Trust and Collectives

"Trust and Collectives" is a compilation of articles: (I) "On Rational Trust" (in Meggle, G. (ed.) Social Facts & Collective Intentionality, Dr. Hänsel-Hohenhausen AG (currently Ontos), 2002), (II) "Simulating Rational Social Normative Trust, Predictive Trust, and Predictive Reliance Between Agents" (M.Tuomela and S. Hofmann, Ethics and Information Technology 5, 2003), (III) "A Collective's Trust in a Collective's action" (Protosociology, 18-19, 2003), and (IV) "Cooperation and Trust in Group Contexts" (R. Tuomela and M.Tuomela, Mind and Society 4/1, 2005 ). The articles are tied together by an introduction that dwells deeply on the topic of trust. (I) presents a somewhat general version of (RSNTR) and some basic arguments. (II) offers an application of (RSNTR) for a computer simulation of trust.(III) applies (RSNTR) to Raimo Tuomela's "we-mode"collectives (i.e. The Philosophy of Social Practices, Cambridge University Press, 2002). (IV) analyzes cooperation and trust in the context of acting as a member of a collective. Thus, (IV) elaborates on the topic of collective agency in (III) and puts the trust account (RSNTR) to work in a framework of cooperation. The central aim of this work is to construct a well-argued conceptual and theoretical account of rational trust, viz. a person's subjectively rational trust in another person vis-à-vis his performance of an action, seen from a first-person point of view. The main method is conceptual and theoretical analysis understood along the lines of reflective equilibrium. The account of rational social normative trust (RSNTR), which is argued and defended against other views, is the result of the quest. The introduction stands on its own legs as an argued presentation of an analysis of the concept of rational trust and an analysis of trust itself (RSNTR). It is claimed that (RSNTR) is "genuine" trust and embedded in a relationship of mutual respect for the rights of the other party. This relationship is the growing site for trust, a causal and conceptual ground, but it is not taken as a reason for trusting (viz. predictive "trust"). Relevant themes such as risk, decision, rationality, control, and cooperation are discussed and the topics of the articles are briefly presented. In this work it is argued that genuine trust is to be kept apart from predictive "trust." When we trust a person vis-à-vis his future action that concerns ourselves on the basis of his personal traits and/or features of the specific situation we have a prediction-like attitude. Genuine trust develops in a relationship of mutual respect for the mutual rights of the other party. Such a relationship is formed through interaction where the parties gradually find harmony concerning "the rules of the game." The trust account stands as a contribution to philosophical research on central social notions and it could be used as a theoretical model in social psychology, economical and political science where interaction between persons and groups are in focus. The analysis could also serve as a model for a trust component in computer simulation of human action. In the context of everyday life the account clarifies the difference between predictive "trust" and genuine trust. There are no fast shortcuts to trust. Experiences of mutual respect for mutual rights cannot be had unless there is respect.

Individuals' Responsibility in Corporations

I discuss role responsibly, individual responsibility and collective responsibility in corporate multinational setting. My case study is about minerals used in electronics that come from the Democratic Republic of Congo. What I try to show throughout the thesis is how many things need to be taken into consideration when we discuss the responsibility of individuals in corporations. No easy and simple answers are available. Instead, we must keep in mind the complexity of the situation at all times, judging cases on individual basis, emphasizing the importance of individual judgement and virtue, as well as the responsibility we all share as members of groups and the wider society. I begin by discussing the demands that are placed on us as employees. There is always a potential for a conflict between our different roles and also the wider demands placed on us. Role demands are usually much more specific than the wider question of how we should act as human beings. The terminology of roles can also be misleading as it can create illusions about our work selves being somehow radically separated from our everyday, true selves. The nature of collective decision-making and its implications for responsibility is important too. When discussing the moral responsibility of an employee in a corporate setting, one must take into account arguments from individual and collective responsibility, as well as role ethics. Individual responsibility is not a separate or competing notion from that of collective responsibility. Rather, the two are interlinked. Individuals' responsibilities in collective settings combine both individual responsibility and collective responsibility (which is different from aggregate individual responsibility). In the majority of cases, both will apply in various degrees. Some members might have individual responsibility in addition to the collective responsibility, while others just the collective responsibility. There are also times when no-one bears individual moral responsibility but the members are still responsible for the collective part. My intuition is that collective moral responsibility is strongly linked to the way the collective setting affects individual judgements and moulds the decisions, and how the individuals use the collective setting to further their own ends. Individuals remain the moral agents but responsibility is collective if the actions in question are collective in character. I also explore the impacts of bureaucratic ethic and its influence on the individual. Bureaucracies can compartmentalize work to such a degree that individual human action is reduced to mere behaviour. Responsibility is diffused and the people working in the bureaucracy can come to view their actions to be outside the normal human realm where they would be responsible for what they do. Language games and rules, anonymity, internal power struggles, and the fragmentation of information are just some of the reasons responsibility and morality can get blurry in big institutional settings. Throughout the thesis I defend the following theses: ● People act differently depending on their roles. This is necessary for our society to function, but the more specific role demands should always be kept in check by the wider requirements of being a good human being. ● Acts in corporations (and other large collectives) are not reducible to individual actions, and cannot be explained fully by the behaviour of individual employees. ● Individuals are responsible for the actions that they undertake in the collective as role occupiers and are very rarely off the hook. Hiding behind role demands is usually only an excuse and shows a lack of virtue. ● Individuals in roles can be responsible even when the collective is not. This depends on if the act they performed was corporate in nature or not. ● Bureaucratic structure affects individual thinking and is not always a healthy environment to work in. ● Individual members can share responsibility with the collective and our share of the collective responsibility is strongly linked to our relations. ● Corporations and other collectives can be responsible for harm even when no individual is at fault. The structure and the policies of the collective are crucial. ● Socialization plays an important role in our morality at both work and outside it. We are all responsible for the kind of moral context we create. ● When accepting a role or a position in a collective, we are attaching ourselves with the values of that collective. ● Ethical theories should put more emphasis on good judgement and decision-making instead of vague generalisations. My conclusion is that the individual person is always in the centre when it comes to responsibility, and not so easily off the hook as we sometimes think. What we do, and especially who we choose to associate ourselves with, does matter and we should be more careful when we choose who we work for. Individuals within corporations are responsible for choosing that the corporation they associate with is one that they can ascribe to morally, if not fully, then at least for the most part. Individuals are also inclusively responsible to a varying degree for the collective activities they contribute to, even in overdetermined contexts. We all are responsible for the kind of corporations we choose to support through our actions as consumers, investors and citizens.