Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.

Learning challenges of NGOs in development : Co-operation of Finnish NGOs in Morogoro, Tanzania

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have gained an important role in development co-operation during the last two decades. The development funding channelled through NGOs has increased and the number of NGOs engaged in development activities, both North and South, has been growing. Supporting NGOs has been seen as one way to strengthen civil society in the South and to provide potential for enhancing more effective development than the state, and to exercise participatory development and partnership in their North-South relationships. This study focuses on learning in the co-operation practices of small Finnish NGOs in Morogoro, Tanzania. Drawing on the cultural-historical activity theory and the theory of expansive learning, in this study I understand learning as a qualitative change in the actual co-operation practices. The qualitative change, for its part, emerges out of attempts to deal with the contradictions in the present activity. I use the concept of developmental contradiction in exploring the co-operation of the small Finnish NGOs with their Tanzanian counterparts. Developmental contradiction connects learning to actual practice and its historical development. By history, in this study I refer to multiple developmental trajectories, such as trajectories of individual participants, organisations, co-operation practices and the institutional system in which the NGO-development co-operation is embedded. In the empirical chapters I explore the co-operation both in the development co-operation projects and in micro-level interaction between partners taking place within the projects. I analyse the perceptions of the Finnish participants about the different developmental trajectories, the tensions, inclusions and exclusions in the evolving object of co-operation in one project, the construction of power relations in project meetings in three projects, and the collision of explicated partnership with the emerging practice of trusteeship in one project. On the basis of the empirical analyses I elaborate four developmental contradictions and learning challenges for the co-operation. The developmental contradictions include: 1) implementing a ready-made Finnish project idea vs. taking the current activities of Tanzanian NGO as a starting point; 2) gaining experiences and cultural interaction vs. access to outside funding; 3) promoting the official tools of development co-operation in training vs. use of tools and procedures taken from the prior activities of both partners in actual practice; and 4) asymmetric relations between the partners vs. rhetoric of equal partnership. Consequently, on the basis of developmental contradictions four learning challenges are suggested: a shift from legitimation of Finnish ideas to negotiation, transcending the separate objects and finding a partly joint object, developing locally shared tools for the co-operation, and identification and reflection of the power relations in the practice of co-operation. Keywords: activity theory; expansive learning; NGO development co-operation; partnership; power

NORDEK : A Plan for Increased Nordic Economic Co-operation and Integration 1968-1970

For the first time the attempt of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden to increase Nordic economic co-operation and integration (NORDEK 1968-1970) is analysed by using records from the four governments archives and interviews with central actors participating. A dominating argument has until now been that dynamics in Nordic economic integration is different from dynamics in European integration. This archive based study disproves the myth however of ideological Nordism and of short term political developments outside Norden as most important for the NORDEK initiative. The NORDEK initiative was actually more a consequence of a long term socioeconomic and socio-political path dependant process. The study also disproves the myth that the NORDEK plan was a political and ideological symbol without socioeconomic substance. The purpose with NORDEK was to create a better basis for generating economic growth and social welfare. The proposed NORDEK institutions were therefore developed to promote economic progress. The study finally shows that the NORDEK failure in 1970 was not a result of lacking economic rationale or incompatible economic interests. The failure was a result of a power struggle in Finnish domestic policy and lacking political will in the other Nordic countries to continue without Finland.

Nature-based entrepreneurship in private forests – The preconditions for the sustainable co-operation between private forest owners and entrepreneurs

Nature-based tourism is one of the fastest growing tourism sectors at the moment. It is also the form of tourism that often benefits the economy of rural areas. In addition to state owned forests, nature-based tourism is in many countries situated in private forests, which are not owned by entrepreneurs themselves. Therefore, the ownership issues and property rights form central challenges for the business activities. The maintenance of good relationships between private forest owners and entrepreneurs, as well as combining their interests, becomes vital. These relationships are typically exceptionally asymmetrical, granting the forest owner unilateral rights regulating the business activities in their forests. Despite this, the co-operation is typically very informal and the existing economic compensation models do not necessarily cover all the forest owners’ costs. The ownership issues bring their own characteristics to the relationship. Therefore, we argue that different aspects of ownership, especially psychological ones, have to be more critically examined and taken into consideration in order to build truly successful relations between these parties. This is crucial for sustaining the business activities. The core of psychological ownership is the sense of possession. Psychological ownership can be defined as a state, in which individuals perceive the target of ownership, the object or idea, as “theirs”. The concept of psychological ownership has so far been mainly used in the context of professional organizations. In this research, it has been used to explain the relationships between private forest owners and nature-based entrepreneurs. The aim of this study is to provide new information concerning the effect of psychological ownership on the collaboration and to highlight the good practices. To address the complexity of the phenomenon, qualitative case study methods were adopted to understand the role of ownership at the level of subjective experience. The empirical data was based on 27 in-depth interviews with private forest owners and nature-based tourism entrepreneurs. The data was analysed by using the methods of qualitative analysis to construct different typologies to describe the essence of successful collaboration. As a result of the study, the special characteristics and the practical level expressions of the psychological ownership in the privately owned forest context were analysed. Four different strategies to perceive these ownership characteristics in co-operation relationships were found. By taking the psychological ownership into consideration via these strategies, the nature-based entrepreneurs aim to balance the co-operation relationship and minimise the risks in long term activities based on privately owned forests.