Conrad Summenhart's theory of individual rights and its medieval background

This study focuses on the theory of individual rights that the German theologian Conrad Summenhart (1455-1502) explicated in his massive work Opus septipartitum de contractibus pro foro conscientiae et theologico. The central question to be studied is: How does Summenhart understand the concept of an individual right and its immediate implications? The basic premiss of this study is that in Opus septipartitum Summenhart composed a comprehensive theory of individual rights as a contribution to the on-going medieval discourse on rights. With this rationale, the first part of the study concentrates on earlier discussions on rights as the background for Summenhart s theory. Special attention is paid to language in which right was defined in terms of power . In the fourteenth century writers like Hervaeus Natalis and William Ockham maintained that right signifies power by which the right-holder can to use material things licitly. It will also be shown how the attempts to describe what is meant by the term right became more specified and cultivated. Gerson followed the implications that the term power had in natural philosophy and attributed rights to animals and other creatures. To secure right as a normative concept, Gerson utilized the ancient ius suum cuique-principle of justice and introduced a definition in which right was seen as derived from justice. The latter part of this study makes effort to reconstructing Summenhart s theory of individual rights in three sections. The first section clarifies Summenhart s discussion of the right of the individual or the concept of an individual right. Summenhart specified Gerson s description of right as power, taking further use of the language of natural philosophy. In this respect, Summenhart s theory managed to bring an end to a particular continuity of thought that was centered upon a view in which right was understood to signify power to licit action. Perhaps the most significant feature of Summenhart s discussion was the way he explicated the implication of liberty that was present in Gerson s language of rights. Summenhart assimilated libertas with the self-mastery or dominion that in the economic context of discussion took the form of (a moderate) self-ownership. Summenhart discussion also introduced two apparent extensions to Gerson s terminology. First, Summenhart classified right as relation, and second, he equated right with dominion. It is distinctive of Summenhart s view that he took action as the primary determinant of right: Everyone has as much rights or dominion in regard to a thing, as much actions it is licit for him to exercise in regard to the thing. The second section elaborates Summenhart s discussion of the species dominion, which delivered an answer to the question of what kind of rights exist, and clarified thereby the implications of the concept of an individual right. The central feature in Summenhart s discussion was his conscious effort to systematize Gerson s language by combining classifications of dominion into a coherent whole. In this respect, his treatement of the natural dominion is emblematic. Summenhart constructed the concept of natural dominion by making use of the concepts of foundation (founded on a natural gift) and law (according to the natural law). In defining natural dominion as dominion founded on a natural gift, Summenhart attributed natural dominion to animals and even to heavenly bodies. In discussing man s natural dominion, Summenhart pointed out that the natural dominion is not sufficiently identified by its foundation, but requires further specification, which Summenhart finds in the idea that natural dominion is appropriate to the subject according to the natural law. This characterization lead him to treat God s dominion as natural dominion. Partly, this was due to Summenhart s specific understanding of the natural law, which made reasonableness as the primary criterion for the natural dominion at the expense of any metaphysical considerations. The third section clarifies Summenhart s discussion of the property rights defined by the positive human law. By delivering an account on juridical property rights Summenhart connected his philosophical and theological theory on rights to the juridical language of his times, and demonstrated that his own language of rights was compatible with current juridical terminology. Summenhart prepared his discussion of property rights with an account of the justification for private property, which gave private property a direct and strong natural law-based justification. Summenhart s discussion of the four property rights usus, usufructus, proprietas, and possession aimed at delivering a detailed report of the usage of these concepts in juridical discourse. His discussion was characterized by extensive use of the juridical source texts, which was more direct and verbal the more his discussion became entangled with the details of juridical doctrine. At the same time he promoted his own language on rights, especially by applying the idea of right as relation. He also showed recognizable effort towards systematizing juridical language related to property rights.

Avioliiton teologia Englannin kirkossa ja Suomen evankelis-luterilaisessa kirkossa vuosina 1963-2006

The theology of marriage in the Church of England(CofE) and in the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland(ELCF)1963–2006 The method of the study is a systematic analysis of the sources. In the CofE marriage stems from creation, but it is also sacramental, grounded in the theology of love and redemption. Man and woman have a connection between them that is a mystical union in character because of the one between Christ and the Church; therefore every marriage is sacramental. The purposes of marriage have been expressed in a different order than earlier. A caring relationship and sexuality are set before childbirth as the causes of marriage. The remedial cause of marriage is also moved to the background and it cannot be found in the recent wedding formulas. A personal relationship and marriage as a school of faith and love have a central place in the theology of marriage. The theology of love unites the love of God and marriage. In the CofE the understanding of divorce and co-habiting has changed, too. Co-habiting can now be understood as a stage towards marriage. Divorce has been understood as a phenomenon that must be taken as a fact after an irretrievable breakdown of marriage. Thus the church must concentrate on pastoral care after divorce. Similarly, the ELCF also maintains that the order of creation is the origin of marriage as a lifelong institution. This is also an argument for the solemnization of marriage in the church. Faith and grace are not needed for real marriage because marriage is the culmination of reason and natural law. The society defines marriage and the church gives its blessing to the married couples if so requested. Luther’s view of marriage is different from this because he saw marriage as a school of love and faith, similar to CofE. He saw faith as essential to enable the fullfillment of natural law. Marriage in the ELCF is mostly a matter of natural ethics. An ideal form of life is sought through the Golden Rule. This interpretation of marriage means that it does not presuppose Christian education for children to follow. The doctrine of the two kingdoms is definitely essential as background. It has been impugned by scholars, however, as a permanent foundation of marriage. There is a difference between the marriage formulas and the other sources concerning the purposes of marriage in the ELCF. The formulas do not include sexuality, childbirth or children and their education as purposes of marriage. The formulas include less theological vocabulary than in the CofE. The liturgy indicates the doctrine in CofE. In the Lutheran churches there is not any need to express the doctrine in the wedding formulas. This has resulted in less theology of marriage in the formulas. The theology of Luther is no longer any ruling principle in the theology of marriage. The process of continuing change in society refines the terms for marriage more than the theological arguments do.