Kalman Filter Algorithm for Rating and Prediction in Basketball

The Thesis presents a state-space model for a basketball league and a Kalman filter algorithm for the estimation of the state of the league. In the state-space model, each of the basketball teams is associated with a rating that represents its strength compared to the other teams. The ratings are assumed to evolve in time following a stochastic process with independent Gaussian increments. The estimation of the team ratings is based on the observed game scores that are assumed to depend linearly on the true strengths of the teams and independent Gaussian noise. The team ratings are estimated using a recursive Kalman filter algorithm that produces least squares optimal estimates for the team strengths and predictions for the scores of the future games. Additionally, if the Gaussianity assumption holds, the predictions given by the Kalman filter maximize the likelihood of the observed scores. The team ratings allow probabilistic inference about the ranking of the teams and their relative strengths as well as about the teams’ winning probabilities in future games. The predictions about the winners of the games are correct 65-70% of the time. The team ratings explain 16% of the random variation observed in the game scores. Furthermore, the winning probabilities given by the model are concurrent with the observed scores. The state-space model includes four independent parameters that involve the variances of noise terms and the home court advantage observed in the scores. The Thesis presents the estimation of these parameters using the maximum likelihood method as well as using other techniques. The Thesis also gives various example analyses related to the American professional basketball league, i.e., National Basketball Association (NBA), and regular seasons played in year 2005 through 2010. Additionally, the season 2009-2010 is discussed in full detail, including the playoffs.

New Governance and the EU Courts : The Experimentalist Architecture of Judicial Decision-Making

The dissertation examines the role of the EU courts in new governance. New governance has raised unprecedented interest in the EU in recent years. This is manifested in a plethora of instruments and actors at various levels that challenge more traditional forms of command-and-control regulation. New governance and political experimentation more generally is thought to sap the ability of the EU judiciary to monitor and review these experiments. The exclusion of the courts is then seen to add to the legitimacy problem of new governance. The starting point of this dissertation is the observation that the marginalised role of the courts is based on theoretical and empirical assumptions which invite scrutiny. The theoretical framework of the dissertation is deliberative democracy and democratic experimentalism. The analysis of deliberative democracy is sustained by an attempt to apply theoretical concepts to three distinctive examples of governance in the EU. These are the EU Sustainable Development Strategy, the European Chemicals Agency, and the Common Implementation Strategy for the Water Framework Directive. The case studies show numerous disincentives and barriers to judicial review. Among these are questions of the role of courts in shaping governance frameworks, the reviewability of science-based measures, the standing of individuals before the courts, and the justiciability of soft law. The dissertation analyses the conditions of judicial review in each governance environment and proposes improvements. From a more theoretical standpoint it could be said that each case study presents a governance regime which builds on legislation that lays out major (guide)lines but leaves details to be filled out at a later stage. Specification of detailed standards takes place through collaborative networks comprising members from national administrations, NGOs, and the Commission. Viewed this way, deliberative problem-solving is needed to bring people together to clarify, elaborate, and revise largely abstract and general norms in order to resolve concrete and specific problems and to make law applicable and enforceable. The dissertation draws attention to the potential of peer review included there and its profound consequences for judicial accountability structures. It is argued that without this kind of ongoing and dynamic peer review of accountability in governance frameworks, judicial review of new governance is difficult and in some cases impossible. This claim has implications for how we understand the concept of soft law, the role of the courts, participation rights, and the legitimacy of governance measures more generally. The experimentalist architecture of judicial decision-making relies upon a wide variety of actors to provide conditions for legitimate and efficient review.