A modell of socially optimal hydro reservoir usage - yelding socially optimal outcomes in nordic electricity markets

An extensive electricity transmission network facilitates electricity trading between Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark. Currently most of the area's power generation is traded at NordPool, where the trading volumes have steadily increased since the early 1990's, when the exchange was founded. The Nordic electricity is expected to follow the current trend and further integrate with the other European electricity markets. Hydro power is the source for roughly a half of the supply in the Nordic electricity market and most of the hydro is generated in Norway. The dominating role of hydro power distinguishes the Nordic electricity market from most of the other market places. Production of hydro power varies mainly due to hydro reservoirs and demand for electricity. Hydro reservoirs are affected by water inflows that differ each year. The hydro reservoirs explain remarkably the behaviour of the Nordic electricity markets. Therefore among others, Kauppi and Liski (2008) have developed a model that analyzes the behaviour of the markets using hydro reservoirs as explanatory factors. Their model includes, for example, welfare loss due to socially suboptimal hydro reservoir usage, socially optimal electricity price, hydro reservoir storage and thermal reservoir storage; that are referred as outcomes. However, the model does not explain the real market condition but rather an ideal situation. In the model the market is controlled by one agent, i.e. one agent controls all the power generation reserves; it is referred to as a socially optimal strategy. Article by Kauppi and Liski (2008) includes an assumption where an individual agent has a certain fraction of market power, e.g. 20 % or 30 %. In order to maintain the focus of this thesis, this part of their paper is omitted. The goal of this thesis is two-fold. Firstly we expand the results from the socially optimal strategy for years 2006-08, as the earlier study finishes in 2005. The second objective is to improve on the methods from the previous study. This thesis results several outcomes (SPOT-price and welfare loss, etc.) due to socially optimal actions. Welfare loss is interesting as it describes the inefficiency of the market. SPOT-price is an important output for the market participants as it often has an effect on end users' electricity bills. Another function is to modify and try to improve the model by means of using more accurate input data, e.g. by considering pollution trade rights effect on input data. After modifications to the model, new welfare losses are calculated and compared with the same results before the modifications. The hydro reservoir has the higher explanatory significance in the model followed by thermal power. In Nordic markets, thermal power reserves are mostly nuclear power and other thermal sources (coal, natural gas, oil, peat). It can be argued that hydro and thermal reservoirs determine electricity supply. Roughly speaking, the model takes into account electricity demand and supply, and several parameters related to them (water inflow, oil price, etc.), yielding finally the socially optimal outcomes. The author of this thesis is not aware of any similar model being tested before. There have been some other studies that are close to the Kauppi and Liski (2008) model, but those have a somewhat different focus. For example, a specific feature in the model is the focus on long-run capacity usage that differs from the previous studies on short-run market power. The closest study to the model is from California's wholesale electricity markets that, however, uses different methodology. Work is constructed as follows.

The Impact of Emissions Trading on the Price of Electricity in Nord Pool : Market Power and Price Determination in the Nordic Electricity Market

The objective of this thesis is to find out how dominant firms in a liberalised electricity market will react when they face an increase in the level of costs due to emissions trading, and how this will effect the price of electricity. The Nordic electricity market is chosen as the setting in which to examine the question, since recent studies on the subject suggest that interaction between electricity markets and emissions trading is very much dependent on conditions specific to each market area. There is reason to believe that imperfect competition prevails in the Nordic market, thus the issue is approached through the theory of oligopolistic competition. The generation capacity available at the market, marginal cost of electricity production and seasonal levels of demand form the data based on which the dominant firms are modelled using the Cournot model of competition. The calculations are made for two levels of demand, high and low, and with several values of demand elasticity. The producers are first modelled under no carbon costs and then by adding the cost of carbon dioxide at 20€/t to those technologies subject to carbon regulation. In all cases the situation under perfect competition is determined as a comparison point for the results of the Cournot game. The results imply that the potential for market power does exist on the Nordic market, but the possibility for exercising market power depends on the demand level. In season of high demand the dominant firms may raise the price significantly above competitive levels, and the situation is aggravated when the cost of carbon dioixide is accounted for. Under low demand leves there is no difference between perfect and imperfect competition. The results are highly dependent on the price elasticity of demand.