Disabled Revolutionary War Veterans and the Construction of Disability in the Early United States, c. 1776-1840

This thesis addresses the following broad research question: what did it mean to be a disabled Revolutionary War veteran in the early United States during the period from 1776 to roughly 1840? The study approaches the question from two angles: a state-centred one and an experiential one. In both cases, the theoretical framework employed comes from disability studies. Consequently, disability is regarded as a sociocultural phenomenon rather than a medical condition. The state-centred dimension of the study explores the meaning of disability and disabled veterans to the early American state through an examination of the major military pension laws of the period. An analysis of this legislation, particularly the invalid pension acts of 1793 and 1806, indicates that the early United States represents a key period in the development of the modern disability category. The experiential approach, in contrast, shifts the focus of attention away from the state towards the lived experiences of disabled veterans. It seeks to address the issue of whether or not the disabilities of disabled veterans had any significant material impact on their everyday lives. It does this through a comparison of the situation of 153 disabled veterans with that of an equivalent number of nondisabled veterans. The former group received invalid pensions while the latter did not. In comparing the material conditions of disabled and nondisabled veterans, a wide range of primary sources from military records to memoirs and letters are used. The most important sources in this regard are the pension application papers submitted by veterans in the early nineteenth century. These provide us with a unique insight into the everyday lives of veterans. Looking at the issue of experience through the window of the pension files reveals that there was not much difference in the broad contours of disabled and nondisabled veteran life. This finding has implications for the theorisation of disability that are highlighted and discussed in the thesis. The main themes covered in this study are: the wartime experiences of injured American soldiers, the military pension establishment of the early United States and the legal construction of disability, and the post-war working and family lives of disabled veterans. Keywords: disability, early America, veterans, military pensions, disabled people, Revolutionary War, United States, disability theory.

Non-reductive Physicalism, Irreducibility of the Mental and the Problem of Mental Causation : A study of Donald Davidson's and Georg Henrik von Wright's positions in the philosophy of mind

In this study I consider what kind of perspective on the mind body problem is taken and can be taken by a philosophical position called non-reductive physicalism. Many positions fall under this label. The form of non-reductive physicalism which I discuss is in essential respects the position taken by Donald Davidson (1917-2003) and Georg Henrik von Wright (1916-2003). I defend their positions and discuss the unrecognized similarities between their views. Non-reductive physicalism combines two theses: (a) Everything that exists is physical; (b) Mental phenomena cannot be reduced to the states of the brain. This means that according to non-reductive physicalism the mental aspect of humans (be it a soul, mind, or spirit) is an irreducible part of the human condition. Also Davidson and von Wright claim that, in some important sense, the mental aspect of a human being does not reduce to the physical aspect, that there is a gap between these aspects that cannot be closed. I claim that their arguments for this conclusion are convincing. I also argue that whereas von Wright and Davidson give interesting arguments for the irreducibility of the mental, their physicalism is unwarranted. These philosophers do not give good reasons for believing that reality is thoroughly physical. Notwithstanding the materialistic consensus in the contemporary philosophy of mind the ontology of mind is still an uncharted territory where real breakthroughs are not to be expected until a radically new ontological position is developed. The third main claim of this work is that the problem of mental causation cannot be solved from the Davidsonian - von Wrightian perspective. The problem of mental causation is the problem of how mental phenomena like beliefs can cause physical movements of the body. As I see it, the essential point of non-reductive physicalism - the irreducibility of the mental - and the problem of mental causation are closely related. If mental phenomena do not reduce to causally effective states of the brain, then what justifies the belief that mental phenomena have causal powers? If mental causes do not reduce to physical causes, then how to tell when - or whether - the mental causes in terms of which human actions are explained are actually effective? I argue that this - how to decide when mental causes really are effective - is the real problem of mental causation. The motivation to explore and defend a non-reductive position stems from the belief that reductive physicalism leads to serious ethical problems. My claim is that Davidson's and von Wright's ultimate reason to defend a non-reductive view comes back to their belief that a reductive understanding of human nature would be a narrow and possibly harmful perspective. The final conclusion of my thesis is that von Wright's and Davidson's positions provide a starting point from which the current scientistic philosophy of mind can be critically further explored in the future.

Kysymys esineellisyydestä : Georg Lukácsin esineellistymisteoria ja Martin Heideggerin fundamentaaliontologia

Käsilläolevan tutkielman aiheena on esineellistymisen käsite. Sitä tarkastellaan yhtäältä sellaisena kuten se esitetään Georg Lukácsin (1885-1971) teoksessa Historia ja luokkatietoisuus (1923), toisaalta kuten sitä koskeva teoria on luettavissa esiin Martin Heideggerin (1889-1976) läpimurtoteoksesta Oleminen ja aika (1927). Molemmat ajattelijat pyrkivät teoksissaan rakentamaan kokonaisvaltaista tulkintaa länsimaisen ajattelun ja toiminnan taipumuksesta tulkita todellisuus esineellisenä (dinglich), so. eletystä elämästä ja toiminnasta irrallisena olioiden (Dinge) maailmana. Sekä Lukács että Heidegger pyrkivät osoittamaan, että esineellistyneen todellisuuden ontologisena perustana toimii inhimillisen praktisen toiminnan kenttä, josta käsin esineellistävät ja objektivoivat suhtautumistavat todellisuuteen voivat vasta jälkikäteisesti syntyä. Molemmille ajattelijoille esineellisyyden muodostuminen ontologiaa hallitsevaksi tulkinnaksi todellisuuden luonteesta edellyttää myös tietynlaisia sosiaalisen olemisen rakenteita. Tutkielmassa tehdään vertailevaa käsiteanalyysia Lukácsin ja Heideggerin teoreettisten diskurssien välillä. Tavoitteena on rakentaa mahdollisuutta lukea mainittuja filosofeja saman, modernille olemassaololle keskeisen ontologisen sekä eksistentiaalisen ongelman tarkastelijoina. Toisaalta vertaileva lähestymistapa pyrkii myös tuomaan esiin olennaisia ja perustavia eroja Lukácsin marxilaisen ja Heideggerin fundamentaaliontologisen orientaation välillä. Tutkielmassa pyritäänkin osoittamaan, että Heideggerin fundamentaaliontologia ei tarkastele kauppatavaran rakennetta eikä sosiaalisen vaihdon prosesseja marxilaisesta näkökulmasta riittävällä tavalla, kun taas Lukácsin teoreettinen projekti tulee edellyttäneeksi tuottavaan subjektiviteettiin pohjautuvan ontologisen perusasenteen. Tämä ontologinen positio voidaan puolestaan kritisoida hedelmällisesti heideggerilaisesta näkökulmasta. Viime kädessä tutkielma pyrkii avaamaan esineellistymisteorioiden vertailun kautta kysymyksen länsimarxilaisen materialistisen dialektiikan ja Heideggerin fenomenologisen ontologian välisestä suhteesta.