Logic as the Universal Science : Bertrand Russell's Early Conception of Logic and Its Philosophical Context

Bertrand Russell (1872 1970) introduced the English-speaking philosophical world to modern, mathematical logic and foundational study of mathematics. The present study concerns the conception of logic that underlies his early logicist philosophy of mathematics, formulated in The Principles of Mathematics (1903). In 1967, Jean van Heijenoort published a paper, Logic as Language and Logic as Calculus, in which he argued that the early development of modern logic (roughly the period 1879 1930) can be understood, when considered in the light of a distinction between two essentially different perspectives on logic. According to the view of logic as language, logic constitutes the general framework for all rational discourse, or meaningful use of language, whereas the conception of logic as calculus regards logic more as a symbolism which is subject to reinterpretation. The calculus-view paves the way for systematic metatheory, where logic itself becomes a subject of mathematical study (model-theory). Several scholars have interpreted Russell s views on logic with the help of the interpretative tool introduced by van Heijenoort,. They have commonly argued that Russell s is a clear-cut case of the view of logic as language. In the present study a detailed reconstruction of the view and its implications is provided, and it is argued that the interpretation is seriously misleading as to what he really thought about logic. I argue that Russell s conception is best understood by setting it in its proper philosophical context. This is constituted by Immanuel Kant s theory of mathematics. Kant had argued that purely conceptual thought basically, the logical forms recognised in Aristotelian logic cannot capture the content of mathematical judgments and reasonings. Mathematical cognition is not grounded in logic but in space and time as the pure forms of intuition. As against this view, Russell argued that once logic is developed into a proper tool which can be applied to mathematical theories, Kant s views turn out to be completely wrong. In the present work the view is defended that Russell s logicist philosophy of mathematics, or the view that mathematics is really only logic, is based on what I term the Bolzanian account of logic . According to this conception, (i) the distinction between form and content is not explanatory in logic; (ii) the propositions of logic have genuine content; (iii) this content is conferred upon them by special entities, logical constants . The Bolzanian account, it is argued, is both historically important and throws genuine light on Russell s conception of logic.

On the moderators of trait avoidance motivation in predicting cognitive biases and adjustment

The present research focused on motivational and personality traits measuring individual differences in the experience of negative affect, in reactivity to negative events, and in the tendency to avoid threats. In this thesis, such traits (i.e., neuroticism and dispositional avoidance motivation) are jointly referred to as trait avoidance motivation. The seven studies presented here examined the moderators of such traits in predicting risk judgments, negatively biased processing, and adjustment. Given that trait avoidance motivation encompasses reactivity to negative events and tendency to avoid threats, it can be considered surprising that this trait does not seem to be related to risk judgments and that it seems to be inconsistently related to negatively biased information processing. Previous work thus suggests that some variable(s) moderate these relations. Furthermore, recent research has suggested that despite the close connection between trait avoidance motivation and (mal)adjustment, measures of cognitive performance may moderate this connection. However, it is unclear whether this moderation is due to different response processes between individuals with different cognitive tendencies or abilities, or to the genuinely buffering effect of high cognitive ability against the negative consequences of high trait avoidance motivation. Studies 1-3 showed that there is a modest direct relation between trait avoidance motivation and risk judgments, but studies 2-3 demonstrated that state motivation moderates this relation. In particular, individuals in an avoidance state made high risk judgments regardless of their level of trait avoidance motivation. This result explained the disparity between the theoretical conceptualization of avoidance motivation and the results of previous studies suggesting that the relation between trait avoidance motivation and risk judgments is weak or nonexistent. Studies 5-6 examined threat identification tendency as a moderator for the relationship between trait avoidance motivation and negatively biased processing. However, no evidence for such moderation was found. Furthermore, in line with previous work, the results of studies 5-6 suggested that trait avoidance motivation is inconsistently related to negatively biased processing, implying that theories concerning traits and information processing may need refining. Study 7 examined cognitive ability as a moderator for the relation between trait avoidance motivation and adjustment, and demonstrated that cognitive ability moderates the relation between trait avoidance motivation and indicators of both self-reported and objectively measured adjustment. Thus, the results of Study 7 supported the buffer explanation for the moderating influence of cognitive performance. To summarize, the results showed that it is possible to find factors that consistently moderate the relations between traits and important outcomes (e.g. adjustment). Identifying such factors and studying their interplay with traits is one of the most important goals of current personality research. The present thesis contributed to this line of work in relation to trait avoidance motivation.

Posted Workers and Free Movement of Services in the European Union – the Impact on National Employment and Immigration Law

This thesis examines posting of workers within the free movement of services in the European Union. The emphasis is on the case law of the European Court of Justice and in the role it has played in the liberalisation of the service sector in respect of posting of workers. The case law is examined from two different viewpoints: firstly, that of employment law and secondly, immigration law. The aim is to find out how active a role the Court has taken with regard these two fields of law and what are the implications of the Court’s judgments for the regulation on a national level. The first part of the thesis provides a general review of the Community law principles governing the freedom to provide services in the EU. The second part presents the Posted Workers’ Directive and the case law of the European Court of Justice before and after the enactment of the Directive from the viewpoint of employment law. Special attention is paid to a recent judgment in which the Court has taken a restrictive position with regard to a trade union’s right to take collective action against a service provider established in another Member State. The third part of the thesis concentrates, firstly, on the legal status of non-EU nationals lawfully resident in the EU. Secondly, it looks into the question of how the Court’s case law has affected the possibilities to use non-EU nationals as posted workers within the freedom to provide services. The final chapter includes a critical analysis of the Court’s case law on posted workers. The judgments of the European Court of Justice are the principal source of law for this thesis. In the primary legislation the focus is on Articles 49 EC and 50 EC that lay down the rules concerning the free movement of services. Within the secondary legislation, the present work principally concentrates on the Posted Workers’ Directive. It also examines proposals of the European Commission and directives that have been adopted in the field of immigration. The conclusions of the case study are twofold: while in the field of employment law, the European Court of Justice has based its judgments on a very literal interpretation of the Posted Workers’ Directive, in the field of immigration its conclusions have been much more innovative. In both fields of regulation the Court’s judgments have far-reaching implications for the rules concerning posting of workers leaving very little discretion for the Member States’ authorities.

From Francovich to Köbler and beyond : The evolution of a State liability regime for the EC

The aim of this paper is to present the evolution of the Francovich doctrine within the European legal order. The first part deals with the gradual development of the ECJ's case law on State liability in damages for breach of EC law. Starting from the seminal Francovich and Brasserie du Pêcheur, the clarification of the criteria set by the Court is attempted with reference to subsequent case law, whereas issues concerning the extent and form of the compensation owned are also mentioned. The second part concerns one of the more recent developments in the field, namely State liability for breaches of Community law attributed to national judiciary. The Court's ruling in Köbler is examined in connection with two other recent judgments, namely Commission v. Italy of 2003 and Kühne & Heitz, as an attempt of the ECJ to reframe its relationships with national supreme courts and appropriate for itself the position of the Supreme Court in the European legal order. The implications on State liability claims by the ruling in Commission v. France of 1997 constitute the theme of the third part, where it is submitted that Member States can also be held liable for disregard of Community law by private individuals within their respected territories. To this extent, Schmidberger is viewed as a manifestation of this opinion, with fundamental rights acquiring a new dimension, being invoked by the States, contra the individuals as a shield to liability claims. Finally, the third part examines the relationship between the Francovich doctrine and the principle of legal certainty and concludes that the solutions employed by the ECJ have been both predictable and acceptable by the national legal orders. Keywords: State liability, damages, Francovich, Köbler, Schmidberger

Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology

The dissertation consists of four essays and a comprehensive introduction that discusses the topics, methods, and most prominent theories of philosophical moral psychology. I distinguish three main questions: What are the essential features of moral thinking? What are the psychological conditions of moral responsibility? And finally, what are the consequences of empirical facts about human nature to normative ethics? Each of the three last articles focuses on one of these issues. The first essay and part of the introduction are dedicated to methodological questions, in particular the relationship between empirical (social) psychology and philosophy. I reject recent attempts to understand the nature of morality on the basis of empirical research. One characteristic feature of moral thinking is its practical clout: if we regard an action as morally wrong, we either refrain from doing it even against our desires and interests, or else feel shame or guilt. Moral views seem to have a conceptual connection to motivation and emotions – roughly speaking, we can’t conceive of someone genuinely disapproving an action, but nonetheless doing it without any inner motivational conflict or regret. This conceptual thesis in moral psychology is called (judgment) internalism. It implies, among other things, that psychopaths cannot make moral judgments to the extent that they are incapable of corresponding motivation and emotion, even if they might say largely the words we would expect. Is internalism true? Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in so-called experimental philosophy, which is a methodological view according to which claims about conceptual truths that appeal to our intuitions should be tested by way of surveys presented to ordinary language users. One experimental result is that the majority of people are willing to grant that psychopaths make moral judgments, which challenges internalism. In the first article, ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’, I argue that these results pose no real threat to internalism, since experimental philosophy is based on a too simple conception of the relationship between language use and concepts. Only the reactions of competent users in pragmatically neutral and otherwise conducive circumstances yield evidence about conceptual truths, and such robust intuitions remain inaccessible to surveys for reasons of principle. The epistemology of folk concepts must still be based on Socratic dialogue and critical reflection, whose character and authority I discuss at the end of the paper. The internal connection between moral judgment and motivation led many metaethicists in the past century to believe along Humean lines that judgment itself consists in a pro-attitude rather than a belief. This expressivist view, as it is called these days, has far-reaching consequences in metaethics. In the second essay I argue that perhaps the most sophisticated form of contemporary expressivism, Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism, according to which moral judgments are decisions or contingency plans, is implausible from the perspective of the theory of action. In certain circumstances it is possible to think that something is morally required of one without deciding to do so. Morality is not a matter of the will. Instead, I sketch on the basis of Robert Brandom’s inferentialist semantics a weak form of judgment internalism, according to which the content of moral judgment is determined by a commitment to a particular kind of practical reasoning. The last two essays in the dissertation emphasize the role of mutual recognition in the development and maintenance of responsible and autonomous moral agency. I defend a compatibilist view of autonomy, according to which agents who are unable to recognize right and wrong or act accordingly are not responsible for their actions – it is not fair to praise or blame them, since they lacked the relevant capacity to do otherwise. Conversely, autonomy demands an ability to recognize reasons and act on them. But as a long tradition in German moral philosophy whose best-known contemporary representative is Axel Honneth has it, both being aware of reasons and acting on them requires also the right sort of higher-order attitudes toward the self. Without self-respect and self-confidence we remain at the mercy of external pressures, even if we have the necessary normative competence. These attitudes toward the self, in turn, are formed through mutual recognition – we value ourselves when those who we value value us. Thus, standing in the right sort of relations of recognition is indirectly necessary for autonomy and moral responsibility. Recognition and valuing are concretely manifest in actions and institutions, whose practices make possible participation on an equal footing. Seeing this opens the way for a kind of normative social criticism that is grounded in the value of freedom and automomy, but is not limited to defending negative rights. It thus offers a new way to bridge the gap between liberalism and communitarianism.

Legal Reasoning in Context

This study in EU law analyses the reasoning of the Court of Justice (the Court of Justice of the European Union) in a set of its preliminary rulings. Preliminary rulings are answers to national courts questions on the interpretation (and validity) of EU law called preliminary references. These questions concern specific legal issues that have arisen in legal disputes before the national courts. The Court of Justice alone has the ultimate authority to interpret EU law. The preliminary rulings bind the national courts in the cases giving rise to the preliminary reference, and the interpretations of EU law offered in the preliminary rulings are considered generally binding on all instances applying EU law. EU law is often described as a dynamic legal order and the Court of Justice as at the vanguard of developing it. It is generally assumed that the Court of Justice is striving to realise the EU s meta-level purpose (telos): integration. Against this backdrop one can understand the criticism the Court of Justice is often faced with in certain fields of EU law that can be described as developing. This criticism concerns the Court s (negatively) activist way of not just stating the law but developing or even making law. It is difficult to analyse or prove wrong this accusation as it is not in methodological terms clearly established what constitutes judicial activism, or more exactly where the threshold of negative activism lies. Moreover, one popular approach to assessing the role of the Court of Justice described as integration through law has become fairly political, neglecting to take into consideration the special nature of law as both facilitating and constraining action, not merely a medium for furthering integration. This study offers a legal reasoning approach of a more legalist nature, in order to balance the existing mix of approaches to explaining what the Court of Justice does and how. Reliance on legal reasoning is found to offer a working framework for analysis, whereas the tools for an analysis based on activism are found lacking. The legal reasoning approach enables one to assess whether or not the Court of Justice is pertaining to its own established criteria of interpretation of EU law, and if it is not, one should look more in detail at how the interpretation fits with earlier case-law and doctrines of EU law. This study examines the reasoning of the Court of Justice in a set of objectively chosen cases. The emphasis of the study is on analysing how the Court of Justice applies the established criteria of interpretation it has assumed for itself. Moreover, the judgments are assessed not only in terms of reasoning but also for meaningful silences they contain. The analysis is furthermore contextualised by taking into consideration how the cases were commented by legal scholars, their substantive EU law context, and also their larger politico-historical context. In this study, the analysis largely shows that the Court of Justice is interpreting EU law in accordance with its previous practice. Its reasoning retains connection with the linguistic or semiotic criteria of interpretation, while emphasis lies on systemic reasoning. Moreover, although there are a few judgments where the Court of Justice offers clearly dynamic reasoning or what can be considered as substantive reasoning stemming from, for example, common sense or reasonableness, such reasons are most often given in addition to systemic ones. In this sense and even when considered in its broader context, the case-law analysed in this study does not portray a specifically activist image of the Court of Justice. The legal reasoning approach is a valid alternative for explaining how and why the Court of Justice interprets EU law as it does.