Patterns of Transcendence : Classical Myth in Marina Tsvetaeva's Poetry of the 1920s

This study examines the position and meaning of Classical mythological plots, themes and characters in the oeuvre of the Russian Modernist poet Marina Tsvetaeva (1892-1941). The material consists of lyric poems from the collection Posle Rossii (1928) and two longer lyrical tragedies, Ariadna (1924) and Fedra (1927). These works are examined in the context of Russian Modernism and Tsvetaeva s own poetic development, also taking into account the author s biography, namely, her correspondence with Boris Pasternak. Tsvetaeva s appropriations of the myths enter into a dialogue with the Classical tradition and with the earlier Russian and Western literary manifestations of the source material. Her Classical texts are inextricably linked with her own authorial myth, they are used to project both her ideas about poetry as well as the authored self of her poems. An important context for Tsvetaeva s application of the Classical myths is the concept of the Platonic ladder of Eros. This plot evokes the process of transcendence of the mortal subject into the immaterial realm and is applied by the author as an extended metaphor of the poet s birth. Emphasizing the dialectical movement between the earthly and the divine, Tsvetaeva s Classical personae foreground various positions of the individual between these two realms. By means of kaleidoscopic reformulations of similar metaphors and concepts, Tsvetaeva s mythological poems illustrate the poet s position between the material and the immaterial and the various consequences of this dichotomy on the creative mission. At the heart of Tsvetaeva s appropriation of the Sibyl, Phaedra, Eurydice and Ariadne is the tension between the body and disembodiment. The two lyrical tragedies develop the dichotomous worldview further, nevertheless emphasizing the dual perspective of the divine and the earthly realms: immaterial existence is often evaluated from a material perspective and vice versa. The Platonic subtext is central for Ariadna, focussing on Theseus development from an earthly hero to a spiritual one. Fedra concentrates on Phaedra s divinely induced physical passion, which is nevertheless evoked in a creative light.

Aristotle on the Perception of Perception : Seeing, Remembering, and Sleeping

This study is an inquiry into three related topics in Aristotle’s psychology: the perception of seeing, the perception of past perception, and the perception of sleeping. Over the past decades, Aristotle’s account of the perception of perception has been studied in numerous articles and chapters of books. However, there is no monograph that attempts to give a comprehensive analysis of this account and to assess its relation and significance to Aristotle’s psychological theory in general as well as to other theories pertaining to the topics (e.g. theories of consciousness), be they ancient, medieval, modern, or contemporary. This study intends to fill this gap and to further the research into Aristotle’s philosophy and into the philosophy of mind. The present study is based on an accurate analysis of the sources, on their Platonic background, and on later interpretations within the commentary tradition up to the present. From a methodological point of view, this study represents systematically orientated research into the history of philosophy, in which special attention is paid to the philosophical problems inherent in the sources, to the distinctions drawn, and to the arguments put forward as well as to their philosophical assessment. In addition to contributing many new findings concerning the topics under discussion, this study shows that Aristotle’s account of the perception of perception substantially differs from many later theories of consciousness. This study also suggests that Aristotle be regarded as a consistent direct realist, not only in respect of sense perception, but also in respect of memory.

Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology

The dissertation consists of four essays and a comprehensive introduction that discusses the topics, methods, and most prominent theories of philosophical moral psychology. I distinguish three main questions: What are the essential features of moral thinking? What are the psychological conditions of moral responsibility? And finally, what are the consequences of empirical facts about human nature to normative ethics? Each of the three last articles focuses on one of these issues. The first essay and part of the introduction are dedicated to methodological questions, in particular the relationship between empirical (social) psychology and philosophy. I reject recent attempts to understand the nature of morality on the basis of empirical research. One characteristic feature of moral thinking is its practical clout: if we regard an action as morally wrong, we either refrain from doing it even against our desires and interests, or else feel shame or guilt. Moral views seem to have a conceptual connection to motivation and emotions – roughly speaking, we can’t conceive of someone genuinely disapproving an action, but nonetheless doing it without any inner motivational conflict or regret. This conceptual thesis in moral psychology is called (judgment) internalism. It implies, among other things, that psychopaths cannot make moral judgments to the extent that they are incapable of corresponding motivation and emotion, even if they might say largely the words we would expect. Is internalism true? Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in so-called experimental philosophy, which is a methodological view according to which claims about conceptual truths that appeal to our intuitions should be tested by way of surveys presented to ordinary language users. One experimental result is that the majority of people are willing to grant that psychopaths make moral judgments, which challenges internalism. In the first article, ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’, I argue that these results pose no real threat to internalism, since experimental philosophy is based on a too simple conception of the relationship between language use and concepts. Only the reactions of competent users in pragmatically neutral and otherwise conducive circumstances yield evidence about conceptual truths, and such robust intuitions remain inaccessible to surveys for reasons of principle. The epistemology of folk concepts must still be based on Socratic dialogue and critical reflection, whose character and authority I discuss at the end of the paper. The internal connection between moral judgment and motivation led many metaethicists in the past century to believe along Humean lines that judgment itself consists in a pro-attitude rather than a belief. This expressivist view, as it is called these days, has far-reaching consequences in metaethics. In the second essay I argue that perhaps the most sophisticated form of contemporary expressivism, Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism, according to which moral judgments are decisions or contingency plans, is implausible from the perspective of the theory of action. In certain circumstances it is possible to think that something is morally required of one without deciding to do so. Morality is not a matter of the will. Instead, I sketch on the basis of Robert Brandom’s inferentialist semantics a weak form of judgment internalism, according to which the content of moral judgment is determined by a commitment to a particular kind of practical reasoning. The last two essays in the dissertation emphasize the role of mutual recognition in the development and maintenance of responsible and autonomous moral agency. I defend a compatibilist view of autonomy, according to which agents who are unable to recognize right and wrong or act accordingly are not responsible for their actions – it is not fair to praise or blame them, since they lacked the relevant capacity to do otherwise. Conversely, autonomy demands an ability to recognize reasons and act on them. But as a long tradition in German moral philosophy whose best-known contemporary representative is Axel Honneth has it, both being aware of reasons and acting on them requires also the right sort of higher-order attitudes toward the self. Without self-respect and self-confidence we remain at the mercy of external pressures, even if we have the necessary normative competence. These attitudes toward the self, in turn, are formed through mutual recognition – we value ourselves when those who we value value us. Thus, standing in the right sort of relations of recognition is indirectly necessary for autonomy and moral responsibility. Recognition and valuing are concretely manifest in actions and institutions, whose practices make possible participation on an equal footing. Seeing this opens the way for a kind of normative social criticism that is grounded in the value of freedom and automomy, but is not limited to defending negative rights. It thus offers a new way to bridge the gap between liberalism and communitarianism.

Knowledge through Discussion : An Interpretation of Epistemology in Plato's Meno

According to Meno s paradox we cannot inquire into what we do not know because we do not know what we are inquiring into. There are many ways to interpret the paradox but the central issue about our ability to reach truth is a profound one. In the dialogue Meno, Plato presents the paradox and an outline of a solution which enables us to reach knowledge (epistēmē) through philosophical discussion. During the last century Meno has often been considered transitional between Socratic thinking and Plato s own philosophy, and thus the dialogue has not been adequately interpreted as an integrated whole. Therefore the distinctive epistemology of the dialogue has not gained due notice. In this thesis the dialogue is analysed as an integrated whole and the philosophical interpretation also takes into account its dramatic features. The thesis emphasises the role of language and definitions in acquiring knowledge. Among the results concerning these subjects is a new interpretation of Socrates s defintion of shape (schēma). The theory of anamnēsis all learning is recollection in the Meno is argued to answer the paradox philosophically although Plato s presentation also contains playful and ironic elements. The background of the way Plato presents his case is that he appreciated the fact that no argument can plausibly demonstrate that argumentation is able to reach truth. In the Meno, Plato makes the earliest explicit distinction between knowledge and true belief in the history of Western philosophy. He also gives a definition of knowledge which is the basis of the so called classical definition of knowledge as justified true belief. In the Meno, true beliefs become knowledge when someone ties them down by reasoning about the explanation. The analysis of the epistemology of the dialogue from this perspective gives an interpretation which integrates the central concepts of the epistemology in the dialogue elenchos, anamnēsis and hypothetical inquiry into a unified whole which contains a plausible argument according to which the ignorant can reach knowledge through discussion. The conception that emerges by such an analysis is interesting both from the point of view of current interests and that of the history of philosophy. The method of knowledge acquisition in the Meno can, for example, be seen as a predecessor of modern scientific methods. The Meno is the earliest Greek mathematical text that has survived in its original form. The analysis presented in the thesis of the geometric passages in the dialogue provides new results both concerning Socrates s geometry lesson with the slave and the example presenting the hypothetical method. Concerning the latter, a new interpretation is presented. Keywords: anamnēsis, epistēmē, knowledge, Meno s paradox, Plato

The Innocent Pleasure : A Study on Luther's theology of music

The aim of the study is to examine Luther s theology of music from the standpoint of pleasure. The theological assessment of musical pleasure is related to two further questions: the role of emotions in Christianity and the apprehension of beauty. The medieval discussion of these themes is portrayed in the background chapter. Significant traits were: the suspicion felt towards sensuous gratification in music, music as a mathematical discipline, the medieval theory of emotions informed by Stoic apatheia and Platonic-Aristotelian metriopatheia, the notion of beauty as an attribute of God, medieval aesthetics as the aesthetic of proportion and the aesthetic of light and the emergence of the Aristotelian view of science that is based on experience rather than speculation. The treatment of Luther s theology of music is initiated with the notion of gift. Luther says that music is the excellent (or even the best) gift of God. This has sometimes been understood as a mere music-lover s enthusiasm. Luther is, however, not likely to use the word gift loosely. His theology can be depicted as a theology of gift. The Triune God is categorically giving. The notion of gift also includes reciprocity. When we receive the gifts of God, it evokes praise in us. Praising God is predominantly a musical phenomenon. The particular benefit of music in Luther s thought is that it can move human emotions. This emphasis is connected to the overall affectivity of Luther s theology. In contrast to the medieval discussion, Luther ascribes to saints not just emotions but particularly warm and tender affections. The power of music is related to the auditory and vocal character of the Word. Faith comes through hearing the Word that is at once musical and affective perception. Faith is not a mere opinion but the affective trust of the heart. Music can touch the human heart and persuade with its sweetness, like the good news of the Gospel. Music allows us to perceive Luther s theology as a theology of joy and pleasure. Joy is for Luther a gift of the Holy Spirit that fills the heart and bursts out in voice and gestures. Pleasure appears to be a central aspect to Luther s theology. The problem of the Bondage of the Will is precisely the human inability to feel pleasure in God s will. To be pleased in the visible and tangible creation is not something a Christian should avoid. On the contrary, if one is not pleased with the world that God has created, it is a sign of unbelief and ingratitude. The pleasure of music is aesthetic perception. This in turn necessitates the investigation of Luther s aesthetics. Aesthetic evaluation is not just a part of Luther s thought. Eventually his theology as a whole could be portrayed in aesthetic terms. Luther s extremely positive appreciation of music illutrates his theology as an affective acknowledgement of the goodness of the Creation and faith as an aesthetic contentment.

Hyveiden harjoittaminen : edellytykset ja esteet

In the first half of the 20th century, most moral philosophers took the concept of virtue to be secondary to moral principles or emotions, though in various and mutually conflicting ways. In the early 1960s interest in the virtues was restored by the analytic philosophers Elizabeth Anscombe and Georg Henrik von Wright, the younger colleagues and friends of the late Wittgenstein. Later, Alasdair MacIntyre became a leading virtue ethicist. In 1981, MacIntyre introduced in After Virtue the concept of practices, which he based on the Aristotelian distinction between praxis and poiesis. This dissertation examines MacIntyre s characterization of the interconnectedness between practices and virtues, especially in relation to skills, education, and certain emotions. The primary position of the virtues is defended against the tendency in modern moral philosophy to overemphasize the role either of principles and rules or of emotions. The view according to which rational action and acting according to the virtues is best conceptualized as following rules or principles is criticized by arguments that are grounded by some Wittgensteinian observations, and that can be characterized as transcendental. Even if the virtues cannot be defined by, and are not based entirely on, emotions, the role of certain emotions on the learning and education of skills and virtues are studied more carefully than by MacIntyre. In the cases of resentment, indignation, and shame, the analysis of Peter Strawson is utilized, and in the case of regret, the analysis of Bernard Williams. Williams analysis of regret and moral conflict concludes in a kind of antirealism, which this study criticizes. Where education of practices and skills and the related reactive emotions are examined as conditions of learning and practicing the virtues, institutions and ideologies are examined as obstacles and threats to the virtues. This theme is studied through Karl Marx s conception of alienation and Karl Polanyi s historical and sociological research concerning the great transformation . The study includes six Finnish-published articles carrying the titles Our negative attitudes towards other persons , Authority and upbringing , Moral conflicts, regret and ethical realism , Practices and institutions , Doing justice as condition to communal action: a transcendental argument for justice as virtue , and Alienation from practices in capitalist society: Alasdair MacIntyre s Marxist Aristotelianism . The introductory essay sums up the themes of the articles and presents some central issues of virtue ethics by relating the classical Socratic questions to Aristotelian practical philosophy, as well as to current controversies in metaethics and moral psychology.