Relationships in food chains: an empirical examination of trust, commitment and communication

This report derives from the EU funded research project “Key Factors Influencing Economic Relationships and Communication in European Food Chains” (FOODCOMM). The research consortium consisted of the following organisations: University of Bonn (UNI BONN), Department of Agricultural and Food Marketing Research (overall project co-ordination); Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern Europe (IAMO), Department for Agricultural Markets, Marketing and World Agricultural Trade, Halle (Saale), Germany; University of Helsinki, Ruralia Institute Seinäjoki Unit, Finland; Scottish Agricultural College (SAC), Food Marketing Research Team - Land Economy Research Group, Edinburgh and Aberdeen; Ashtown Food Research Centre (AFRC), Teagasc, Food Marketing Unit, Dublin; Institute of Agricultural & Food Economics (IAFE), Department of Market Analysis and Food Processing, Warsaw and Government of Aragon, Center for Agro-Food Research and Technology (CITA), Zaragoza, Spain. The aim of the FOODCOMM project was to examine the role (prevalence, necessity and significance) of economic relationships in selected European food chains and to identify the economic, social and cultural factors which influence co-ordination within these chains. The research project considered meat and cereal commodities in six different European countries (Finland, Germany, Ireland, Poland, Spain, UK/Scotland) and was commissioned against a background of changing European food markets. The research project as a whole consisted of seven different work packages. This report presents the results of qualitative research conducted for work package 5 (WP5) in the pig meat and rye bread chains in Finland. Ruralia Institute would like to give special thanks for all the individuals and companies that kindly gave up their time to take part in the study. Their input has been invaluable to the project. The contribution of research assistant Sanna-Helena Rantala was significant in the data gathering. FOODCOMM project was coordinated by the University of Bonn, Department of Agricultural and Food Market Research. Special thanks especially to Professor Monika Hartmann for acting as the project leader of FOODCOMM.

Essays on Illegal Activities, Institutions and Economic Growth

In public economics, two extremist views on the functions of a government compete: one emphasizes government working for the public interest to provide value for the citizens, while another regards government mainly as a workhorse for private interests. Moreover, as the sole legitimate authority, the government has the right to define the rules and laws as well as to enforce them. With respect to regulation, two extremes arise: from too little regulation to too much of it. If the government does not function or ceases to exist, the state falls into anarchy or chaos (Somalia). If it regulates too much, it will completely suffocate private activities, which might be considered extralegal (the former Soviet Union). In this thesis I scrutinize the government s interventionist policies and evaluate the question of how to best promote economic well-being. The first two essays assume that the government s policies promote illegal activity. The first paper evaluates the interaction between the government and the mafia, and pays attention to the law enforcement of underground production. We show that the revenue-maximizing government will always monitor the shadow economy, as monitoring contributes to the government s revenue. In general, both legal and illegal firms are hurt by the entry of the mafia. It is, however, plausible that legal firms might benefit by the entry of the mafia if it competes with the government. The second paper tackles the issue of the measurement of the size of the shadow economy. To formulate policies it is essential to know what drives illegal economic activity; is it the tax burden, excess regulation, corruption or a weak legal environment? In this paper we propose an additional explanation for tax evasion and shadow production, namely cultural factors as manifested by religion as determinants of tax morality. According to our findings, Catholic and Protestant countries do not differ in their tax morale. The third paper contributes to the literature discussing the role of the government in promoting economic and productivity growth. Our main result is that, given the complex relationship between economic growth and economic freedom, marketization has not necessarily been beneficial in terms of growth. The last paper builds on traditional growth literature and revisits the debate on convergence clubs arising from demographic transition. We provide new evidence against the idea that countries within a club would converge over time. Instead, we propose that since the demographic transition is a dynamic process, one can expect countries to enter the last regime of stable, modern growth in stages.

Normalization and Charter 77 : Violence, Commitment and Resistance in Czechoslovakia

In Czechoslovakia, the occupation of 1968 denoted the beginning of normalization , a political and societal stagnation that lasted two decades. Dissident initiative Charter 77 emerged in 1977, demanding that the leaders of the country respect human rights. The Helsinki process provided a macro-level framework that influenced opposition and dissident activities throughout Eastern Europe. The study contributes a focused empirical analysis of the period of normalization and the dissident movement Charter 77. Dissent in general is seen as an existential attitude; it can be encapsulated as a morally rationalized critical stance as derived from shared experience or interpretation of injustice, which serves as a basis for a shared collective identity comprising oppositional consciousness as one unifying factor. The study suggests that normalization can be understood as a fundamentally violent process and discusses the structural and cultural manifestations of violence with relation to Charter 77. In general, the aim of the system was to passivize the society to such an extent that it would not constitute a potential threat to the hegemonic rule of the regime. Normalization caused societal stagnation and apoliticization, but it also benefited those who accepted the new political reality. The study, however, questions the image of Czechoslovakia s allegedly highly repressive rule by showing that there was also quite considerable tolerance of Charter 77 and consideration before severe repression was brought to bear against dissidents. Furthermore, the study provides understanding of the motives and impetuses behind dissent, the strategic shifts in Charter 77 activities, and the changes in the regime s policies toward Charter 77. The study also adds new perspective on the common image of Charter 77 as a non political initiative and suggests that Charter 77 was, in fact, a political entity, an actively political one in the latter half of the 1980s. Charter 77 was a de facto hybrid of a traditional dissident initiative and an oppositional actor. Charter 77 adopted a two-dimension approach: firstly, it still emphasized its role as a citizens initiative supporting human rights, but, secondly, at the same time, it was a directly political actor supporting and furthering the development of political opposition against the ruling power.

Joseph A. Schumpeter's Theory of Social and Economic Evolution : a Reconstruction and Critique

The book presents a reconstruction, interpretation and critical evaluation of the Schumpeterian theoretical approach to socio-economic change. The analysis focuses on the problem of social evolution, on the interpretation of the innovation process and business cycles and, finally, on Schumpeter s optimistic neglect of ecological-environmental conditions as possible factors influencing social-economic change. The author investigates how the Schumpeterian approach describes the process of social and economic evolution, and how the logic of transformations is described, explained and understood in the Schumpeterian theory. The material of the study includes Schumpeter s works written after 1925, a related part of the commentary literature on these works, and a selected part of the related literature on the innovation process, technological transformations and the problem of long waves. Concerning the period after 1925, the Schumpeterian oeuvre is conceived and analysed as a more or less homogenous corpus of texts. The book is divided into 9 chapters. Chapters 1-2 describe the research problems and methods. Chapter 3 is an effort to provide a systematic reconstruction of Schumpeter's ideas concerning social and economic evolution. Chapters 4 and 5 focus their analysis on the innovation process. In Chapters 6 and 7 Schumpeter's theory of business cycles is examined. Chapter 8 evaluates Schumpeter's views concerning his relative neglect of ecological-environmental conditions as possible factors influencing social-economic change. Finally, chapter 9 draws the main conclusions.

Customer Commitment and Key Account Management

What is the nature of customer commitment in business-to-business relationships and what are its antecedents? What Key Account Management practices help to build customer commitment? Commitment is an important element of Key Account Management since customer relationships are built upon a the foundation of commitment. Building long-term key account relationships occurs by enhancing and maintaining their commitment. Customer commitment has various antecedents, and managing commitment involves focusing on these antecedents. This paper explains the nature of commitment and describes its antecedents. It also suggests how to manage each of these antecedents to strengthen customer commitment.

The link between foreign aid, public investment and economic growth

Länsimaat ovat rahoittaneet kehitysyhteistyöhankkeita jo lähes kuuden vuosikymmenen ajan, mutta kehitysavun tehokkuudesta ei olla edelleenkään päästy yksimielisyyteen. Yksi avunantajamaiden tapa vaikuttaa kehitysavun tehokkuuteen, eli avun vaikutukseen vastaanottajamaan taloudellisen kasvun kiihdyttäjänä, on sitoa ne julkisen sektorin infrastruktuurihankkeisiin. Joissain tapauksissa tämä vaikuttaa avun vastaanottajan käytökseen ja asenteisiin kehitysapua kohtaan. Tutkielmassa käsitellään kehitysavun tehokkuutta tilanteessa, jossa se on sidottu julkisen sektorin investointeihin kehitysmaassa. Tutkimus pohjaa Kalaitzidakisin ja Kalyvitisin (2008) malliin, jossa osa kehitysmaan julkisen talouden investoinneista rahoitetaan kehitysavulla. Seuraavaksi tarkastellaan ylijäämää tavoittelevan käyttäytymisen (rent- seeking) vaikutusta kehitysavun tehokkuuteen pohjaten Economidesin, Kalyvitisin ja Philippopoulosin (2008) malliin. Tutkielmassa referoidaan lisäksi tutkimuskysymystä sivuavia empiirisiä tutkimuksia, esitellään aluksi tavallisimmat kehitysyhteistyön muodot, sekä esitellään talousteoreettisia näkökulmia kehitysyhteistyön tehokkuuden määrittelylle. Tutkielma perustuu puhtaasti teoreettisiin malleihin ja niissä sovelletut menetelmät ovat matemaattisia. Tutkielmassa käsitellään ensin tapaus, jossa kehitysyhteistyöllä rahoitetaan julkisen sektorin investointihankkeita. Jossain tapauksissa kehitysavun kasvu lasku siirtää vastaanottajamaan kulutusta julkisista investoinneista kulutukseen, jolloin kehitysyhteistyövaroin osittain rahoitettujen hankkeiden koko pienenee, ja suhteellinen tehokkuus laskee. Seuraavaksi tarkastellaan tilannetta, jossa kehitysyhteistyövaroista vain osa päätyy hankkeen rahoittamiseen, ja todetaan, että kehitysavun tehokkuus ja vaikutus maan kansantulon kasvuun vähenee talouden toimijoiden ylijäämää tavoittelevan käyttäytymisen (mukaan lukien korruptio) myötä entisestään. Tämän tutkimuksen perusteella voidaan todeta, että kehitysapu vaikuttaa kehittyvän maan talouden kasvuun tapauksessa, jossa julkisia infrastruktuurihankkeita rahoitetaan osittain maan omin verovaroin ja osittain kehitysyhteistyövaroin. Ylijäämää tavoitteleva käyttäytyminen vaikuttaa kehitysavun tehokkuuteen negatiivistesti vähentäen kehitysavun positiivisia kasvuvaikutuksia.

Appropriate Institutions and Economic Growth - one size fits no-one

Modern-day economics is increasingly biased towards believing that institutions matter for growth, an argument that has been further enforced by the recent economic crisis. There is also a wide consensus on what these growth-promoting institutions should look like, and countries are periodically ranked depending on how their institutional structure compares with the best-practice institutions, mostly in place in the developing world. In this paper, it is argued that ”non-desirable” or “second-best” institutions can be beneficial for fostering investment and thus providing a starting point for sustained growth, and that what matters is the appropriateness of institutions to the economy’s distance to the frontier or current phase of development. Anecdotal evidence from Japan and South-Korea is used as a motivation for studying the subject and a model is presented to describe this phenomenon. In the model, the rigidity or non-rigidity of the institutions is described by entrepreneurial selection. It is assumed that entrepreneurs are the ones taking part in the imitation and innovation of technologies, and that decisions on whether or not their projects are refinanced comes from capitalists. The capitalists in turn have no entrepreneurial skills and act merely as financers of projects. The model has two periods, and two kinds of entrepreneurs: those with high skills and those with low skills. The society’s choice of whether an imitation or innovation – based strategy is chosen is modeled as the trade-off between refinancing a low-skill entrepreneur or investing in the selection of the entrepreneurs resulting in a larger fraction of high-skill entrepreneurs with the ability to innovate but less total investment. Finally, a real-world example from India is presented as an initial attempt to test the theory. The data from the example is not included in this paper. It is noted that the model may be lacking explanatory power due to difficulties in testing the predictions, but that this should not be seen as a reason to disregard the theory – the solution might lie in developing better tools, not better just better theories. The conclusion presented is that institutions do matter. There is no one-size-fits-all-solution when it comes to institutional arrangements in different countries, and developing countries should be given space to develop their own institutional structures that cater to their specific needs.