Reconsidering Relativism and Intentionalism in Interpretation : Donald Davidson, Hermeneutics, and Pragmatism

This study focuses on two philosophical issues related to the interpretation of art. Firstly, it considers the role of authorial intentions in interpretation. Secondly, the study raises the issue of relativism in interpretation through a discussion of the relativistic tendencies apparent in the views of three major figures of contemporary philosophy: Joseph Margolis, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Richard Rorty. The major goal of the thesis is to develop a theory of interpretation supporting the role of authorial intentions in interpretation on the basis of Donald Davidson s late philosophy of language and the holistic account of interpretation that underlies different parts of his philosophy. It is my belief that an intentionalist view of interpretation built on Davidsonian elements manages to form the most convincing defense of that interpretive position against the skepticism present in the views of Margolis, Gadamer, and Rorty. The theoretical issues addressed in the thesis are illuminated by discussions of case-examples, most importantly Richard Wagner s The Valkyrie, Thomas Adés America: A Prophecy, and some symphonies by Dimitri Shostakovich. In chapter one, I present a critical discussion of Margolis robust relativism. While finding Margolis criticism of the self-refutive argument plausible, I, nevertheless, argue that the relativistic logic Margolis offers should not be favored in interpretation. The first parts of chapter two outline Davidsonian intentionalism by presenting a reading of Davidson s later work in philosophy of language and mind, and by indicating its relationship to Davidson s views of literature. Then, I shall compare Davidson s ideas with some recent modest forms of intentionalism found in analytic aesthetics, and argue that Davidsonian intentionalism is in many respects more satisfactory compared to them. Chapter three engages Gadamer s hermeneutics by defending E.D. Hirsch s criticism of Gadamer. Uncovering the shortcomings in the replies of Gadamer s followers to Hirsch s criticism serves as a basis for the defense of intentionalism in interpretation carried out in the chapter. That defense is then extended with a discussion of some recent hermeneutic readings of Davidson s views. Chapter four deals with the standing of intentionalism through Rorty s pragmatist approach to literature. By indicating the position of pragmatist notions of aesthetic experience and imagination in Davidsonian intentionalism, it is shown that an intentionalist approach need not be as impoverished with regard to the value Rorty attributes to literature as he assumes. The concluding chapter outlines some ways in which one can be a pluralist with regard to art and interpretation without falling into relativism.

Other Side of This Life : Death, Value, and Social Being in Thomas Pynchon's Fiction

This dissertation analyzes the interrelationship between death, the conditions of (wo)man s social being, and the notion of value as it emerges in the fiction of the American novelist Thomas Pynchon (1937 ). Pynchon s present work includes six novels V. (1963), The Crying of Lot 49 (1966), Gravity s Rainbow (1973), Vineland (1990), Mason & Dixon (1997), Against the Day (2006) and several short stories. Death constitues a central thematic in Pynchon s work, and it emerges through recurrent questions of mortality, suicide, mass destruction, sacrifice, afterlife, entropy, the relationship between the animate and the inanimate, and the limits of representation. In Pynchon, death is never a mere biological given (or event); it is always determined within a certain historical, cultural, and ideological context. Throughout his work, Pynchon questions the strict ontological separation of life and death by showing the relationship between this separation and social power. Conceptual divisions also reflect the relationship between society and its others, and death becomes that through which lines of social demarcation are articulated. Determined as a conceptual and social "other side", death in Pynchon forms a challenge to modern culture, and makes an unexpected return: the dead return to haunt the living, the inanimate and the animate fuse, and technoscientific attempts at overcoming and controlling death result in its re-emergence in mass destruction and ecological damage. The questioning of the ontological line also affects the structuration of Pynchon's prose, where the recurrent narrated and narrative desire to reach the limits of representation is openly associated with death. Textualized, death appears in Pynchon's writing as a sudden rupture within the textual functioning, when the "other side", that is, the bare materiality of the signifier is foregrounded. In this study, Pynchon s cultural criticism and his poetics come together, and I analyze the subversive role of death in his fiction through Jean Baudrillard s genealogy of the modern notion of death from L échange symbolique et la mort (1976). Baudrillard sees an intrinsic bond between the social repression of death in modernity and the emergence of modern political economy, and in his analysis economy and language appear as parallel systems for generating value (exchange value/ sign-value). For Baudrillard, the modern notion of death as negativity in relation to the positivity of life, and the fact that death cannot be given a proper meaning, betray an antagonistic relation between death and the notion of value. As a mode of negativity (that is, non-value), death becomes a moment of rupture in relation to value-based thinking in short, rationalism. Through this rupture emerges a form of thinking Baudrillard labels the symbolic, characterized by ambivalence and the subversion of conceptual opposites.

Non-reductive Physicalism, Irreducibility of the Mental and the Problem of Mental Causation : A study of Donald Davidson's and Georg Henrik von Wright's positions in the philosophy of mind

In this study I consider what kind of perspective on the mind body problem is taken and can be taken by a philosophical position called non-reductive physicalism. Many positions fall under this label. The form of non-reductive physicalism which I discuss is in essential respects the position taken by Donald Davidson (1917-2003) and Georg Henrik von Wright (1916-2003). I defend their positions and discuss the unrecognized similarities between their views. Non-reductive physicalism combines two theses: (a) Everything that exists is physical; (b) Mental phenomena cannot be reduced to the states of the brain. This means that according to non-reductive physicalism the mental aspect of humans (be it a soul, mind, or spirit) is an irreducible part of the human condition. Also Davidson and von Wright claim that, in some important sense, the mental aspect of a human being does not reduce to the physical aspect, that there is a gap between these aspects that cannot be closed. I claim that their arguments for this conclusion are convincing. I also argue that whereas von Wright and Davidson give interesting arguments for the irreducibility of the mental, their physicalism is unwarranted. These philosophers do not give good reasons for believing that reality is thoroughly physical. Notwithstanding the materialistic consensus in the contemporary philosophy of mind the ontology of mind is still an uncharted territory where real breakthroughs are not to be expected until a radically new ontological position is developed. The third main claim of this work is that the problem of mental causation cannot be solved from the Davidsonian - von Wrightian perspective. The problem of mental causation is the problem of how mental phenomena like beliefs can cause physical movements of the body. As I see it, the essential point of non-reductive physicalism - the irreducibility of the mental - and the problem of mental causation are closely related. If mental phenomena do not reduce to causally effective states of the brain, then what justifies the belief that mental phenomena have causal powers? If mental causes do not reduce to physical causes, then how to tell when - or whether - the mental causes in terms of which human actions are explained are actually effective? I argue that this - how to decide when mental causes really are effective - is the real problem of mental causation. The motivation to explore and defend a non-reductive position stems from the belief that reductive physicalism leads to serious ethical problems. My claim is that Davidson's and von Wright's ultimate reason to defend a non-reductive view comes back to their belief that a reductive understanding of human nature would be a narrow and possibly harmful perspective. The final conclusion of my thesis is that von Wright's and Davidson's positions provide a starting point from which the current scientistic philosophy of mind can be critically further explored in the future.

Expected Performance of the ATLAS Experiment - Detector, Trigger and Physics

A detailed study is presented of the expected performance of the ATLAS detector. The reconstruction of tracks, leptons, photons, missing energy and jets is investigated, together with the performance of b-tagging and the trigger. The physics potential for a variety of interesting physics processes, within the Standard Model and beyond, is examined. The study comprises a series of notes based on simulations of the detector and physics processes, with particular emphasis given to the data expected from the first years of operation of the LHC at CERN.