Non-reductive Physicalism, Irreducibility of the Mental and the Problem of Mental Causation : A study of Donald Davidson's and Georg Henrik von Wright's positions in the philosophy of mind

In this study I consider what kind of perspective on the mind body problem is taken and can be taken by a philosophical position called non-reductive physicalism. Many positions fall under this label. The form of non-reductive physicalism which I discuss is in essential respects the position taken by Donald Davidson (1917-2003) and Georg Henrik von Wright (1916-2003). I defend their positions and discuss the unrecognized similarities between their views. Non-reductive physicalism combines two theses: (a) Everything that exists is physical; (b) Mental phenomena cannot be reduced to the states of the brain. This means that according to non-reductive physicalism the mental aspect of humans (be it a soul, mind, or spirit) is an irreducible part of the human condition. Also Davidson and von Wright claim that, in some important sense, the mental aspect of a human being does not reduce to the physical aspect, that there is a gap between these aspects that cannot be closed. I claim that their arguments for this conclusion are convincing. I also argue that whereas von Wright and Davidson give interesting arguments for the irreducibility of the mental, their physicalism is unwarranted. These philosophers do not give good reasons for believing that reality is thoroughly physical. Notwithstanding the materialistic consensus in the contemporary philosophy of mind the ontology of mind is still an uncharted territory where real breakthroughs are not to be expected until a radically new ontological position is developed. The third main claim of this work is that the problem of mental causation cannot be solved from the Davidsonian - von Wrightian perspective. The problem of mental causation is the problem of how mental phenomena like beliefs can cause physical movements of the body. As I see it, the essential point of non-reductive physicalism - the irreducibility of the mental - and the problem of mental causation are closely related. If mental phenomena do not reduce to causally effective states of the brain, then what justifies the belief that mental phenomena have causal powers? If mental causes do not reduce to physical causes, then how to tell when - or whether - the mental causes in terms of which human actions are explained are actually effective? I argue that this - how to decide when mental causes really are effective - is the real problem of mental causation. The motivation to explore and defend a non-reductive position stems from the belief that reductive physicalism leads to serious ethical problems. My claim is that Davidson's and von Wright's ultimate reason to defend a non-reductive view comes back to their belief that a reductive understanding of human nature would be a narrow and possibly harmful perspective. The final conclusion of my thesis is that von Wright's and Davidson's positions provide a starting point from which the current scientistic philosophy of mind can be critically further explored in the future.

Self-Concept and School Achievement of Pupils with Cleft Lip, Cleft Palate or Both : A longitudinal study

The goal of this research was to survey the self-concept and school achievement of pupils with cleft lip, cleft palate or both from juvenile age to adolescence. Longitudinal researches of self-concept and school achievement among pupils with cleft lip, cleft palate or both are uncommon. This research was the first longitudinal research ever conducted in Finland among this population. This research can be considered to be a special educational study because of the target group involved. Self-concept consists of the person s entire personality. Personality is biological and deterministic. Self-concept includes concepts, attitudes and feelings that the person has about him or her qualities, abilities and relations to the environment. The individual associates experiences to this personality with earlier observations through the social interaction. The individual will have the consciousness of the person s existence and action. The target group in this study consisted of Finnish children with clefts, who were comprised of four different age groups. The questionnaire was sent to all subjects (N1 = 419) both times. A total of 74 % of children returned the questionnaire in 1988 (N2=305). 48 % of children returned the questionnaire in 1993 (N3=203). 42% of children returned the questionnaire both times (N4=175) . These 175 children formed the research subjects. The survey was conducted in 1988, and again in 1993. In 1988, the pupils surveyed were 9 to 12 years of age, while in 1993 they were between 14 and 17 years old. The data was collected through the use of a questionnaire, which consisted of common questions and a personality inventory test that was developed for Finnish students by professor Maija-Liisa Rauste-von Wright. Quantitative analysis methods were used to examine the structure of self-concept and school achievement. Structures found in this research were observed in relation to disorder, gender and maturation. According to these results, structures of self-concepts and school achievement are in fact stable. Basic self-concept elements are seen to be formed at an early age. The developmental aspects of self-concept following puberty are observed as the stability of self-concept and as the forming of a general self. The level of school achievement is stable, but the structure of school achievement changes. From these results, it is possible to state that the gender of the child has a statistical significance regarding self-concept and school achievement. However, the experienced disorder does not have statistical significance as regards to self-concept and school achievement. Results of self-concept support the research of self-concept conducted earlier in Finland.