Mikä on ihme ja mitä ihmeistä voidaan tietää? : Keskustelu ihmeistä uusimmassa englanninkielisessä uskonnonfilosofiassa

What is a miracle and what can we know about miracles? A discussion of miracles in anglophone philosophy of religion literature since the late 1960s. The aim of this study is to systematically describe and philosophically examine the anglophone discussion on the subject of miracles since the latter half of the 1960s. The study focuses on two salient questions: firstly, what I will term the conceptual-ontological question of the extent to which we can understand miracles and, secondly, the epistemological question of what we can know about miracles. My main purpose in this study is to examine the various viewpoints that have been submitted in relation to these questions, how they have been argued and on what presuppositions these arguments have been based. In conducting the study, the most salient dimension of the various discussions was found to relate to epistemological questions. In this regard, there was a notable confrontation between those scholars who accept miracles and those who are sceptical of them. On the conceptual-ontological side I recognised several different ways of expressing the concept of miracle . I systematised the discussion by demonstrating the philosophical boundaries between these various opinions. The first and main boundary was related to ontological knowledge. On one side of this boundary I placed the views which were based on realism and objectivism. The proponents of this view assumed that miraculousness is a real property of a miraculous event regardless of how we can perceive it. On the other side I put the views which tried to define miraculousness in terms of subjectivity, contextuality and epistemicity. Another essential boundary which shed light on the conceptual-ontological discussion was drawn in relation to two main views of nature. The realistic-particularistic view regards nature as a certain part of reality. The adherents of this presupposition postulate a supernatural sphere alongside nature. Alternatively, the nominalist-universalist view understands nature without this kind of division. Nature is understood as the entire and infinite universe; the whole of reality. Other, less important boundaries which shed light on the conceptual-ontological discussion were noted in relation to views regarding the laws of nature, for example. I recognised that the most important differences between the epistemological approaches were in the different views of justification, rationality, truth and science. The epistemological discussion was divided into two sides, distinguished by their differing assumptions in relation to the need for evidence. Adherents of the first (and noticeably smaller) group did not see any epistemological need to reach a universal and common opinion about miracles. I discovered that these kinds of views, which I called non-objectivist, had subjectivist and so-called collectivist views of justification and a contextualist view of rationality. The second (and larger) group was mainly interested in discerning the grounds upon which to establish an objective and conclusive common view in relation to the epistemology of miracles. I called this kind of discussion an objectivist discussion and this kind of approach an evidentialist approach. Most of the evidentialists tried to defend miracles and the others attempted to offer evidence against miracles. Amongst both sides, there were many different variations according to emphasis and assumption over how they saw the possibilities to prove their own view. The common characteristic in all forms of evidentialism was a commitment to an objectivist notion of rationality and a universalistic notion of justification. Most evidentialists put their confidence in science in one way or another. Only a couple of philosophers represented the most moderate version of evidentialism; they tried to remove themselves from the apparent controversy and contextualised the different opinions in order to make some critical comments on them. I called this kind of approach a contextualising form of evidentialism. In the final part of the epistemological chapter, I examined the discussion about the evidential value of miracles, but nothing substantially new was discovered concerning the epistemological views of the authors.

Nuorisokodista maailmalle : Kokemuksia nuorisokodissa elämisestä ja aikuisiässä selviytymisestä

This thesis studies the experiences of women who have lived in a youth home as girls. There are two main themes: 1) experiences of living in a youth home, and 2) experiences of coping as an adult. Data on the first theme is purely subjective; it derives from personal, recalled experiences. Data on the second theme is partly based on experiences and partly on facts about the current life situation of the research participants. A third theme of the thesis is concerned with the question of how the research participants’ placement in a youth home influenced their later life. The thesis contributes valuable knowledge concerning the experiences of young people who have been raised in substitute care, a topic that is rare in the literature. The empirical data of the study consists of responses to an initial inquiry and subsequent interviews. The inquiry was sent to 116 former inhabitants of a youth home. 62 altogether returned the inquiry, and 34 participated in the interview. The purpose of the inquiry was to produce an overview of the life situations of the research participants and to invite them to participate in the interview. In addition, the inquiry sought to produce an overview of how the participants enjoyed living in a youth home and how they saw its significance in terms of their later lives. The interviews concentrated on the research participants’ experiences concerning the processes of getting into a youth home, living there, and coping independently in life afterwards. The most central result relating to the first main theme was that the experiences were both shared and non-shared. Living in a youth home was characterized by six general sentiments: “wonderful, real home”, “new world!”, “safe haven”, “place to live”, “penal institution”, and “nightmare”. These sentiments seemed to be related first and foremost to whether one’s own, individual needs and expectations had been met in the youth home. The strongest and most common needs, as experienced, were the needs for safety, belongingness and respect. On the basis of the experiences, meeting these needs can be considered as the most important task of a youth home. The results relating to the second main theme of the study were examined in two different ways. Comparisons with the general female population (education, situation in working life and financial circumstances) showed that research participants had coped less well. Differences were also found to exist in family structures: nuclear families and single mother families were more unusual among research participants, and stepfamilies more common, than in the general population. More of the participants’ children than of the general population’s lived with somebody other than their parent. However, the experience of coping well was common among research participants, although the beginning of independent living had been generally experienced as difficult: feelings of loneliness, insecurity and restlessness were dominant. Later, a sense of life control developed and strengthened through joining with others (family, work, friends), through accepting one’s own life history and through creating one’s own model of living. As the most significant explanation of their coping, the research participants identified their own (innate) strength and will to cope. The majority of the research participants felt that the youth home had a positive influence on their later lives. Positive influences can be grouped in three “levels”: I) getting out of the home, II) having good experiences and learning useful things, and III) the essential effect on one’s own way of thinking and living. The second level’s influence includes strengthened self-esteem, increased social understanding and new knowledge and skills. Some research participants did not think the youth home had any significance in terms of their later lives, and some thought it had negative significance.