Essays on Financial Analyst Forecasts and Recommendations

The trade of the financial analyst is currently a much-debated issue in today’s media. As a large part of the investment analysis is conducted under the broker firms’ regime, the incentives of the financial analyst and the investor do not always align. The broker firm’s commercial incentives may be to maximise its commission from securities trading and underwriting fees. The purpose of this thesis is to extend our understanding of the work of a financial analyst, the incentives he faces and how these affect his actions. The first essay investigates how the economic significance of the coverage of a particular firm impacts the analysts’ accuracy of estimation. The hypothesis is that analysts put more effort in analysing firms with a relatively higher trading volume, as these firms usually yield higher commissions. The second essay investigates how analysts interpret new financial statement information. The essay shows that analysts underreact or overreact to prior reported earnings, depending on the short-term pattern in reported earnings. The third essay investigates the possible investment value in Finnish stock recommendations, issued by sell side analysts. It is established that consensus recommendations issued on Finnish stocks contain investment value. Further, the investment value in consensus recommendations improves significantly through the exclusion of recommendations issued by banks. The fourth essay investigates investors’ behaviour prior to financial analysts’ earnings forecast revisions. Lately, the financial press have reported cases were financial analysts warn their preferred clients of possible earnings forecast revisions. However, in the light of the empirical results, it appears that the problem of analysts leaking information to some selected customers does not appear systematically on the Finnish stock market.