complete proof system for a modest yet nontrivial fragment of dependence logic. A key problem is identified and addressed in adapting a known proof system of classical propositional logic to become a proof system for the fragment, namely that the rule of contraction is needed but is unsound in its unrestricted form. A proof system is suggested for the fragment and its completeness conjectured. Finally, the thesis investigates the very foundation of dependence logic. An alternative semantics called 1-semantics is suggested for the syntax of dependence logic. There are several key differences between 1-semantics and other semantics of dependence logic. 1-semantics is derived from first order semantics by a natural type shift. Therefore 1-semantics reflects an established semantics in a coherent manner. Negation in 1-semantics is a semantic operation and satisfies the law of excluded middle. A translation is provided from unrestricted formulas of existential second order logic into 1-semantics. Also game theoretic semantics are considerd in the light of 1-semantics.

Group Beliefs : Studies on the Nature and Logic of Collective Doxastic Attitudes

This thesis studies the nature and logic of collective doxastic attitudes, or what is referred to in ordinary language as "group beliefs". Beliefs and other intentional attitudes are attributed to groups and collections of people, and such attributions are used to explain and predict the actions of groups. The thesis develops an understanding of group beliefs as voluntarily adopted views or acceptances rather than as ordinary beliefs. Such an understanding can provide new answers to questions concerning collective knowledge and justification of group beliefs, and it allows developing modal logics with collective doxastic and epistemic notions. The thesis consists of six articles. The first three articles are philosophical studies concerned with the nature of group beliefs. The last three articles are logical studies that aim at developing proof-theoretical calculi for reasoning about collective doxastic attitudes.

Rethinking Service Companies’ Business Logic: Do We Need a Customer-Dominant Logic as a Guideline?

Purpose –This paper explores and expands the roles of customers and companies in creating value by introducing a new a customer-based approach to service. The customer’s logic is examined as being the foundation of a customer-based marketing and business logic. Design/methodology/approach – The authors argue that both goods-dominant logics and service-dominant logics are provider-dominant. Contrasting the customer-dominant logic with provider-dominant logics, the paper examines the creation of service value from the perspectives of value-in-use, the customer’s own context, and the customer’s experience of service. Findings –Moving from a provider-dominant logic to a customer-dominant logic uncovered five major challenges to service marketers: Company involvement, company control in co-creation, visibility of value creation, locus of customer experience, and character of customer experience. Research limitations/implications – The paper is exploratory. It presents and discusses a conceptual model and suggests implications for research and practice. Practical implications –Awareness of the mechanisms of customer logic will provide businesses with new perspectives on the role of the company in their customer’s lives. We propose that understanding the customer’s logic should represent the starting-point for the marketer’s business logic. Originality/value – The paper increases the understanding of how the customer’s logic underpins the customer-dominant business logic. By exploring consequences of applying a customer-dominant logic, we suggest further directions for theoretical and empirical research.

Towards Service Logic: The Unique Contribution of Value Co-Creation

The underpinning logic of value co-creation in service logic is analysed. It is observed that three of the ten foundational premises of the so-called service-dominant logic are problematic and do not support an understanding of value-co-creation and creation that is meaningful for theoretical development and decision making in business and marketing practice. Without a thorough understanding of the interaction concept, the locus and nature of value co-creation cannot be identified. Based on the analysis in the present article it is observed that a unique contribution of a service perspective on business (service logic) is not that customers always are co-creators of value, but that under certain circumstances the service provider gets opportunities to co-create value together with its customers. Finally, the three problematic premises are reformulated accordingly.

What Can A Service Logic Offer Marketing Theory

The goods-dominated marketing model has major shortcomings as a guiding marketing theory. Its marketing mix approach is mainly geared towards buying and does not include consumption as an integral part of marketing theory. Although it is during the process of consuming goods and services that value is generated for customers and the foundation for repeat purchasing and customer relationships are laid, this process is left outside the scope of marketing. The focus in service marketing is not on a product but on interactions in service encounters. Consumption has become an integral part of a holistic marketing model. Other than standardized goods-based value propositions can be better understood when taking a servicebased approach. It is concluded that marketing based on a goods logic is but a special case of marketing based on a service logic and applicable only in certain contexts with standardized products.

Towards Service Logic: The Unique Contribution of Value Co-Creation

The underpinning logic of value co-creation in service logic is analysed. It is observed that three of the ten foundational premises of the so-called service-dominant logic are problematic and do not support an understanding of value-co-creation and creation that is meaningful for theoretical development and decision making in business and marketing practice. Without a thorough understanding of the interaction concept, the locus and nature of value co-creation cannot be identified. Based on the analysis in the present article it is observed that a unique contribution of a service perspective on business (service logic) is not that customers always are co-creators of value, but that under certain circumstances the service provider gets opportunities to co-create value together with its customers. Finally, the three problematic premises are reformulated accordingly.

Constructions and situations : a constructivist reading of Hegel's System

The object of this work is Hegel's Logic, which comprises the first third of his philosophical System that also includes the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit. The work is divided into two parts, where the first part investigates Hegel s Logic in itself or without an explicit reference to rest of Hegel's System. It is argued in the first part that Hegel's Logic contains a methodology for constructing examples of basic ontological categories. The starting point on which this construction is based is a structure Hegel calls Nothing, which I argue to be identical with an empty situation, that is, a situation with no objects in it. Examples of further categories are constructed, firstly, by making previous structures objects of new situations. This rule makes it possible for Hegel to introduce examples of ontological structures that contain objects as constituents. Secondly, Hegel takes also the very constructions he uses as constituents of further structures: thus, he is able to exemplify ontological categories involving causal relations. The final result of Hegel's Logic should then be a model of Hegel s Logic itself, or at least of its basic methods. The second part of the work focuses on the relation of Hegel's Logic to the other parts of Hegel's System. My interpretation tries to avoid, firstly, the extreme of taking Hegel's System as a grand metaphysical attempt to deduce what exists through abstract thinking, and secondly, the extreme of seeing Hegel's System as mere diluted Kantianism or a second-order investigation of theories concerning objects instead of actual objects. I suggest a third manner of reading Hegel's System, based on extending the constructivism of Hegel's Logic to the whole of his philosophical System. According to this interpretation, transitions between parts of Hegel's System should not be understood as proofs of any sort, but as constructions of one structure or its model from another structure. Hence, these transitions involve at least, and especially within the Philosophy of Nature, modelling of one type of object or phenomenon through characteristics of an object or phenomenon of another type, and in the best case, and especially within the Philosophy of Spirit, transformations of an object or phenomenon of one type into an object or phenomenon of another type. Thus, the transitions and descriptions within Hegel's System concern actual objects and not mere theories, but they still involve no fallacious deductions.