3 resultados para Statutes.
em Helda - Digital Repository of University of Helsinki
Resumo:
The Birth of the Minority State Church Development of the legal relationship between the state of Finland and the Finnish Orthodox Church 1917 1922 Mika Nokelainen, University of Helsinki, Finland. The present research seeks to explain how the legal relationship developed between the state of Finland and the Orthodox Church of Finland. The main focus is on three statutes: 1) the Statute of the Orthodox Church in Finland as stated by Prime Minister J. K. Paasikivi s cabinet in November 1918, 2) The Republican Constitution of July 1919 and 3) The Freedom of Religion Act of 1923. This study examines how different political goals influenced the three statutes mentioned above. Another important factor that is taken into account is the attitude of the Lutheran Church of Finland, the church of the national majority, towards the Orthodox minority and its judicial position in the country. Finland became independent in December 1917, in the aftermath of the November Revolution in Russia. The Orthodox Church already had hundreds of years of history in Finland. In the 19th century, several statutes by emperors of Russia had made the Orthodox Church an official state church of Finland. Due to the long history of the Orthodox Church in Finland, Prime Minister Paasikivi s cabinet made the decision to support the church in the spring of 1918. Furthermore, the cabinet s goal to occupy East Karelia increased its willingness to support the church. The Finnish-national Orthodox Church was needed to educate the East-Karelians. A new statute on the Orthodox Church in Finland came into force in November 1918, reorganising the administration, economy and legal relationship between the church and state in Finland. With this statue, the cabinet gained some authority over the church. Sections of this statute made possible, for example, the cabinet s interference in the internal affairs of the church. The Republican Constitution of 1919 included the principle of freedom of religion. The state, which previously had been Lutheran, now became non-denominational. However, the Republican Constitution explicitly mentioned the Lutheran as well as the Orthodox Church, which indirectly confirmed the position of the Orthodox Church as the second state church of Finland. This position was finally confirmed by the Freedom of Religion Act in 1923. In general, the Lutheran Church of Finland did not resist the judicial position of the Orthodox Church. However, some Lutherans regarded the Orthodox Church with suspicion because of its intimate connection with Russia.
Puukaupan säännöt : Yksityismetsänomistajien ja metsäteollisuuden puukauppa Itä-Suomessa 1919 - 1939
Resumo:
The Finnish forest industry bought more than half of the timber used in factories and sawmills in the 1930s from non-industrial private forests (NIPF). This research investigates the rules conformed to this timber trade. The main research questions are: what were the rules that influenced the timber trade; and by whom they were set up? Attention is also paid to the factors which advanced the forest owners’ negotiation possibilities. A variety of sources were used: legal and company statutes, timber trade contracts, archives of the forest companies and organisations. Moreover, the written reminiscences collected by the Finnish Literature Society in the early 1970s were used to analyse the views of individual sellers and buyers. An institutional economics approach was applied as the theoretical framework of this study. In the timber trade the seller (forest owner) and the buyer (the employee of the forest company) agreed to the rules of the timber trade. They agreed about the amount and the price of the timber on sale, but also rules concerning, e.g., timber marking and harvesting. The forest companies had a strong control over the written contracts. Neither the private forest owners nor the forest organisations had much influence over these contracts. However, they managed to influence the rules which could not be found in the contracts. These written and unwritten rules regulated, for instance, the timber marking and measurement. The forest organisations such as Central Forestry Board Tapio (Keskusmetsäseura Tapio) and associations of forest owners (metsänhoitoyhdistykset) helped private forest owners in gaining more control over the timber marking. In timber marking, the forest owner selected trees to be included in the timber trade and gained more information, which he could use in the negotiations. The other rule, which was changed despite forest companies’ resistance, was the timber measurement. The Central Union of Agricultural Producers (MTK) negotiated with the Central Association of Finnish Woodworking Industries (SPKL) about changing the rules of the measurement practices. Even though SPKL did not support any changes, the new timber measurement law was accepted in the year 1938. The new law also created a supervisory authority to solve possible disagreements. Despite this the forest companies were still in charge of the measurement process in most cases. The private forest owners attained changes in the rules of the timber trade mainly during the 1930s. Earlier the relative weakness of the private forest organisations had diminished their negotiation positions. This changed in the 1930s as the private forest owners and their organisations became more active. At the same time the forest industry experienced a shortage of timber, especially pulp wood, and this provided the private forest owners with more leverage. Full-text (in Finnish) available at http://helda.helsinki.fi/handle/10224/4081
Resumo:
This study discusses legal interpretation. The question is how legal texts, for instance laws, statutes and regulations, can and do have meaning. Language makes interpretation difficult as it holds no definite meanings. When the theoretical connection between semantics and legal meaning is loosened and we realise that language cannot be a means of justifying legal decisions, the responsibility inherent in legal interpretation can be seen in full. We are thus compelled to search for ways to analyse this responsibility. The main argument of the book is that the responsibility of legal interpretation contains a responsibility towards the text that is interpreted (and through the mediation of the text also towards the legal system), but not only this. It is not simply a responsibility to read and read well, but it transcends on a broader scale. It includes responsibility for the effects of the interpretation in a particular situation and with regard to the people whose case is decided. Ultimately, it is a responsibility to do justice. These two aspects of responsibility are conceptualised here as the two dimensions of the ethics of legal interpretation: the textual and the situational. The basic conception of language presented here is provided by Ludwig Wittgenstein s later philosophy, but the argument is not committed to only one philosophical tradition. Wittgenstein can be counterpointed in interesting ways by Jacques Derrida s ideas on language and meaning. Derrida s work also functions as a contrast to hermeneutic theories. It is argued that the seed to an answer to the question of meaning lies in the inter-personal and situated activity of interpretation and communication, an idea that can be discerned in different ways in the works of Wittgenstein, Derrida and Hans-Georg Gadamer. This way the question of meaning naturally leads us to think about ethics, which is approached here through the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. His thinking, focusing on topics such as otherness, friendship and hospitality, provides possibilities for answering some of the questions posed in this book. However, at the same time we move inside a normativity where ethics and politics come together in many ways. The responsibility of legal interpretation is connected to the political and this has to be acknowledged lest we forget that law always implies force. But it is argued here that the political can be explored in positive terms as it does not have to mean only power or violence.