Traditional Village Governance (Desa Adat) and Inter-ethnic Conflict in Bali : A Study of Conflict between Balinese and Migrants: Cases from Municipality of Denpasar

Regional autonomy in Indonesia was initially introduced as a means of pacifying regional disappointment at the central government. Not only did the Regional Autonomy Law of 1999 give the Balinese a chance to express grievance regarding the centralist policies of the Jakarta government but also provided an opportunity to return to the regional, exclusive, traditional village governance (desa adat). As a result, the problems faced by the island, particularly ethnic conflicts, are increasingly handled by the mechanism of this traditional type of governance. Traditional village governance with regard to ethnic conflicts (occurring) between Balinese and migrants has never been systematically analyzed. Existing analyses emphasized only the social context, but do not explain either the cause of conflicts and the ensuing problems entails or the virtues of traditional village governance mechanisms for mediating in the conflict. While some accounts provide snapshots, they lack both theoretical and conflict study perspective. The primary aim of this dissertation is to explore the expression and the causes of conflict between the Balinese and migrants and to advance the potential of traditional village governance as a means of conflict resolution with particular reference to the municipality of Denpasar. One conclusion of the study is that the conflict between the Balinese and migrants has been expressed on the level of situation/contradiction, attitudes, and behavior. Yet the driving forces behind the conflict itself consist of the following factors: absence of cooperation; incompatible position and perception; inability to communicate effectively; and problem of inequality and injustice, which comes to the surface as a social, cultural, and economic problem. This complex of factors fuels collective fear for the future of both groups. The study concludes that traditional village governance mechanisms as a means of conflict resolution have not yet been able to provide an enduring resolution for the conflict. Analysis shows that the practice of traditional village governance is unable to provide satisfactory mechanisms for the conflict as prescribed by conflict resolution theory. Traditional village governance, which is derived from the exclusive Hindu-Balinese culture, is accepted as more legitimate among the Balinese than the official governance policies. However, it is not generally accepted by most of the Muslim migrants. In addition, traditional village governance lacks access to economic instruments, which weakens its capacity to tackle the economic roots of the conflict. Thus the traditional mechanisms of migrant ordinance , as practiced by the traditional village governance have not yet been successful in penetrating all aspects of the conflict. Finally, one of the main challenges for traditional village governance s legal development is the creation of a regional legal system capable of accommodating rapid changes in line with the national and international legal practices. The framing of the new laws should be responsive to the aspirations of a changing society. It should not only protect the various Balinese communities interests, but also that of other ethnic groups, especially those of the minority. In other words, the main challenge to traditional village governance is its ability to develop flexibility and inclusiveness.

The Population Consequences of Sex and Conflict

Natural selection generally operates at the level of the individual, or more specifically at the level of the gene. As a result, individual selection does not always favour traits which benefit the population or species as a whole. The spread of an individual gene may even act to the detriment of the organism in which it finds. Thus selection at the level of the individual can affect processes at the level of the organism, group or even at the level of the species. As most behaviours ultimately affect births, deaths and the distribution of individuals, it seems inevitable that behavioural decisions will have an impact on population dynamics and population densities. Behavioural decisions can often involve costs through allocation of energy into behavioural strategies, such as the investment into armaments involved in fighting over resources or increased mortality due to injury or increased predation risk. Similarly, behaviour may act o to benefit the population, in terms of higher survival and increased fecundity. Examples include increased investment through parental care, choosing a mate based on the nuptial gifts they may supply and choosing territories in the face of competition. Investigating the impact of behaviour on population ecology may seem like a trivial task, but it is likely to have important consequences at different levels. For example, antagonistic behaviour may occasionally become so extreme that it increases the risk of extinction, and such extinction risk may have important implications for conservation. As a corollary, any such behaviour may also act as a macroevolutionary force, weeding out populations with traits which, whilst beneficial to the individuals in the short term, ultimately result in population extinction. In this thesis, I examine how behaviours, specifically conflict and competition over a resource and aspects of behaviour involved in sexual selection, can affect population densities, and what the implications are for the evolution and ecology of the populations in question. It is found that both behaviours related to individual conflict and mating strategies can have an effect at the level of the population, but that various factors, such as a feedback between selection and population densities or macroevolution caused by species extinctions, may act to limit the intensity of conflicts that we observe in nature.

Kin selection, social polymorphism, and reproductive allocation in ants

Social groups are common across animal species. The reasons for grouping are straightforward when all individuals gain directly from cooperating. However, the situation becomes more complex when helping entails costs to the personal reproduction of individuals. Kin selection theory has offered a fruitful framework to explain such cooperation by stating that individuals may spread their genes not only through their own reproduction, but also by helping related individuals reproduce. However, kin selection theory also implicitly predicts conflicts when groups consist of non-clonal individuals, i.e. relatedness is less than one. Then, individual interests are not perfectly aligned, and each individual is predicted to favour the propagation of their own genome over others. Social insects provide a solid study system to study the interplay between cooperation and conflict. Breeding systems in social insects range from solitary breeding to eusocial colonies displaying complete division of reproduction between the fertile queen and the sterile worker caste. Within colonies, additional variation is provided by the presence of several reproductive individuals. In many species, the queen mates multiply, which causes the colony to consist of half-sib instead of full-sib offspring. Furthermore, in many species colonies contain multiple breeding queens, which further dilutes relatedness between colony members. Evolutionary biology is thus faced with the challenge to answer why such variation in social structure exists, and what the consequences are on the individual and population level. The main part of this thesis takes on this challenge by investing the dynamics of socially polymorphic ant colonies. The first four chapters investigate the causes and consequences of different social structures, using a combination of field studies, genetic analyses and laboratory experiments. The thesis ends with a theoretical chapter focusing on different social interactions (altruism and spite), and the evolution of harming traits. The main results of the thesis show that social polymorphism has the potential to affect the behaviour and traits of both individuals and colonies. For example, we found that genetic polymorphism may increase the phenotypic variation between individuals in colonies, and that socially polymorphic colonies may show different life history patterns. We also show that colony cohesion may be enhanced even in multiple-queen colonies through patterns of unequal reproduction between queens. However, the thesis also demonstrates that spatial and temporal variation between both populations and environments may affect individual and colony traits, to the degree that results obtained in one place or at one time may not be applicable in other situations. This opens up potential further areas of research to explain these differences.

Disarming identities : Ethnic identities in conflict resolution: Hindrance or helpful resource?

This thesis proposes that national or ethnic identity is an important and overlooked resource in conflict resolution. Usually ethnic identity is seen both in international relations and in social psychology as something that fuels the conflict. Using grounded theory to analyze data from interactive problem-solving workshops between Palestinians and Israelis a theory about the role of national identity in turning conflict into protracted conflict is developed. Drawing upon research from, among others, social identity theory, just world theory and prejudice it is argued that national identity is a prime candidate to provide the justification of a conflict party’s goals and the dehumanization of the other necessary to make a conflict protracted. It is not the nature of national identity itself that lets it perform this role but rather the ability to mobilize a constituency for social action (see Stürmer, Simon, Loewy, & Jörger, 2003). Reicher & Hopkins (1996) have demonstrated that national identity is constructed by political entrepreneurs to further their cause, even if this construction is not a conscious one. Data from interactive problem-solving workshops suggest that the possibility of conflict resolution is actually seen by participants as a direct threat of annihilation. Understanding the investment necessary to make conflict protracted this reaction seems plausible. The justification for ones actions provided by national identity makes the conflict an integral part of a conflict party’s identity. Conflict resolution, it is argued, is therefore a threat to the very core of the current national identity. This may explain why so many peace agreements have failed to provide the hoped for resolution of conflict. But if national identity is being used in a constructionist way to attain political goals, a political project of conflict resolution, if it is conscious of the constructionist process, needs to develop a national identity that is independent of conflict and therefore able to accommodate conflict resolution. From this understanding it becomes clear why national identity needs to change, i.e. be disarmed, if conflict resolution is to be successful. This process of disarmament is theorized to be similar to the process of creating and sustaining protracted conflict. What shape and function this change should have is explored from the understanding of the role of national identity in supporting conflict. Ideas how track-two diplomacy efforts, such as the interactive problem-solving workshop, could integrate a process by both conflict parties to disarm their respective identities are developed.