Ranskan rooli ja asema läntisessä liittoutumassa neljännen ja viidennen tasavallan vaihtumakohdassa 1956-1958

The study discusses the position of France as the United States’ ally in NATO in 1956-1958. The concrete position of France and the role that it was envisioned to have are being treated from the point of view of three participants of the Cold War: France, the United States and the Soviet Union. How did these different parties perceive the question and did these views change when the French Fourth Republic turned into the Fifth in 1958? The study is based on published French and American documents of Foreign Affairs. Because of problems with accessibility to the Soviet archival sources, the study uses reports on France-NATO relations of Pravda newspaper, the official organ of the Communist Party of the USSR, to provide information about how the Soviet side saw the question. Due to the nature and use of source material, and the chronological structure of the work, the study belongs methodologically to the research field of History of International Relations. As distinct from political scientists’ field of research, more prone to theorize, the study is characteristically a historical research, a work based on qualitative method and original sources that aims at creating a coherent narrative of the views expressed during the period covered by the study. France’s road to a full membership of NATO is being treated on the basis of research literature, after which discussions about France’s position in the Western Alliance are being chronologically traced for the period of last years of the Fourth Republic and the immediate months of coming back to power of Charles de Gaulle. Right from the spring of 1956 there can be seen aspirations of France, on one hand, to maintain her freedom of action inside the Western Alliance and, on the other, to widen the dialogue between the allies. The decision on France’s own nuclear deterrent was made already during the Fourth Republic, when it was thought to become part of NATO’s common defence. This was to change with de Gaulle. The USA felt that France still fancied herself as a great power and that she could not participate in full in NATO’s common defence because of her colonies. The Soviet Union saw the concrete position of France in the Alliance as in complete dependence on the USA, but her desired role was expressed largely in “Gaullist” terms. The expressions used by the General and the Soviet propaganda were close to each other, but the Soviet Union could not support de Gaulle without endangering the position of the French Communist Party. Between the Fourth and Fifth Republics no great rupture in content took place concerning the views of France’s role and position in the Western Alliance. The questions posed by de Gaulle had been expressed during the whole period of Fourth Republic’s existence. Instead, along with the General the weight and rhetoric of these questions saw a great change. Already in the early phase the Americans saw it possible that with de Gaulle, France would try to change her role. The rupture took place in the form of expression, rather than in its content.