Essays on Microcredit in Rural Bangladesh

This thesis is a collection of three essays on Bangladeshi microcredit. One of the essays examines the effect of microcredit on the cost of crime. The other two analyze the functioning mechanism of microcredit programs, i.e. credit allocation rules and credit recovery policy. In Essay 1, the demand for microcredit and its allocation rules is studied. Microcredit is claimed to be the most effective means of supplying credit to the poorest of the poor in rural Bangladesh. This fact has not yet been examined among households who demand microcredit. The results of this essay show that educated households are more likely to demand microcredit and its demand does not differ by sex. The results also show that microcredit programs follow different credit allocation rules for male and female applicants. Education is an essential characteristic for both sexes that credit programs consider in allocating credit. In Essay 2, the focus is to establish a link between microcredit and the incidence of rural crime in Bangladesh. The basic hypothesis is that microcredit programs jointly hold the group responsibility which provides an incentive for group members to protect each other from criminal gang in order to safeguard their own economic interests. The key finding of this essay is that the average cost of crime for non-borrowers is higher than that for borrowers. In particular, 10% increase in the credit reduces the costs of crime by 4.2%. The third essay analyzes the reasons of high repayment rate amid Bangladeshi microcredit programs. The existing literature argues that credit applicants are able to screen out the high risk applicants in the group formulation stage using their superior local information. In addition, due to the joint liability mechanism of the programs, group members monitor each others economic activities to ensure the minimal misuse of credit. The arguments in the literature are based on the assumption that once the credit is provided, credit programs have no further role in ensuring that repayments are honored by the group. In contrast, using survey data this essay documents that credit programs use in addition organizational pressures such as humiliation and harassment the non-payer to recover the unpaid installments. The results also show that the group mechanisms do not have a significant effect in recovering default dues.