Mikä on ihme ja mitä ihmeistä voidaan tietää? : Keskustelu ihmeistä uusimmassa englanninkielisessä uskonnonfilosofiassa

What is a miracle and what can we know about miracles? A discussion of miracles in anglophone philosophy of religion literature since the late 1960s. The aim of this study is to systematically describe and philosophically examine the anglophone discussion on the subject of miracles since the latter half of the 1960s. The study focuses on two salient questions: firstly, what I will term the conceptual-ontological question of the extent to which we can understand miracles and, secondly, the epistemological question of what we can know about miracles. My main purpose in this study is to examine the various viewpoints that have been submitted in relation to these questions, how they have been argued and on what presuppositions these arguments have been based. In conducting the study, the most salient dimension of the various discussions was found to relate to epistemological questions. In this regard, there was a notable confrontation between those scholars who accept miracles and those who are sceptical of them. On the conceptual-ontological side I recognised several different ways of expressing the concept of miracle . I systematised the discussion by demonstrating the philosophical boundaries between these various opinions. The first and main boundary was related to ontological knowledge. On one side of this boundary I placed the views which were based on realism and objectivism. The proponents of this view assumed that miraculousness is a real property of a miraculous event regardless of how we can perceive it. On the other side I put the views which tried to define miraculousness in terms of subjectivity, contextuality and epistemicity. Another essential boundary which shed light on the conceptual-ontological discussion was drawn in relation to two main views of nature. The realistic-particularistic view regards nature as a certain part of reality. The adherents of this presupposition postulate a supernatural sphere alongside nature. Alternatively, the nominalist-universalist view understands nature without this kind of division. Nature is understood as the entire and infinite universe; the whole of reality. Other, less important boundaries which shed light on the conceptual-ontological discussion were noted in relation to views regarding the laws of nature, for example. I recognised that the most important differences between the epistemological approaches were in the different views of justification, rationality, truth and science. The epistemological discussion was divided into two sides, distinguished by their differing assumptions in relation to the need for evidence. Adherents of the first (and noticeably smaller) group did not see any epistemological need to reach a universal and common opinion about miracles. I discovered that these kinds of views, which I called non-objectivist, had subjectivist and so-called collectivist views of justification and a contextualist view of rationality. The second (and larger) group was mainly interested in discerning the grounds upon which to establish an objective and conclusive common view in relation to the epistemology of miracles. I called this kind of discussion an objectivist discussion and this kind of approach an evidentialist approach. Most of the evidentialists tried to defend miracles and the others attempted to offer evidence against miracles. Amongst both sides, there were many different variations according to emphasis and assumption over how they saw the possibilities to prove their own view. The common characteristic in all forms of evidentialism was a commitment to an objectivist notion of rationality and a universalistic notion of justification. Most evidentialists put their confidence in science in one way or another. Only a couple of philosophers represented the most moderate version of evidentialism; they tried to remove themselves from the apparent controversy and contextualised the different opinions in order to make some critical comments on them. I called this kind of approach a contextualising form of evidentialism. In the final part of the epistemological chapter, I examined the discussion about the evidential value of miracles, but nothing substantially new was discovered concerning the epistemological views of the authors.